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This dissertation investigates various issues in development economics and public eco-
nomics. The three chapters cover topics concerning the behavior modes of agents in gov-
ernment, family and community, and attempt to uncover the hidden mechanisms which
improve or impede economic efficiency and development.
Although the dissertation covers various topics, the underlying motivation of all these
studies is to explore the behavior mode of agents under uncertainty in different circum-
stances. In Chapter 1, we show that, due to uncertainty of government performance,
politicians are able to manipulate their public image by misallocating public resources.
The uncertainty of human capital investment, as shown in Chapter 2, can change the fer-
tility decisions of households. Moreover, without an effective insurance market, people in
developing countries have to manage uncertainties of income and consumption by forming
risk sharing groups. In Chapter 3, I demonstrate that gift exchange can facilitate risk
sharing among households. The three chapters all consist of theoretical analysis and em-
pirical studies. Depending on topics, I employ data from the United States, Africa and
rural China to conduct empirical studies.
The first chapter considers the “dark” side of fiscal decentralization. We demonstrate in
a yardstick competition model, that when fiscal expenditure is decentralized, more public
resources might be misallocated between visible public goods and invisible ones. The second
chapter investigates the role that income plays in explaining the (heterogeneous) fertility
responses to adult mortality risks. Our analysis helps to reconcile the conflicting empirical
evidence regarding the impact of HIV/AIDS on fertility found in previous literature. The
third chapter considers a mechanism that facilitates risk sharing when effective contract
enforcement is lacking. The “emotional collateral” between friends may help regulate the
limited commitment problem. I show that the mechanism can work effectively if gift
expenses serve as signals that separate friends, who have “emotional collateral”, from non-
friends.
The first chapter, written jointly with Wendun Wang, was motivated by the finding
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that the poverty rate can increase as fiscal expenditure is decentralized. To interpret this
puzzling pattern, we introduce the concept “dress-up contest” to a yardstick competition
model. A “dress-up contest” is a competition for the best public image, and fiscal decentral-
ization can lead to such a contest between the political leaders of each local government. In
previous literature, yardstick competition can improve government efficiency by regulating
politicians’ moral hazard problem (Besley and Coate (1995)). However, in the chapter we
show that, when taking visibility of public goods into account, yardstick competition (due
to fiscal decentralization) will force local governments to allocate more resources to more
visible public goods (such as cash assistance) than to less visible goods (such as vendor
payments). The resulting distortion of resource allocation causes a structural bias in public
expenditure and hurts social welfare.
To empirically verify our theoretical model, we employ U.S. state-level data from 1992
to 2008, and we estimate the panel data model using various econometric approaches. The
empirical results provide strong evidence that fiscal decentralization can lead to distortion
in public expenditure arising from dress-up contests. We also find that this distortion
increases the poverty rate on the regional level.
The second chapter is jointly written with Yang Zhou and Erwin Bulte. By proposing a
portfolio choice model based on a “quantity-quality tradeoff”, we explore fertility decisions
by taking into account the risk of human capital investment. Our theory highlights the
detrimental effect of adult mortality risks on human capital investment, and predicts het-
erogeneous impacts on fertility choice across income groups. Suppose that rich people are
less risk-averse than the poor, and that adult mortality risk increases. Then, rich families
may expand their family size and lower their human capital investment on each child, to
guarantee their return from children in the future. Conversely, poor families would reduce
their family size, since risky investments in children become unaffordable.
As an implication, our model suggests that adult mortality risks have destructive im-
pacts on economic growth, particularly in the context of developing countries, due to the
uncertainty of returns to human capital investments. Unlike Voth (2013) and Young (2005),
which emphasize that adult mortality risks (e.g. black death or HIV/AIDS) may increase
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returns to human capital investments by reducing labor supply. In this paper, we highlight
its detrimental effect on human capital accumulation. Due to the increased uncertainty,
parents are reluctant to invest in their children. This destruction of human capital may
particularly drag some relatively rich countries back to a “Malthusian regime” from a “Post
Malthusian regime” (cf. “Unified growth theory” in Weil and Galor (1999)).
We take our theory to (African) data. By using the case of HIV/AIDS epidemics, we
find empirical evidence to support heterogeneous responses to adult mortality shocks over
income groups. Furthermore, we find that human capital investment is decreasing in all
the countries, particularly in rich ones, because rich people prefer to lower investments
per child in response to the increased adult mortality risks. Our empirical study provides
support to our “portfolio” theory of fertility, and also helps reconcile conflicting empirical
evidence regarding the effect of HIV/AIDS on fertility in previous research.
In Chapter 3, I analyze gift giving behavior in developing regions. In regions such as
rural China, the Philippines and some African countries, people spend a large amount of
money on gifts. The share of gift expenses over income is on average more than 10%,
even though living standards are only on the edge of subsistence. As a result, individuals
may even have to borrow money or sell blood to be able to give gifts (Chen and Zhang
(2009)). In this chapter, I study the causes and consequences of gift behavior through both
theoretical and empirical approaches.
The chapter studies how gift exchange helps to overcome the limited commitment
problem in risk sharing. Due to emotional connection, friends will endure more from
emotional or moral cost if they default to one another. As a consequence, friends are more
trustworthy and less likely to default in risk sharing. Thus people rely on friends in risk
sharing, but friendship is not perfectly identifiable in reality. Gift expenses, however, can
serve as a signal of friendship. Due to altruism, giving a gift is less costly for a friend
than for a non-friend. As a signal, gift exchange improves the efficiency of risk sharing by
identifying friendship. I also demonstrate that the welfare gains due to this improvement
may be offset by increased inequality. The model helps to rationalize the high gift expenses
in China and other developing countries.
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By using a unique data set containing detailed records about gift exchange in rural
China, I find empirical evidence to support the association between gift expenses and risk
sharing. When facing consumption shocks, people who spend more on gifts can more easily
obtain loans and help. By testing more model predictions, I provide additional evidence
which helps to identify the model from competing models.
In all three chapters, I conduct both theoretical and empirical research. Although
the topics are not closely connected, the three chapters all aim to uncover the hidden
determinants of economic efficiency and development, and to inform policies in these areas.
Authorship and contributions
The first chapter is written jointly with Wendung Wang and is completed under the
supervision of Prof. Jan Magnus and Prof. Erwin Bulte.
The second chapter is written jointly with Yang Zhou and Erwin Bulte.
The third chapter, as my job market paper, is completed under the supervision of Prof.
Erwin Bulte and Prof. Xiaobo Zhang.
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2 Dress-up Contests: A Dark Side of Fiscal Decentral-
ization1
Abstract: A “dress-up contest” is a yardstick competition of politicians for the best public
images, and fiscal decentralization can lead to such contests. In this paper we model the
dress-up contest (due to fiscal decentralization) and investigate how it affects social welfare.
We show that as public expenditure is being decentralized, local politicians will allocate
more resources to more visible public goods than less visible goods under pressure of dress-
up contest. The resulting distortion of resource allocation causes a structural bias of public
expenditure and further hurts social welfare. To empirically verify our theoretical model,
we employ state-level data of welfare expenditure in the United States from 1992 to 2008,
and estimate the panel data model using various econometric approaches. The empirical
results provide strong evidence that fiscal decentralization can lead to distortion in public
expenditure arising from dress-up contests. We also find that this distortion increases the
regional poverty rate.
JEL classification: D72, H75, H77
Key words: Fiscal decentralization; Yardstick competition; Dress-up contest; Functional
coefficient model
1The paper is jointly written with Wendun Wang, we are grateful to seminar participants in Tilburg
University, the V Workshop on Fiscal Federalism in Barcelona, and Asian Meeting of the Econometric
Society (AMES) in Singapore; to Erwin Bulte, Federico Revelli, Stephen Calabrese, Daniel Wilson, Rafael
Parchet, Albert Solé Ollé, Reyer Gerlagh for useful comments. Remaining errors are our own.
5
2.1 Introduction
During the last three decades, fiscal decentralization and local-government reform have
been at the center-stage of policy experiments. This has occurred not only in countries
with a traditional tendency to decentralize, such as the United States, but also in a large
number of developing and transition economies, such as Africa, Asia, and Latin America
(The World Bank (1999)). Fiscal decentralization, which moves the responsibility for
decision-making in public expenditure from central to local governments, is widely believed
to be an effective tool for improving the efficiency of public expenditure. One of the major
mechanism, well documented in the literature, is yardstick competition. The hypothesis of
yardstick competition suggests that, “if citizens of a jurisdiction use information about the
policies implemented in other jurisdictions to gauge and evaluate the performance of their
own government, that process will increase electoral competition at home and thus incite
the governing politicians to act in their benefit more than they would otherwise” (Kenyon,
Kincaid, and on Intergovernmental Relations (1991)). Since the comparison is made more
easily among local governments than central ones, yardstick competition is accordingly
intenser among local-level politicians. As a result, the efficiency of public expenditure will
be enhanced as it is being decentralized (see Besley and Coate (1995)).
However, as Sobel (1999) points out, yardstick competition does not necessarily improve
efficiency of public expenditure but rather provide mis-incentive to agents. In this paper,
we explore a negative effect of yardstick competition. When voters evaluate a politician’s
capacity, some projects may provide more accurate information than the others. Under
the pressure of yardstick competition, politician will have incentive to distort the structure
of public expenditure, and spend more on these more “visible” projects. As a result, fiscal
decentralization does not necessarily improve social welfare, since the structure of public
expenditure will be even biased when it is being decentralized.
The objective of this paper is two-fold. First, we develop a simple model to capture
the politicians’ decisions in a yardstick competition, and show its negative effect on the
allocation of public expenditure. Second, by using a data set of welfare expenditure in
United States from 1992 to 2008, we test the key predictions of our model, and provide
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empirical evidence to the dark side of fiscal decentralization.
The intuition of our model is as follows. Incumbent politicians of local governments
are involved in a yardstick competition, since voters appraise the politicians at home by
comparing them with the peer politicians in similar jurisdictions. Suppose voters can only
infer the capacity of politician based on observed outcomes of public projects, the yardstick
competition is actually about the politicians’ perceived capacities or public images, rather
than the “real” capabilities. This kind of yardstick competition is thus named as “dress-up
contest” in this paper.
Assume public projects are different in terms of “visibility”: a project is defined as
“being less visible if it is harder to assess government competence” (Mani and Mukand
(2007)). For voters, they will trust more on the assessments based on the outcomes of
the more visible projects than those of the less visible ones, since the inferences are more
accurate. For politicians, the more visible projects can make a larger contribution to their
public images than the less visible ones. Therefore, a politician will have an incentive to
allocate more resources to the more visible projects. In terms of building better public
image, it is more cost-effective to spend on the more visible projects. As a result, the
dress-up contest results in a biased structure of public expenditure toward the more visible
projects, and causes a welfare loss of the voters. The impact of fiscal decentralization also
becomes negative. As public expenditure is being decentralized, the structure of public
expenditure will be distorted due to the dress-up contest among politicians of local-level
governments.
We use state-level welfare expenditure data in United States to test two theoretical
predictions of the model. First, we test the effect of fiscal decentralization on the structure
of public expenditure; second, we test whether fiscal decentralization will result in loss of
social welfare by distorting the structure of public expenditure. In United States, welfare
expenditure consists of cash assistance and vendor payments. The former one is relatively
visible since it is directly spent by government and easily observed by citizens. So in this
paper, we propose to use the ratio between the spending on cash assistance and vendor
payments program to measure the share of the spending on visible projects. We find that
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fiscal decentralization causes a flow of public expenditure from the more visible project to
the less visible one, which confirms our theoretical finding that fiscal decentralization can
cause dress-up contests between local governments. Furthermore, the estimation results
suggest that the effect of fiscal decentralization is stronger on the structure of public expen-
diture where yardstick competition is fiercer. This is another evidence of dress-up contests.
To capture how the distorted structure of public expenditure affects poverty, we employ a
functional coefficient method, which allows us to capture the possible nonlinear interaction
between the cash-vendor-payment (CV) ratio, welfare expenditure, and poverty. We find
that the structural distortion can greatly lower the efficiency of welfare expenditure and
increases poverty rate. We thus empirically verify our theoretical findings, and provide
empirical evidence for the negative side of fiscal decentralization.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to argue that fiscal decentralization
can lower efficiency of public expenditure due to yardstick competition for politicians’ pub-
lic images (dress-up contest). Unlike previous literature, fiscal decentralization adversely
affect not by reducing the size of public expenditure, but rather distorting its structure.
The paper also provides empirical evidence to the negative side of fiscal decentralization
and the underlying mechanism. This paper fits into several strands of literature. First,
following Besley and Coate (1995) and Besley and Smart (2007), we study the effect of
yardstick competition on the efficiency of public expenditure, but highlight its negative
side due to difference of visibility across public projects. Second, by using some results
in Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999) and Mani and Mukand (2007), we introduce
visibility of public projects to the analysis on yardstick competition, and reveal a dark side
of fiscal decentralization both theoretically and empirically. Third, this paper is related to
the empirical studies regarding the effect of yardstick competition, such as Revelli (2006),
and our empirical findings highlight the effect of yardstick competition on the structure of
public expenditure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our
theoretical model, and derive key testable implications. Section 3 describe the institutional
background and the data. In Section 4, we outline the empirical strategy and present the
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estimation results. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
2.2.1 Background
Following Mani and Mukand (2007), we capture the behavior of a politician in a career
concern model. Voters will evaluate the capability of a politician and make their voting
decisions based on the observed outcome of the public projects she implemented. So
politician has an incentive to make her public image of ability as high as possible, under
the pressure of yardstick competition.
Assume public projects are different in visibility. The assumption is realistic for two
reasons. First, some public project outcomes are intrinsically harder to directly observe or
measure, for example, the loss of life in a famine might be easy to observe, but it is relatively
hard to observe the occurrence of malnutrition. The second reason for low visibility is the
“complexity” of a public project. Many factors can determine the outcome of a project,
so that it is hard to isolate the politician’s competence, even though the outcome itself
is easily observed. For example, among the welfare programs in United States, most
cash assistance programs, which help the unemployed, elderly or families with dependent
children, are directly implemented by governments, so the outcomes of such programs can
effectively reflect the politicians’ capacities. By contrast, some other welfare programs are
implemented by welfare house, soup kitchen and hospital, the outcomes of these programs
do not only depend on the politicians’ abilities, but also the performance of the contractors.
So voters may feel hard to assess the politician’s capacity based on these projects.
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume there are two projects, project
a and b, which are different in terms of visibility. A politician has to decide to allocate
resources to each project given budget constraint. In what follows, we will model the
yardstick competition in a two-period political game, and demonstrate the dark side of
fiscal decentralization when visibility of public project matters.
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2.2.2 Politicians
Assume there are two jurisdictions, A and B. In a two-period game, the incumbent politi-
cian in each jurisdiction aims to retain office for the entire two periods, so it is crucial
for them to win the election between the first and the second period. While in office she
allocates effort and public expenditures to a set of public projects in the first period, in
order to maximize the probability of winning election.
Specifically, the objective function of incumbent politician in jurisdiction i (politician
i hereafter) is as follows.





where R is the return from winning the election, and ηi is the probability of winning the
local election for the politician i. Since there is no return if she loses the election, the
expected return to win the election is Rηi for politician i. The incumbent’s (opportunity)
cost of offering effort and public expenditures is given by Ci. We assume that the first-
and second-order derivatives of the cost function satisfy Ci(e)′ > 0 and C ′′i (e) > 0. The
public expenditure she can use is given by I, and budget constraint applies.
2.2.3 Voters
Voters are willing to support the (more) capable politician in election, but it is costly to
evaluate the capacities of the politicians. So as stated in Downs (1957), many voters can
only be “rationally ignorant”, and merely do a "referendum on the incumbent management".
In this model, we assume there are two types of voters: well-informed voters and ill-
informed (ignorant) ones. The information cost is assumed to be relatively low for the well-
informed voters, so they will evaluate the capacity of a politician based on the observed
outcome of public projects. By contrast, the voting decision of an ignorant voter will
not be based on inference about capacity, but rather other factors, such as ideology or
10
macroeconomic trends. The behavior is labeled as “retrospective voting”. We assume the
share of well-informed voters is k. If the information cost is lower, the share of well-informed
voters are larger, namely, k is larger.
We now sketch out how a well-informed voter evaluates the capacity of a politician.
Assume the production function of each public goods is given as follows.
zj,i = τi + ej,i + εj,i j ∈ {a, b}, i ∈ {A,B}, (2)
where zj,i is the observed outcome of the public good j provided by politician i, τi





captures the exogenous stochastic factors. Public good a being more visible than
b implies that there is more noise in the outcome of b than in that of a, i.e. σ2a, i < σ2b, i.
Well-informed voters can obtain information regarding the outcome of the public good
z. The politician’s capability τ and public expenditure e are unobserved. However, vot-
ers (with rational expectation) have common knowledge of the prior distribution, τi ∼
N (τ , σ2τ ) for i ∈ {A,B}. Voters can use the observed outcome zi := {za,i, zb,i} and the
rationally expected expenditure ei? := {e?a,i, e?b,i} to update their priors of the politician’s
capability, i.e. from τ to (zj,i−e?j,i) with associated variance σ2j,i. According to Dewatripont,
Jewitt, and Tirole (1999) and Mani and Mukand (2007), the mean posterior assessment of
the politician’s capability can be obtained via










hτ + ha + hb
]
(3)
where hτ = 1/σ2τ and hj = 1/σ2j (j = a, b) are the precision of the prior and two realiza-
tions, respectively. In election, well-informed voters will make their decisions based on the
perceived capacities of the politician. When they assess the capacity of a politician, from
Equation (3), a larger weight is put on the belief updated from the outcome of the more




When voters decide whether to elect the incumbent politician or not, they do not only refer
to the ex-ante estimate of the local challenger’s competence τ , but also the performance of
the incumbent politicians in similar jurisdictions. As stated in Besley and Smart (2007),
incumbents will be partly judged on their relative performance, since such comparison
provides a more accurate estimate of the underlying unobservables. So in a local election,
an incumbent politician will not only face local rivals, but also have to compete with the
peer politicians in similar jurisdictions. In another word, the competition is not a local
competition, but rather a kind of yardstick competition. In what follows, we will capture
the key features of yardstick competition by a simple approach.
Assume the probability of winning election for politician i, ηi, depends on three factors:
the inferred capacity of politician i, Φi; the inferred capacity of a politician in another
jurisdiction, Φ−i and the share of well-informed voter. So the function is featured as
follows,
ηi = ηi (Φi, Φ−i, k) (4)
In this yardstick competition, if the inferred capacity of politician i is high, she will be
preferred by the well-informed voters, and have more chance to win the election. By the
same logic, if the perceived capacities of her peer politicians in other jurisdictions are







So the politician cannot only care about her own perceived capacity Φi, but also the peer
politicians in similar jurisdictions. In fact, this competition is not for the “real” capacities,
but rather the perceived capacities inferred from the outcomes of public projects, in another









The marginal contribution of Φi to probability ηi is diminishing, so the second-order
derivative of the probability function with respect to Φi is negative, and the assumption is
reasonable particularly consider ηi is upper bounded by one. The cross partial derivative
with respect to Φi and Φ−i is assumed to be positive. As a reference point, if Φ−i is small,
it is hard to tell the capacity of politician i is high or low from the comparison between Φi
and Φ−i, so a larger Φi will earn a relatively smaller rise in ηi. As the reference level Φ−i
gets higher, the comparison turns more accurate, and ∂ηi/∂Φi will be accordingly larger.
The share of well-informed voter, k also affects the probability of winning election,
since it decides the degree of dress-up contest. Only well-informed voters can make voting
decision based on inferred capacity of the politician, apparently there will be no dress-up
contest if there is no any well-informed voters. As the share of well-informed voters gets
larger, a politician starts to care about her own perceived capacity, and the comparison with
the peer politicians. The dress-up contest will accordingly get intense, and the probability




2.2.5 Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
In the first period of this political game, a politician will choose ea and eb to maximize the
probability of winning election, given her peer politicians’ strategies and the share of the
well-informed voters. We first look at the strategy of politician A (The case for politician
B is symmetric.). The optimization problem gives the first order condition with respect
to ea,A,
R · ∂ηA (ΦA, ΦB, k)
∂ΦA
· ha
hτ + ha + hb
− C ′A (ea,A, eb, A)− λ = 0 (8)
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where λ is a Lagrangian multiplier. Since we have assumed the budget constraint is
binding, λ must not be equal to zero. On a rational expectation equilibrium, politician A
will spend e?a,A on project a, which is given by
e?a,A = arg maxE (UA) (9)
According to Mani and Mukand (2007), as long as project a and b are substitute, the
politician will spend more on project a, which is more visible than b, so e?a,A > e?b,A. The
intuition is that the voters find the updated information from the outcome of project a is
more reliable, since za is less noisy than zb. Then the politician will have an incentive to
allocate more resources to making a better outcome of project a than project b, so that
the politician can make her perceived capacity (public image) as good as possible.
Moreover, in the yardstick competition, e?a,A will not only depend on the visibility of
project a, i.e. σ2a, but also the expenditure that incumbent politician B allocate to project
a, i.e. e?a,B. Define FA := ∂E(UA)/∂ea,A, then we have
FA = R ·
∂ηA (ΦA, ΦB, k)
∂ΦA
· ha
hτ + ha + hb
− C ′A (ea,A, eb, A)− λ (10)
Since ∂2ηi/∂Φ2i < 0, we have
∂FA
∂ea,A






hτ + ha + hb
)2










hτ + ha + hb
)2
> 0 (12)
since ∂2ηi/∂Φi∂Φ−i > 0. Using the implicit function theorem, therefore, we obtain the follow-















In this yardstick competition, to obtain a better image (perceived capacity), politician
A will spend more on project a if the peer politicians do so in other jurisdictions, even
though too much resources allocated to project a will cause a biased structure of public
expenditure, and result in a loss of social welfare.
2.2.6 Fiscal Decentralization
Yardstick competition is founded on the idea that voters are “rationally ignorant”, since
it is costly for them to acquire information. When the information cost gets lower, more
voters can turn to be well-informed, and use relative performance evaluation to make
voting decisions. That is why yardstick competition in local election is intenser than state-
or even higher level election. Apparently it is easier for voters to observe the outcome of
public projects in their local jurisdiction, rather than state or federal. The comparison of
performance is also easier to make among local governments than higher-level governments,
since they are not only closer, but also more comparable. So in local election, more voters
can be well-informed due to lower information cost. As k gets larger, an intenser yardstick
competition makes local politicians care more about their public image. They will thus
have an incentive to spend more on visible project a, and the structure of local-level public
expenditure will be more biased than state- or higher level. We show the proof as follows.




Since ∂2ηi/∂Φidk > 0,
∂FA
∂k




hτ + ha + hb
> 0 (15)















As a result, fiscal decentralization will cause a biased structure of public expenditure
towards more visible projects. As public income is being decentralized to local level govern-
ments, more resources are involved in an intenser yardstick competition (in local election).
Compared with higher-level politicians, local politicians have more incentive to exploit
every dollar creating a good public image, and a natural strategy will be spending more
money on the more visible projects. As a result, fiscal decentralization makes more pub-
lic expenditure biased in structure. Unlike the results in Besley and Coate (1995), fiscal
decentralization does not necessarily improve the efficiency of public expenditure. It may
cause distortion in the structure of public expenditure and loss of social welfare, when
public projects are different in visibility. This distortion is considered as a dark side of
fiscal decentralization.
2.3 Data and background
Our empirical analysis aims to provide empirical evidence to the model by testing two key
predictions. Based on our model, as public expenditure is being decentralized, its structure
will turn to be biased towards the more visible projects, and result in welfare loss. So first,
we will explore the association between fiscal decentralization and the structure of public
expenditure, and the underlying mechanism. Second, we would like to see whether the
biased structure, which is made by fiscal decentralization, will result in welfare loss.
A difficulty to test the first prediction is to measure visibility of public projects. In
this paper, we employ a data set of state-level welfare expenditure in United States, our
sample covers 48 states excluding Alaska and Hawaii with the time span from 1992 to 2008.
The data are from Statistical Abstracts of the United States and Census of Government
of United States2.
In the real world, it is difficult to find a strictly visible public goods, because the
outcomes of most public goods are either hard to measure or determined by too many
factors. We use this data set to conduct empirical research, since the two main categories
2Data are provided by United States Census Bureau
16
of welfare expenditure, cash assistance and vendor payments, are naturally different in
visibility. Cash assistance paid directly to needy persons under the categorical programs,
such as Old Age Assistance, Aid for Unemployed and Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF). The program directly increases citizens’ disposable income and reduces
poverty, so its outcome, i.e. poverty reduction, can be observed in the short term. The
outcome also primarily depends on the government’s expenditure on this service, it can
thus effectively reflect the efficiency and capacity of government.
In contrast, vendor payments made directly to private purveyors for medical care,
burials, and other commodities and services provided under welfare programs; its provision
and operation are mainly by welfare institutions, such as hospitals (old-age assistance, aid
to dependent children and to the blind), welfare houses or soup kitchens. The outcome
of these payments depends on a large number of factors beyond the government’s control,
such as the performance of other institutes, and it may not be obvious in the short term.
Compared to cash assistance program, people is harder to infer capacity of government
from vendor payments program, the voters may even not know whether or how the welfare
institutions is funded by government. Therefore, it is reasonable to regard cash assistance
as more visible and vendor payments as less visible.
To test the second hypothesis, we have to appropriately measure the loss of social wel-
fare. Given that we focus on welfare expenditure, we use poverty rate as a measure of social
welfare. The aim of welfare expenditure is to increase social welfare by lowering poverty
rate, but if our theory holds, fiscal decentralization will distort the structure of welfare
expenditure, and may adversely affect poverty rate. The key variables are summarized in





where the local expenditure includes the expenditure of the county, city, and town govern-
ments, and the total expenditure is the expenditure of the state and local governments.
FD is between zero and one. The structure of welfare expenditure is measured by the
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of main variables
VARIABLES Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Fiscal decentralization 0 .0914 0 .1334 0.0001 0.9610
Welfare expenditure 0 .6914 0 .2223 0.2021 1.5460
Cash-vender-payment ratio 0 .1137 0 .0889 0.0013 0.7367
Poverty rate (percentage) 12.559 3.5560 4.5 26.4
Unemployment Rate 5.2916 1.5932 2.2 14
Gini index 0.4392 0 .0284 0 .36 0 .52
ratio of cash assistance and vendor payment, RCV .
Most welfare expenditure is funded by public revenue of state-level government. The
local-level governments have autonomy of administrating the expenditures, although they
have to follow the guideline of state governments. The decentralization degree of welfare
expenditure varies over states and time, from around zero to 0.96. Figure 2 shows the
spatial pattern of the decentralization degree in the United States3.
Figure 1: Fiscal Decentralization of welfare expenditure in United States (2008)
According to Boyd (2003), the spending on cash assistance was declining in many
states (e.g. Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut and so on) since 1995. In the same
period, the decentralization degree of welfare expenditure was also decreasing in these
3One possible determinant is political ideology, states with highest degree of decentralization are more
liberal.
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states. When more welfare expenditure is decided by state governments rather than local,
less money is spent on cash assistance program, and we find poverty rate is decreasing. In
Figure 3, we show the pattern about decentralization, structure of welfare expenditure and
poverty rate in California over time, similar pattern can be found in many other states,
such as Indiana, Arizona and so on.
Figure 2: Fiscal Decentralization, Structure of Welfare Expenditure and Poverty Rate
(California)











The basic pattern is consistent with the empirical findings in Berner (2005). When
local governments controlled more welfare expenditure in North Carolina, cash assistance
program was expanded, and its efficiency became lower. Both results are in line with our
model, and provide basic evidence.
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2.4 Empirical Strategy and Estimation
2.4.1 Hypothesis I
Effect on Structure of Welfare Expenditure We first consider a direct test for the
effect of fiscal decentralization on structural bias of public expenditure and the underlying
mechanism. Based on our model, we have the first hypothesis as follows.
Hypothesis I : As welfare expenditure is being decentralized, ratio of cash assistance
and vendor payments will increase.
To illustrate the hypothesis and our empirical strategy, we introduce some preliminary
notation. Assume that state-level politicians spend 1/vS of the state’s welfare expenditure
on visible projects (cash assistance program), while local-level politicians spend 1/vL of the
local expenditure on such projects. Since yardstick competition is fiercer in local elections
than in state elections, we have vS > vL ≥ 1. If we let Γ be the total (state + local)
public expenditure, then the total expenditure (state and local government) on the cash
assistance program, which is denoted by Cash, and that on the vendor payments program
(less visible project), V endor are given by
Cash = Γ
vS
















The ratio of Cash to V endor (hereafter the CV ratio) is
RCV =
vL + FD(vS − vL)
vL(vS − 1)− FD(vS − vL)
(19)
which is a measure of the structure of welfare expenditure in terms of visibility. Note that






[(vS − 1)vL − FD(vS − vL)]2
> 0 (20)
Therefore, as the degree of fiscal decentralization increases, the total expenditure on
cash assistance program and the CV ratio both increase. Inequality (20) thus allows us
to empirically test the direct association between fiscal decentralization and the biased
structure of public expenditure due to dress-up contests.
To test this hypothesis, we consider the reduced-form model as follow,
RCVit = αi + κ0 + κ1FDit + κ2TWEit + εit (21)
where the subscript it denotes observation of the ith state (i = 1, . . . , N) at year t
(t = 1, . . . , T ), and αi is the state-specific fixed effect. TWE is the total (state + local)
welfare expenditure.
The fixed-effect estimation results are reported in column (1) of Table 2. It shows that
a larger degree of fiscal decentralization causes a larger CV ratio. The estimated coefficient
to FD is 0.4850 and significant at 5 percent. To capture the causal effect, in columns (2)
and (3), we replace the contemporary fiscal decentralization by its first- and second-order
lagged values FDi, t−1 and FDi, t−2, respectively, since an fiscal decentralization policy may
take effect after a period of time. We see that using lagged values gives a more positive
and more significant estimate, confirming the causal relationship between FD and the CV
ratio. The estimation results suggest that when the welfare expenditure gets decentralized,
more spending will flow from vendor payments to cash assistance program.
As a robustness check, we recompute FD using the expenditure from only city and town
governments (excluding the county-level governments), and we denote this ratio as FDCT .
Since yardstick competition is supposed to be even intenser at the city and town level, we
expect to observe a stronger association between structural bias and fiscal decentralization,
i.e. a more significant and positive estimated coefficient κ1. The results in column (4)
indeed indicate a stronger and more significant effect, the coefficient turns to be 2.3915
and significant at 1 percent, showing the robustness of this empirical finding.
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Table 2: Fiscal decentralization effect on CV ratio
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fiscal decentralization 0.4850**
(0.200)
Fiscal decentralization (first lag) 0.5018***
(0.188)
Fiscal decentralization (second lag) 0.4888***
(0.160)
Fiscal decentralization (city and town level) 2.3915***
(0.864)
Welfare expenditure −0.246*** −0.2539*** −0.2270*** −0.2760***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.048)
Constant 0.243*** 0.2484*** 0.2233*** 0.2532***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.026) (0.036)
AIC −2323.83 −1860.35 −1936.64 −385.72
R-square 0.2734 0.2990 0.2655 0.0084
Observations 720 576 576 96
Note: 1. Dependent variable is CV ratio.
2. Standard errors are in parentheses.
3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The role of yardstick competition Furthermore, we would like to explore the under-
lying mechanism of the effect. According to our model, fiscal decentralization increases
the spending on the more visible projects, since more public expenditures are involved
with a fiercer yardstick competition (dress-up contest). Therefore, the variation in yard-
stick competition can explain the effect of fiscal decentralization on the structure of public
expenditure. Therefore, the variation in degree of yardstick competition over local juris-
dictions can affect the structural effect of fiscal decentralization on public expenditure. We
expect that the stronger the yardstick competition of the local jurisdiction, the stronger the
distortion of the public expenditure. More formally, if the local-level yardstick competition






[(vS − 1)vL − FD(vS − vL)]2
< 0 (22)
This implies that given the same degree of fiscal decentralization, if the local-level
yardstick competition is stronger in a particular state, then the politicians in that state
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have more incentive to invest in visible projects. This mechanism can be empirically
captured by an interaction term between yardstick competition and fiscal decentralization.
Thus, we consider the model
RCVit = αi+κ0 +κ1FDit+κ2COMPit+κ3FDit×COMPit+κ4TWEit+β′Xit +εit (23)
where COMP is a measure of the yardstick competition, and Xit is a vector of control
variables, including the land size of each state, and the share of urban population, both
variables are controlled to avoid potential endogeneity problem. Estimating Equation (23)
allows us to examine the mechanism described in the model.
Yardstick competition is difficult to measure, to the best of our knowledge, there is
no satisfactory measure in literature. We propose two measures based on the comparabil-
ity of jurisdictions and the competitiveness of local governments. First, we consider the
comparability of jurisdictions. This is motivated by the argument of Bodenstein and Ur-
sprung (2005) that yardstick competition emerges when the performance of governments
in various jurisdictions becomes sufficiently comparable so that the voters can alleviate the
agency problem by making meaningful comparisons between jurisdictions (see also Besley
and Coate (1995)). In the United States, most congressional districts consist of several
local governments that have similar political and economic situations, such as similar po-
litical interests and voters’ preferences. Hence, we expect that the yardstick competition
between local governments within a congressional district is stronger than that outside the
district. This implies that the congressional district demarcates the political boundaries
of the yardstick competition. If a given district contains more local governments, then the
yardstick competition in this district is intenser because each local government has more
comparable rivals. Given this motivation, we propose to measure the yardstick competition
by
COMPr :=
Number of local governments
Number of congressional districts
(24)
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As COMPr gets larger, the yardstick competition is intenser4. If our theory holds, a
larger COMPr will lead to a serious structural bias, namely larger CV ratio, therefore, κ2
is predicted to be positive.
Next, we consider measuring the yardstick competition by the competitiveness of the
local elections, which is computed based on the percentage of votes won by the leading
party. We denote this measure as COMP c. The average level of competitiveness is a
reasonable measure of the yardstick competition within the state. The competitiveness is
higher if the leading party wins a smaller share of the votes, suggesting that the competing
parties are well matched or none of the candidates has strong support. In both cases,
the yardstick competition can be intense. Due to the lack of county-level data, we use
congressional-district data. In the two-party system of the U.S., congressional elections
are expected to be highly correlated with local (county, city, or town) elections, and thus
the average competitiveness of these elections can be a proxy for the yardstick competition
at the local level. As COMPc gets smaller, the yardstick competition is intenser5. If our
theory holds, a smaller COMPr will lead to a serious structural bias, namely larger CV
ratio, therefore, κ2 is predicted to be negative.
To see how the effect of fiscal decentralization varies at different levels of yardstick
competitiveness, we first rank all the states according to their average competitiveness
(averaged over time). Then, we estimate the fiscal decentralization effect using the two
samples, made up of the most competitive and the least competitive states, respectively.
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 3 present the results. It is clear that the fiscal decentraliza-
tion effect on the structure of welfare expenditure (CV ratio) is much stronger and more
significant in the more competitive states. As shown in Column (1), using COMPr as a
measure to rank states, for most competitive states, the coefficient to FD is 0.7432 and
significant at 1 percent level; whereas the coefficient to -0.09 and insignificant in Column
(3) for least competitive states.
4This ratio is unaffected if we control for a state’s land size or population since we divide both the
numerator and denominator by the land size or population.
5This ratio is unaffected if we control for a state’s land size or population since we divide both the





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Next, we use the entire sample to examine the interactive effect of fiscal decentralization
with yardstick competitiveness by estimating the panel data model (23). The results are
given in columns (5) to (8) of Table 3. We see that the interaction terms are strongly
positive when using COMPr and strongly negative when using COMPc in the models with
level and lagged terms of FD. In Column (5), when using COMPr as a measure of yardstick
competition (dress-up contest), the coefficient to interaction term COMPr×FD is 4.1628
and significant at 10 percent level, however, the coefficient to FD becomes insignificant.
This result suggests that the variation in yardstick competition explains a large share of
the effect of FD, if we compare with the estimation in Table 2, the coefficient to FD
is quite significant when the interaction term is not introduced. In Column (6) to (8),
we find the same pattern, which again confirms that a stronger yardstick competition
leads to a stronger fiscal decentralization effect on the CV ratio. The different significance
levels suggest that COMPr and COMPc measure the yardstick competition from different
perspectives. However, the results from the two measures are generally consistent: a larger
degree of fiscal decentralization and more intense yardstick competition are associated with
a higher CV ratio.
To summarize, the above analysis shows that a high degree of fiscal decentralization
is associated with an expenditure flow from the more visible product (cash assistance) to
the less visible product (vendor payments), and the association is even stronger in regions
with intenser yardstick competition. This is because to achieve a better image and win
more votes, politicians tend to allocate more resources to the more visible project. This
dress-up contest is intensified by fiscal decentralization through the channel of yardstick
competition. These empirical results thus provide support for our theoretical findings.
2.4.2 Hypothesis II:
Effect on Poverty Rate In this section, we explore the welfare consequences of fiscal
decentralization and the underlying mechanism. According to our model, fiscal decen-
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tralization causes the structural bias of public expenditure, thus lowers its efficiency and
creates social welfare loss. Formally we present the testable prediction as follows.
Hypothesis II : As welfare expenditure is being decentralized, the poverty rate will
accordingly increase due to distorted expenditure structure.
Poverty rate is defined by the share of people with an income lower than poverty line6.
We focus on three channels from fiscal decentralization to poverty, which are summarized
in Figure 3. First, according to the model, fiscal decentralization can affect poverty by
changing the structure of welfare expenditure, i.e. an expenditure flow from less visible
goods to more visible goods (Effect A and B). Second, fiscal decentralization can indi-
rectly affect poverty by affecting the size of welfare expenditure (Effect C and D). On
the one hand, fiscal decentralization may increase the welfare expenditure due to higher
administrative costs; on the other hand, it is likely that welfare expenditure shrinks after
fiscal decentralization because the mobility of the poor motivates governments to spend
less on welfare to reduce the fiscal burden. It is not clear which effect dominates, and we
investigate this in our empirical study. Finally, in addition to the indirect effects, fiscal
decentralization can have an impact on poverty through channels other than changing the
size and structure of welfare expenditure. We consider other connections between fiscal
decentralization and poverty as Effect E. In this section, we focus on the Effect A and B.
However, the other channels have to be controlled, not only to avoid omitted variable bias,
but also to identify the main channel from the others.
6The poverty threshold is calculated and updated by United States Census Bureau each year, consider
the basic living standard in each state, county and other geographic division. The standard is based on
the Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplements.
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Figure 3: Transmission channels from fiscal decentralization to poverty










Standard panel data model To provide empirical evidence to the second hypothesis,
we identify the channels separately. We first examine the effect of fiscal decentralization on
the size of welfare expenditure (Effect C), then explore the further effect on poverty rate
(Effect D and E) and the underlying mechanism (Effect B). To examine the hypothesis,
we estimate the following models:
TWEit = αi + θ0 + θ1FDit + eit (25)
pit = αi + β0 + β1FDit + β2TWEit + β3RCVit + β4UNEMit + β5GINIit + εit (26)
where TWE is total welfare expenditure, p is poverty rate, UNEM andGINI represent
unemployment rate and Gini index respectively. Model (25) captures the transmission
Effect C, while Model (26) captures the direct effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty
(Effect E) and the indirect effect through welfare expenditure (Effect D). To examine Effect
B, we add RCV as an explanatory variable in regression (26)7.
Table 4 present the standard fixed-effect estimation results based on Equation (25) and
Equation (26). First, we examine the Effect C, D and E, then will focus on Effect B. Column
(1) shows that fiscal decentralization has a strongly negative effect on welfare expenditure
(Effect C). The estimated coefficient to FD is 1.1031 and significant at 1 percent level.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Column (2) replaces the contemporary value of FD by its first-order lagged value FDL1,
and shows a similar result, confirming that a high degree of fiscal decentralization leads to
less welfare expenditure. This suggests that the negative effect of fiscal decentralization
on welfare expenditure dominates in our case. The empirical finding is consistent with
coordination failure model of fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental competition
(see Oates (1999)). Since the poor are mobile, an increase of welfare expenditure in one
jurisdiction attracts the poor to this region, which adds to the burden of this jurisdiction
but reduces the burden of others. Therefore, if most jurisdictions are free riders, then
fiscal decentralization leads to a coordination failure and the inefficient provision of public
goods.
Column (3) shows a significant and positive overall effect of fiscal decentralization on
poverty, challenging the conventional viewpoint that fiscal decentralization improves social
welfare. The estimated coefficient to FD is 7.4507 and significant at 1 percent level. This
effect is largely reduced (in size and significance) when we include welfare expenditure
(column (4)), but remains significant at 1 percent level. Meanwhile the coefficient of welfare
expenditure is significantly negative. This suggests that part of the fiscal decentralization
effect on poverty is explained by the change of the size of welfare expenditure, and it
provides evidence for strong Effect D. These effects are robust when we include the Gini
coefficient and unemployment (column (5)).
Columns (6) and (7) show that the fiscal decentralization effect remains positive and
significant after we control for welfare expenditure and the CV ratio, and this suggests
the existence of Effect E. The strongly positive and robust effect of fiscal decentralization
again confirms the dark side of fiscal decentralization on poverty reduction.
After controlling Effect C, D and E, now we focus on Effect B, which is crucial to test
Hypothesis II. In Column (6), the CV ratio is positively related to poverty, the estimated
coefficient is 4.5906 and significant at 1 percent level. However, this effect becomes insignif-
icant when we add more control variables (Column (7)). This estimation results show that
the CV ratio can be positively related to poverty (Effect B), but the delicate coefficient
suggests that the standard panel data model may not fully capture the effect of the CV
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ratio on poverty. Also, we see that including RCV can affect the estimated coefficient of
TWE, which suggests possible interactions between RCV and TWE. As shown in Figure
3, the CV ratio influences poverty by interacting with the effect of welfare expenditure, in
another word, CV ratio changes poverty rate by changing the effect of welfare expenditure.
The less significant coefficient in Column (8) does not necessarily indicate that Effect
B does not exist. The effect of CV ratio is not monotonic with poverty rate in theory. An
excessively large (or small) CV ratio reduces the beneficial effect of welfare expenditure
on poverty reduction, while an appropriate value of the ratio can maximize the effect of
welfare expenditure. Therefore, Effect B cannot be fully captured by this standard fixed-
effect model, and more appropriate methods are required. Another limitation of this panel
data model is endogeneity problem. Poverty rate is determined by fiscal decentralization,
meanwhile the degree of fiscal decentralization will be also affected by poverty rate, since it
has been taken as a policy tool in many states. To estimate Effect B and avoid endogeneity
problem, we employ functional coefficient analysis to conduct further research.
Standard functional coefficient model Functional coefficient analysis is an effective
tool for estimating non-linear model, particularly with an interactive effect (see Fan and
Gijbels (1996)). We employ this approach here for three reasons. First, as illustrated
above, CV ratio affects poverty rate by changing the effect of welfare expenditure, usually
this effect can be captured by an empirical model with interaction term as follows,
pit = αi + β0 + β1FDit + β2TWEit + β4RCVit + β5TWEit×RCVit +
2∑
k=1
γkxit,k + εit (27)
where xit = (GINIit, UNEMit). We argue that this approach does not work here since
the effect of CV ratio is supposed to be non-linear. Both extremely large and small values
of the CV ratio reflect the distortion of welfare expenditure, and this structural distortion
can weaken its effect on poverty reduction. Moreover, the interaction term of TWE and
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RCV may result in multi-collinearity, and produce large standard errors8. The problem
may be even serious if non-linear form of RCV is introduced, e.g. RCV 2. Second and
importantly, we only know the effect of CV ratio is non-linear, but have no idea about
its functional form. By using functional coefficient analysis,we don’t have to impose any
specific form to the regression. Third, by using functional coefficient analysis, RCV is not
an explanatory variable, so the endogeneity concern with RCV is not a problem.
To investigate the impact of each channel and capture the possibly nonlinear relation-
ship between the CV ratio and poverty, we consider the functional coefficient model in
which the slope coefficients are allowed to vary over a common variable. Specifically in the
following functional coefficient model, we take each coefficient as a function of CV ratio.
By estimating the model, we know how CV ratio can affect poverty rate through changing
the effects of these variables.
pit = δ0 + δ1FDit + δ2TWEit + δ3GINIit + δ4UNEMit + ηit (28)
where the slope coefficient δk (k = 0, 1, . . . , 4) is a continuous function of the CV
ratio. The variables FD, TWE, GINI, and UNEM in Equation (28) are the same
as in Equation (26)9. One advantage of a functional coefficient model is that it allows
regressors to be correlated with the smoothing variable RCV , and thus avoids the multi-
collinearity problem in Equation (27). Moreover, it provides information on how the effect
of welfare expenditure varies (possibly nonlinearly) for different values of the CV ratio.
The model also allows us to rule out other possible transmission channels from the CV
ratio to poverty, if the other functional coefficients (δ1, δ3, and δ4) do not vary over RCV or
show no clear trends. For the moment, we consider a standard functional model without an
individual-specific effect αi (pool estimation), and the estimated coefficients are consistent
if αi is assumed to be uncorrelated with the regressors. In next subsection we will allow
correlation between αi and the regressors and estimate a fixed-effect functional coefficient
8Actually, estimates of Equation (27) show that β̂5 is not significant.
9DINC is not included to avoid possible multi-collinearity between TWE and DINC, Our robustness




The parameters in this model are estimated by local linear estimation (Fan and Gijbels
(1996); see also Cai, Fan, and Yao (2000)). Thus we specify
δk = δCk + δSk(RCV − u0) (k = 0, 1, . . . , 4) (29)
where min(RCV ) ≤ u0 ≤ max(RCV ). The parameters (δCk, δSk) are estimated by











{δCk + δSk(RCVit − u0)}xitk
)2
Kh(RCVit − u0) (30)
where xitk is the kth regressor, and Kh(·) := h−1K(·/h) with bandwidth h and kernel
function K(·). Various data-driven methods could be used to select the bandwidth, e.g.
cross-validation Fan and Gijbels (1996). We choose the bandwidth by minimizing the
averaged mean square error, following Cai, Fan, and Yao (2000).
If Hypothesis II holds, the correlation between RCV and the coefficient to welfare
expenditure δ2 is non-linear (Effect B). Above a threshold, the correlation is supposed
to be positive, indicating that too much spending on cash assistance program will lower
the efficiency of welfare expenditure and increase poverty rate. Since RCV can affect
poverty rate only through Effect B, its correlation with other variables are supposed to be
insignificant.
Figure 4 shows the slope parameters as a function of the CV ratio. The solid line
plots the coefficient estimate, and the dashed lines are ±2 × the bootstrap standard errors
(calculated over 200 replications). We see a rough U-shape of the welfare-expenditure effect
on poverty (upper-left subfigure). The effect is significantly negative when the proportion
of the cash assistance is relatively small, and it becomes stronger (more negative) as the
ratio increases to around 0.2. However, when the ratio is more than 0.3, increasing the
cash proportion weakens the welfare-expenditure effect on poverty reduction, with wide
confidence bands. The effect even becomes weakly positive when the ratio is particularly
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high. The nonlinear behavior shows that a deviation of the CV ratio from its optimal
value, and in particular an increase in its value, can weaken the poverty-reduction effect
of welfare expenditure. This provides evidence for Hypothesis II: the efficiency loss caused
by an overspending on visible products (Effect B).
Figure 4: Marginal effect of control variables on poverty as function of CV ratio
(standard functional coefficient model)





































































































The effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty (upper-right subfigure) is significantly
positive for values of RCV from around 0.1 to 0.4, and less significant for larger values.
The estimated functional coefficients of the welfare expenditure and FD confirm the results
from the standard fixed-effect model, suggesting Effect D and E are both strong. We also
see that the curves of fiscal decentralization, unemployment, and the Gini index have no
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particular shape, suggesting that the CV ratio does not influence poverty through these
channels.
Fixed-effect functional coefficient model Standard functional coefficient estimation
works if the individual-specific effect αi is independent of the control variables. However,
it is possible that an unobserved individual effect αi is correlated with the control vari-
ables, for example, the historical and cultural differences between states (an unobserved
individual effect) may affect the government behavior, and thus impact the degree of fiscal
decentralization. To allow for possible correlation between the individual-specific effect
and the regressors, we estimate a fixed-effect functional coefficient model:
pit = αi + δ0 + δ1FDit + δ2TWEit + δ3GINIit + δ4UNEMit + ηit (31)
where αi can be correlated with the regressors in any (unknown) pattern. In a func-
tional coefficient model, the fixed effect cannot be removed by a preliminary step of first-
difference or within-transformation of the dependent and independent variables, because
the slope coefficients δk = δk(RCVit) are no longer constant for all the observations. The
transformation based on equations also does not work, because it involves an additive func-
tion that impedes kernel-based estimation, and also because it produces an inconsistent
estimated coefficient of the time-invariant term (see Sun, Carroll, and Li (2009) for the
details). Therefore, we follow Sun, Carroll, and Li (2009) and remove the fixed effects by
deducting a smoothed version of the cross-time average from each individual unit. This
approach first analytically finds the fixed-effect vector via a weighted least square dummy
variable model, and then estimates the functional parameters non-parametrically using a
concentrate weighted least square method. To calculate the bootstrap standard error in
the panel data model, we follow Kapetanios (2008) and construct bootstrap samples by
resampling whole cross-sectional units with replacement (cross-sectional resampling).
Figure 5 presents the fixed-effect functional coefficient estimates for each variable. In
general the shape of the curves is similar to those in the standard functional coefficient
model. In particular, the trends of the welfare-expenditure effect are consistent with previ-
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ous finding: welfare expenditure has a significantly negative effect on poverty when the CV
ratio is low, but a weakly positive effect when the ratio is high (the U-shaped curve). Also,
this effect becomes less significant as the ratio increases. The estimation results provide
further evidence to Hypothesis II.
The estimated coefficients of FD are below the zero line; they are much lower than those
in the standard panel data model, even though we observe only the upper bound of the
confidence interval. Thus, FD has little impact on the poverty rate when we have controlled
for the size (Effect C and D) and the structure (Effect A and B) of welfare expenditure.
This result suggests that the strong Effect E in standard functional coefficient model can
actually be explained by some time-invariant factors in each state. The estimations for
unemployment and the Gini index show no particular trends.
To summarize, by using functional coefficient analysis, particularly when we control
fixed-effect, the estimation results suggest the structural change of welfare expenditure
lowers the efficiency of welfare expenditure, and thus increases poverty rate (Effect B).
Meanwhile, the size of welfare expenditure also matters (Effect D). When Effect B and D
have been controlled, fiscal decentralization can hardly affect poverty rate (Effect E), in
another word, Effect B and D are the main channels through which fiscal decentralization
can affect poverty rate. The estimation results do not only provide empirical evidence to
Hypothesis II, but also allow us to identify main effect from the rest.
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Figure 5: Marginal effect of control variables on poverty as a function of CV ratio
(Fixed-effect estimation)





































































































Robustness check We investigate the robustness of our results in various ways. First,
we focus on the coefficient of TWE and consider different subsets of auxiliary variables
{FD,UNEM,GINI}. The results from both the standard and fixed-effect models show
that including different auxiliary variables does not affect the effect of welfare expenditure.
Second, we consider using an alternative data set, namely the local governments’ ex-
penditure on cash assistance and vendor payments programs. To ensure that the ratio is
well-defined, we assign zero to those observations with no such assistance or payments10.
10Setting these observations to zero cannot distinguish the case with no cash and vendor payments from
the case with vendor payments but no cash assistance.
37
We estimate the functional coefficient model using the local government expenditure. The
left panel of Figure 6 shows that the welfare-expenditure effect on poverty is negative when
RCV is small but weakly positive when RCV is large. This result is consistent with our
previous findings. The larger confidence bands for small values of RCV are partly because
we assign zero to those observations with no assistance or payments, which reduces the
accuracy.
Finally, we consider the possible effect of lagged variables. This captures the causal
effect, and using the lagged value can also reduce the endogeneity to some extent. We
consider the following model:
pit = αi + δ0 + δ1FDi,t−1 + δ2TWEi,t−1 + δ3GINIit + δ4UNEMit + ηit (32)
where δk is a function of RCVi,t−1. In this model, we take a first-order lag of the
control variables FD and TWE together with the smoothing covariate RCV , because
they are related to the fiscal policies. We estimate Equation (32) using both standard and
fixed-effect models, and the right panel of Figure 6 shows that our main results are not
affected.
Figure 6: Functional coefficient estimates of welfare-expenditure effect: Robustness check

















































This paper models and empirically examines the negative side of fiscal decentralization due
to dress-up contest. Because of asymmetric information, voters cannot observe politicians’
capabilities, but make assessments based on the outcome of public projects. Therefore
politicians, under pressure of yardstick competition, are motivated to allocate more re-
sources to more visible projects to improve their public image. We show that the yardstick
competition triggered by fiscal decentralization can turn into a competition for a better
image, and this contest further causes a structural bias in public expenditure (more ex-
penditure on visible projects) and reduces the efficiency of public expenditure.
Our empirical analysis does not only offer evidence to the distorted structure under
fiscal decentralization due to dress-up contest, but also its welfare loss. By testing the
first hypothesis, we find that fiscal decentralization significantly reduces the welfare ex-
penditure. In the second part, by using both standard panel data model and functional
coefficient model, we find fiscal decentralization further increases poverty as it encourages
governments to spend more on visible projects, leading to a higher CV ratio in welfare
expenditure. The functional coefficient analysis does not only suggests that an excessively
large CV ratio weakens the poverty-reduction effect of welfare expenditure because of the
efficiency loss, but also helps to rank the contribution of each channel through which fiscal
decentralization can affect poverty rate. Our estimation results provide supporting evi-
dence for the positive effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty, and our results are robust
to different model specifications. Unlike previous literature, such as Besley and Coate
(1995), both our theoretical and empirical analysis suggests that fiscal decentralization has
a dark side that can lead to social welfare loss through a dress-up contest.
Our results have important policy implications. Policymakers, who consider fiscal de-
centralization to be an efficient policy tool, should also be aware of its dark side. Two
methods can help to avoid dress-up contests and their negative effects on social welfare in
the course of fiscal decentralization. First, there should be a minimum level of public ex-
penditure on less visible projects, so that the structure of public spending does not become
too distorted. Second, an evaluation system could be introduced to increase the visibility
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of public projects, such as the CPA (comprehensive performance assessment) system used
in the UK since 2002. Such an assessment system would allow voters to better evaluate
politicians’ capabilities.
Further research is needed in several areas. First, endogeneity problem is still a concern
when estimating the effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty rate, so a valid instrumental
variable is required, meanwhile we will consider functional coefficient estimation in the
presence of instrumental variables. Second, there are missing values in the current data
set, and a better data set is thus required. Third, better measures of yardstick competition
may be required if we attempt to provide further evidence for dress-up contests. Finally,
“dress-up contest” will be not only affected by fiscal decentralization, but also many other
shocks or policies. For example, the CPA program in UK can significantly affect the
“dress-up contest” among local governments; the reform of cadre performance evaluation
in China in 2009 can also reshape the dress-up contest in China. In future research,
empirical studies can be conducted by using these cases, meanwhile, it will be interesting
if the dress-up contest is used to analyze these policies.
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3 Fertility in Times of AIDS: Adult Mortality, Portfolio
Choice and Human Capital Investment1
Abstract: What happens to fertility decision if adult mortality risk increases? We propose
a portfolio choice model based on the “quantity-quality tradeoff” of investing in human
capital. Our theory predicts that the impact of such a mortality shock on fertility is
heterogeneous across income groups. While rich families expand family size in response to
increased adult mortality risks, the reverse is true for poor families. As an implication, we
highlight the detrimental effect of adult mortality risks on human capital accumulation and
economic growth. We take our theory to (African) data, and find evidence to support key
predictions. We hope the model helps to reconcile conflicting empirical evidence regarding
the effect of HIV/AIDS on fertility in previous research.
JEL classification: D8, I12, J13
Key words: HIV/AIDS, Fertility, Portfolio, Human Capital Investment
1The paper is jointly written by Erwin Bulte and Yang Zhou. We thank German Caruso, Patricio Dal-
ton, Yufeng Huang, Peter Kooreman, Sang Yoon (Tim) Lee, Cezar Santos, Michele Tertilt and Gonzague
Vannoorenberghe for some very useful comments and discussions, as well as seminar audiences at Tilburg
University, University of Mannheim, ESPE Annual Conference in Braga, RES Conference in Manchester
and CSAE Annual Conference in Oxford. Remaining errors are our own.
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3.1 Introduction
The effect of adult mortality risk on fertility choice is ambiguous from both a theoretical and
empirical perspective. While the literature has focused on the effects of adult mortality
risk on fertility via changes in life expectancy (Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney (2009)
and Zhang and Zhang (2005)) or labor supply (Young (2005)), other potentially important
factors such as the return to human capital investment have received only scant attention.
The empirical literature tends to focus on the HIV/AIDS epidemic as a case to explore
fertility choices under adult mortality risks. However, this literature has not reached a
consensus, and the empirical evidence is mixed, or even conflicting2. While some studies
find that fertility decreases in response to increased mortality risk (Young (2005) and Young
(2007)), other studies find no significant effect, or argue that behavioral responses cause
an increase in fertility rates (Fortson (2009), Kalemli-Ozcan and Turan (2011) and Juhn,
Kalemli-Ozcan, and Turan (2013)).
The objective of this paper is two-fold. First, we develop a tractable portfolio model to
study fertility choice under uncertainty of human capital investment. The model replicates
the stylized quantity-quality tradeoff, and predicts differential fertility responses across
income groups. In the model, we highlight the detrimental effect of adult mortality risks on
human capital accumulation and economic growth. Second, we empirically test our model
using the case of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa. Based on both country-level and
individual-level data, we find empirical support for key model predictions. Importantly,
our empirical findings may help reconcile conflicting empirical findings about the effect
of HIV/AIDS on fertility in previous literature. As discussed in Kalemli-Ozcan (2012),
differences in econometric outcomes in existing studies may be attributed to differences
2Most studies use similar empirical strategy and the same data base (The Demographic and Health
Surveys, DHS), but the sample countries may be different.
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in HIV prevalence data, variation in econometric specifications, and variation in countries
included in the sample. In this paper we focus on the latter possibility, and consider the
possibility that the relation between HIV/AIDS and fertility is heterogeneous - varying
across the African continent in a systematic fashion.
Our model is based on the assumption that children are a risky asset and that invest-
ment in children’s human capital is not simply driven by parental altruism. Since most
developing countries lack effective social security, parents count on transfers from their
offspring to secure their old day. They invest in children as part of an overall portfolio
consisting of human capital and other assets. When adult mortality risk increases, e.g.
due to the diffusion of HIV/AIDS, the expected return to investments in children’s human
capital goes down. Depending on parental risk preferences, this may have different con-
sequences. We assume risk preferences vary across income groups, and that rich families
are better able to tolerate risk than poor families. The result is heterogeneous fertility
responses across income groups, so existing (cross-country) studies seeking to tease out av-
erage effects may obscure important underlying patterns and relations in the data. While
our theory is framed in terms of the HIV/AIDS mortality shock, we emphasize the intu-
ition is more general and may also be used to understand the impact of positive shocks to
longevity, such as eventuating from new developments in medicine.
As an implication, our model suggests adult mortality risks have destructive impacts
on economic growth, due to uncertainty of human capital investment, particularly in the
context of developing countries. Unlike Voth (2013) and Young (2005), which emphasize
that adult mortality risks (e.g. black death or HIV/AIDS) may increase return to human
capital investment by reducing labor supply, in this paper, we highlight its detrimental
effect on human capital accumulation. Due to the increased uncertainty, parents are reluc-
tant to invest in their children. This destruction of human capital may particularly drag
some relatively rich countries back to “Malthusian regime” from “Post Malthusian regime”
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(cf. “Unified growth theory” in Weil and Galor (1999)). As a result, it may slow down
economic growth, even trap a country “Malthusian regime”.
We use country-level and individual-level data from a sample of African countries to
test two theoretical predictions of the model. First, we test whether people in high-income
groups tend to increase fertility after the epidemic of HIV/AIDS, and whether people
in low income groups tend to shrink their family size. This prediction is supported by
the data. Second, we test whether both rich and poor households reduce human capital
investment after the shock. This prediction is in line with the estimation results in Fortson
(2011), but stands in contrast with predictions in Young (2005). The reduction in fertility
caused by HIV/AIDS may not result in higher education levels, as predicted in standard
“quantity-quality tradeoff” model, since the enhanced risk implied by higher adult mortality
discourages investments in schooling.
This paper fits into the recent literature on the effects of mortality risks on fertility
choice, and is related to several other strands of the literature. First, following Jayachan-
dran and Lleras-Muney (2009), Zhang and Zhang (2005) and Young (2005), this paper
sheds light on the fertility responses to adult mortality risk (rather than infant mortality
risk). While previous papers emphasize the importance of life expectancy or labor supply,
the present paper highlights the role of risky human capital investment. Second, the model
proposed here builds on the literature studying fertility choice and inter-generational trans-
fers (e.g. Gete and Porchia (2011), Portner (2001) and Chakraborty and Das (2005)). One
common feature is to treat children as assets rather than consumption goods. Because
we introduce the risk of investing in assets, our model not only derives implications for
the mortality-fertility linkage, but also replicates several stylized facts in fertility theory,
see De La Croix and Doepke (2003). Third, this paper relates to work on the effect of
HIV/AIDS on fertility choice, such as Young (2005), Kalemli-Ozcan and Turan (2011),
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and Fink and Linnemayr (2008), and employs the empirical strategy in Fortson (2009) and
Fortson (2011).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present our theoretical model, and
derive key testable implications. In section 3, we introduce the background of HIV/AIDS
epidemic in Africa and argue why it can be used as a case of adult mortality shock. Section
3 also contains our empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the estimation results, and Section
5 concludes.
3.2 Model
We start our theoretical analysis with the basic setup of the portfolio model and derive
optimal fertility and human capital levels. We then introduce an adult mortality shock, and
probe the fertility response of rich and poor households respectively. Next, we aggregate
these individual fertility responses, and show the heterogeneous effects of adult mortality
risks on the total fertility rate (TFR) over aggregate income levels.
3.2.1 Basic Setup: Fertility Choice
Many models of fertility choice view children as a consumption good (e.g. Becker
and Lewis (1973), Wolpin (1984) and Conde-Ruiz, GimeNez, and PeRez-Nievas (2009)),
but investments in human capital are not simply driven by parental altruism. They also
reflect the need to provide security for old age (Neher (1971) and Bental (1989)). As
in Defo (2009) and Aboderin (2006), “customarily, in developing countries, families have
carried the full responsibility and have been the mainstay of support for older people
unable to sustain themselves. The filial obligation of younger generation kin, especially
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adult children, towards their elders has been enshrined in societies’ moral codes and in
many African societies is expressed in traditional proverbs.” Therefore, following Gete
and Porchia (2011), Portner (2001) and Chakraborty and Das (2005), we assume parents
invest in a portfolio consisting of children and other kinds of assets, perhaps including
stocks, savings, or a salaried job. But the return to investing time and money in children
is not risk-less – children may get injured or may even die before providing support to their
aged parents. As the risk implied by investing in children goes up, parents will adjust their
investment strategy, and increase investment in other assets.
Assume there are two kinds of children —— a "high-quality" child (H) and a "low-
quality" child (L), where quality simply reflects investment in human capital before ma-
turity. The high-quality child requires more investment, and will produce a higher return
(in case of success). However, the loss is also higher in case of failure, such as pre-mature
death. Therefore the variance of the high child’s return is larger. The low-quality child,
instead, requires little investment in human capital, and yields a relatively low but stable
return.
Following studies on the sheepskin effect (e.g. Jaeger and Page (1996)), we treat human
capital investment as a discrete choice, rather than a continuous one. In terms of returns to
schooling, it makes relatively little difference to invest in an extra year of schooling, unless
a credential is achieved. For example in Africa, most parents only have to decide whether
to send their children through primary (or secondary) school, or not. The primary school
completion rate in Africa in 2009 was only 67%, and only half these pupils have a chance
of transitioning to lower secondary school3.
3Global Education Digest (2011), regional profile: Sub-Saharan Africa. UNESCO Institute of Statistics.
http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Documents/GED2011_SSA_RP_EN.pdf
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Following portfolio theory (see Cochrane (2009)), we capture the fertility decision of an
agent and the effect of adult mortality risks in a two-period model. In period t, the agent
makes investment decision given her expectation of future return, the quantity and quality
of children are accordingly decided in this period. In period t + 1, the agent can obtain
return of human capital investment from children, when they’ve grown up. So in the first
period, an agent optimizes the expected utility of an investment portfolio, which consists
of human capital investment and other kinds of assets. Specifically, consider an agent with
mean-variance utility preferences. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, assume
her portfolio consists of two assets: a risky asset, children, and a risk-free asset, possibly a






where rp,t+1 = αtrt+1 + (1− α) rf,t+1(wt), and wt is initial wealth of the parents, which
can be taken as both human and physical capital. Et(rp,t+1) and σp,t+1 are the mean and
variance of return to the portfolio; rt+1 is the return on raising children; and rf,t+1(wt) is the
risk-free rate, which we treat as an increasing deterministic function of wt (reflecting that
high human capital facilitates access to high-return investment opportunities, or better
salaried jobs, c.f. Claessens (2006) and Sahn and Alderman (1988)). The choice variable
αt is the share of investment in children in the asset portfolio, so the share of risk-free
assets is given by (1− αt).
We assume risk attitudes of agents are heterogeneous over income groups, compared
with rich people, poor people are more risk averse. Thus the coefficient of relative risk
aversion, θ is assumed to be a decreasing function of wealth. The income-varying risk
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preference is generated from both rf,t+1(wt) and θ (wt) (i.e. DRRA utility function, cf.
Ogaki and Zhang (2001)). We make the assumption based on several empirical studies in
developing countries. The field experiments in Ehiopia and West Africa (Yesuf and Bluff-
stone (2009) and Liebenehm and Waibel (2014)) suggest that the constraints in wealth is
associated with greater risk aversion. Based on survey data in Vietnam, Tanaka, Camerer,
and Nguyen (2010) shows that people living in wealthy villages are less risk averse than in
poor villages.
Assume
rt+1|Ft,∼ N(µ, σ2). (2)
given rp,t+1 = αtrt+1 + (1− α) rf,t+1(wt), we have,
rp,t+1|Ft,∼ N(αtµ+ (1− α) rf,t+1(wt), α2tσ2). (3)
where Ft represents the information set up to time t. The distribution of the return on
the portfolio allows us to rewrite the optimization problem as:
max
αt

















where λ = µ−rf,t+1(wt)/σ is the so-called Sharpe ratio for investments in (the human capital
of) children, measuring the marginal benefits from taking one unit of risk. Reflecting the













Hence, the fraction of wealth allocated to bearing and raising children, αt, increases with
the attractiveness of having off-spring, as captured by the Sharpe ratio (λ), but decreases
with its riskiness (σ) and the agent’s degree of risk aversion (θ)4. As both λ and θ decrease
with wealth levels, it is not evident how wealth affects investments in children.
Once agents choose the optimal investment in each kind of children αtwt, they have
chosen the children number of each kind, given the cost of raising a child, Ct. The number








Since there are two kinds of children, high-quality child (H) and low-quality child (L), the
number of children5 is
nt = nH,t + nL,t. (8)
Denote investment costs by Ct where CH > CL. The return to these kinds is defined as rt+1,
where rH,t+1 ∼ N (µH , σH) and rL,t+1 ∼ N (µL, σL), and where µH > µL and σH > σL6. In
words, raising high-quality child yields higher expected returns, but also implies incurring
higher costs and generating higher risks (for example due to pre-maturity death). As a
benchmark model we assume children have to be treated equally, so that a family can have
high-quality or low-quality child, but not both7. The optimal number of kind-specific child
4Given the risk of human capital investment, which is captured by σ, higher relative return to risk-
free asset (λ) attracts more investment in children. Other things being equal, a higher riskiness (σ) may
disincentive people from investing in children’s human capital, a higher sensitivity (θ) to risk plays a similar
role.
5We (implicitly) assume that the number of children is not necessary to be integer in the model, so
a potential problem is that the current result might be deviated from the condition by using integer
optimization. However, the deviation will be very limited on the aggregate level. We do not only derive
our main results on aggregate level, but also test these predictions by country level data.
6Throughout this paper, we use subscript "L" to represent variables associated with low-quality children
and subscript "H" to represent variables associated with high-quality children.
7We obtain similar results when we loose the assumption that children are equally treated.
49










So there are two kinds of portfolios: the one consisting of H- quality child (and the risk-free















So kind of child is simply chosen by comparing these expected utilities. Proposition 1
characterizes the results.
Proposition 1. If λH > λL, the agent chooses high-quality children; If λH < λL, she
chooses low-quality children; if λH = λL, she is indifferent between high-quality and low-
quality children.
This proposition states that the decision on the kind of offspring depends on the attrac-
tiveness of children as an investment opportunity, as reflected by the Sharpe ratio. Given
the kind of child, the optimal number of children is accordingly given by Equation (9).
Proposition 2. If λH < λ?H , then nL > nH . Otherwise, the relationship between nL and
nH is ambiguous.
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We can prove the proposition by considering Equation (9). nL > nH indicates λH <
λL · CHσHCLσL = λ
?
H , where λ?H is the threshold value of λH . When the relative return of
the low-quality child compared to the risk-free asset is sufficiently high, parents choosing
the low-quality child will choose to have greater fertility than parents choosing the high-
quality child. This implies the quantity-quality tradeoff, but the mechanism is different
than provided by Becker and Lewis (1973). Since CH > CL and σH > σL, a simple
implication is when parents choose low-quality children (λH < λL), nL > nH . However,
when the low-quality child is not sufficiently attractive (λL is “low”), even for CH > CL, it
holds that nL can be smaller than nH . The reason is that people would rather invest in
other assets than in low-quality child. If so, the quantity-quality tradeoff need not hold.
Figure 1 shows how optimal fertility varies with wealth. For low wealth levels, λH < λL,
the agent chooses low-quality offspring. As wealth increases, so does fertility, reflecting
greater ability to invest in low-quality children. However, Sharpe ratios also change, as
depicted in Figure 2. Specifically, both Sharpe ratios decrease with the wealth level, but the
high-quality ratio falls more slowly due to the larger variance of high-quality child’s return.
Eventually the two curves (may) intersect, so that λH = λL, and agents switch from low
to high-quality offspring. Fertility drops abruptly (in case of a quantity-quality tradeoff).
For the rich, who earn a relatively high return on their risk-free assets, only high-quality
children are a sufficiently attractive investment opportunity. Further increasing wealth
implies that, again, fertility increases. This reflects that wealthier households can afford
to invest more in offspring.
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Figure 1: Number of children for agents with different wealth levels.
Figure 2: Sharpe ratios for different individual wealth. λH (dotted line) and λL (solid line) are Sharpe
ratios for high-quality and low-quality children, respectively. wthre is the critical wealth level for kind-
switching.
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3.2.2 Individual Response to a Shock of Adult Mortality Risks
Before exploring the fertility response to an adult mortality shock, we first probe the
effect of such a shock on human capital formation. The adult mortality rate directly reduces
the survival rate of adults, lowering the probability of high-return events and increasing
the probability of low-return events. Assume the adult mortality shock shifts the entire
distribution to the left8. Suppose the reduction in probability of surviving is the same for
high-quality and low-quality children after the shock, then
4Pr (H) = 4Pr (L) . (11)
We can prove that, since
σH > σL. (12)
the reduction in the mean of high-quality children’s return, mH must be larger than the
low-quality child mL, so that,
mH > mL. (13)
The proof is in the Appendix. The intuition is that a larger variance indicates a bigger
loss in case of pre-mature mortality. When the shock increases the probability of such a
“bad” outcome, the reduction of expected returns must be larger. In this paper we focus
on the case that 4Pr (H) = 4Pr (L), which appears consistent with the HIV/AIDS epi-
8The shock changes the location rather than scale of the distribution of the return of human capital
investment
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demic which does not seem to discriminate across education levels. de Walque (2009) and
Gregson, Waddell, and Chandiwana (2001)) show that the effect of HIV/AIDS epidemic
on adult mortality rate of well-educated people is close to that of poor-educated ones. In
Fortson (2008), educated people are actually more likely to be infected. Although low-
educated people suffer from poor protection and cure of HIV infection, well-educated have
better access to risky sexual behavior (e.g. drug abuse or prostitution). Mishra et al (2007)
suggests that HIV infection is not strongly correlated with status of wealth. Even if the
survival rate is higher for the rich than the poor (e.g., due to access to better treatment),
the costs of cure and care will reduce the return to earlier human capital investment9.
Next, we assume that10
mH = cmL , (14)
and




where a > 0, b > 0, c > 1, and d > 0. The Sharpe ratios before and after the mortality
















9The conclusions will hold in many cases when 4Pr (H) < 4Pr (L).
10To ease the notation, we suppress the time representation "t" in what follows.
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where λBH and λBL represent the before-shock Sharpe ratios for the high and low-quality
kinds, and where λAH and λAL denote the after-shock Sharpe ratios. In what follows we will
consistently use the superscript B (A) to denote before (after) mortality shock variables.
The critical wealth level where parents “switch” from the low to the high-quality offspring










When 4Pr (H) = 4Pr (L), we can prove that cσL − σH > 0, so ŵB < ŵA, which ensures
that after the mortality shock some parents switch from the high to the low-quality child
but not the other way around. The result is summarized as follows,
Proposition 3. When 4Pr (H) = 4Pr (L), the mortality shock will cause poor house-








and the width of










where Dσ = σH − σL. It is easy to verify I is increasing in c and decreasing in both Dσ
and b. The intuition is straight-forward. When a shock diminishes the attractiveness of
high-quality children, some parents will switch from high to low-quality offspring. They
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will re-allocate their investment among risky and risk-free assets.
Figure 3: Sharpe ratios for different individual wealth and effect of mortality shock. λBH (dotted line)
and λBL (solid line) are the Sharpe ratios for high-quality and low-quality children before the mortality
shock. λAH (dash-dotted line) and λ
A
L (dashed line) are the Sharpe ratios for high-quality and low-quality
children after the mortality shock. wB (wA) is the critical individual wealth level for kind-switching before
(after) the mortality shock.
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Figure 4: Fertility responses to adult mortality shock. The solid line represents the fertility choice before
the shock, the case after shock is shown by the dash-dotted line. The poor and rich families will keep their
choice of children’s quality but reduce number. The intermediate families will switch kind from high to
low, then expand family size given quantity-quality tradeoff.
Figure 3 illustrates how kind-switching is affected by the mortality shock. The kind-
switching point (or intersection of the two Sharpe ratios) moves to the right following
the mortality shock, occurring at a greater level of wealth. Hence, after the shock, poor
people will reduce their fertility (reflecting lower attractiveness of investing in children),
and instead invest more in the risk-free asset. Rich people will adopt a similar strategy
in response to the lower expected return of high-quality children. However, as shown in
Figure 4, an intermediately wealthy fraction of the population, who is (almost) indifferent
between kinds, switches its investment strategy in response to the mortality shock and opts
for low-quality offspring rather than the high-quality child. These households will actually
increase their fertility to guarantee the return of their human capital investment11.
11We are aware that in reality, people may be hard to make fertility decision by perfectly following
portfolio theory. So in this paper, we borrow portfolio model only attempting to capture the investment
decision about (risky) human capital, and the responses when people face the rising uncertainty in spending
on children.
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3.2.3 Aggregating Responses to a Shock of Adult Mortality Risks
We now turn to the aggregate fertility response to a mortality shock, paying special
attention to the pivotal role of wealth as a determinant of investments in human capital.
For simplicity, assume wealth in a country is uniformly distributed; w ∈ [w, w̄]. In our
empirical study below, we will measure wealth by income per capita, so country size does
not matter. We can therefore normalize w̄−w to one, so that aggregate wealth of a country




wdw = w̄ − 1
2
. (19)
Hence, there is a one to one correspondence between the upper bound, w̄ and the total
wealth of the country, W . Given the specific functional form in Equation (14) and (15),
we can aggregate total fertility number in a country by integrating number of children in























w2(µH − a− bw)dw







2(µH − a− bw)dw, if w̄ > ŵB + 1.
(20)
This outcome is graphically depicted in Figure 5. Similar to the pattern of fertility
choice at the individual level, we find that as aggregate wealth levels increase, the total
fertility rate (TFR) first increases. All the children are of the low-quality, reflecting that
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the high-quality child is too risky to invest in. However, eventually TFR decreases, as
more and more families switch to high-quality offspring. Given their budget constraint,
those families will reduce their fertility. Finally, for wealthy countries, almost all people
are sufficiently rich to afford high-quality children, and the TFR rises again with aggregate
wealth. These dynamics capture the interplay between the direct income effect (raising
demand for offspring) as well as the indirect effect via kind-switching.
Figure 5: Aggregate fertility for countries with different wealth.
We next consider how an adult mortality shock, such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic, affects
fertility accounting for heterogeneous effects over aggregate wealth levels. Figure 6 shows
aggregate fertility for countries with different levels of wealth, before and after the mortality
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shock. NB and NA, are the TFR of countries before and after the mortality shock. ŴB
and ŴA mark the countries where the TFR starts to fall because of the quantity-quality
tradeoff before and after the shock, respectively.
Figure 6: Aggregate fertility for countries with different wealth before and after the mortality shock.
NB (solid line) and NA (dashed line) are the aggregate fertility before and after the mortality shock. WB
(dotted line) and WA (dash-dotted line) are the critical aggregate wealth levels for kind-switching before
and after the mortality shock.
As shown in the top panel, an adult mortality shock moves the entire fertility distribu-
tion to the right. In the bottom panel we summarize the implications in terms of changes
in fertility (i.e., fertility after the shock minus fertility before the shock). In Sectors P and
Q, people reduce fertility after the shock, reflecting that human capital investment is less
profitable. But in Sector R, fertility increases because of kind-switching. The net effect,
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as shown in the bottom panel, may be positive or negative, depending on wealth levels.
Proposition 4. When mthrel < mL < mthreu , the mortality shock decreases TFR of low-
income countries (Wt < W T ), while increases TFR of high-income countries (Wt ∈[
W T , ŴA
]
).
W T is the turning point, or the intersection point of the TFR curves before and after
the shock in Figure 6. Note mL captures the size of the mortality shock.
The proof of the proposition is in the Appendix. The intuition is that most families in
low-income countries are so poor (and, hence, risk-averse) that they cannot afford the risk
of human capital investment after the shock, so they will reduce their fertility. Families in
richer countries also suffer from the mortality shock, but prefer to increase their fertility
to ensure the return of investment in human capital (which has gone down for each child).
Heterogeneous effects can exist as long as mthrel < mL < mthreu , or that mortality shocks
are neither too small nor too large. If mortality shocks are "too big", even kind-switching
agents will not increase their number of children as income increases because of the ex-
tremely low return on offspring. In contrast, if the shocks are "too small", every agent only
slightly reduces her offspring, regardless of the kind, and kind-switching does not occur.
Based on Proposition 4, we predict the impact of HIV/AIDS on fertility is heteroge-
neous, and varies across samples (when different samples contain countries with different
income levels). Specifically, in samples dominated by lowest-income countries, the mor-
tality shocks lowers the TFR. For example, Durevall and Lindskog (2011) find a negative
association between HIV and fertility in Malawi12. When a more mixed sample is employed,
12Durevall and Lindskog (2011) suggest that the epidemic increases the probability that a young woman
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such as Juhn, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Turan (2013), Kalemli-Ozcan (2012) and Fortson (2008),
the estimation results are either ambiguous or weak. However, samples containing suffi-
cient intermediate income countries may display a positive average treatment effect. For
example, Kalemli-Ozcan and Turan (2011) consider a relatively rich country, South Africa,
and finds a positive effect of HIV prevalence on fertility.
Other models linking mortality to fertility produce ambiguous but no heterogeneous
effects. For example, in Zhang and Zhang (2005), adult mortality risk affects fertility by
reducing life expectancy. Expected life-time consumption is lower after the shock, lowering
parental investment in human capital and fertility. But lower expected consumption also
reduces the motivation to save, freeing up family resources for childbearing (considering
children as consumption goods). Hence, the fertility rate may increase or decrease after
the shock, but neither channel generates heterogeneous effects of mortality on fertility13.
3.2.4 Implications on Economic Growth
Our model helps to understand the impacts of adult mortality on economic transition
and growth. We are not the first to discuss this association. Voth (2013) demonstrate the
role that black death, as a mortality shock, played in triggering industrial revolution and
economic growth. Young (2005) argues that HIV/AIDS epidemic may create a long-term
economic growth, so HIV/AIDS is only a humanitarian disaster, rather than economic
gives birth to her first child, while it decreases the probability to give birth of older women and of women
who have already given birth. However, we think the increased probability of the first child only can be
interpreted as an eagerness to have a child under the threat of HIV/AIDS, as pointed out in Trinitapoli
and Yeatman (2011), rather than an intention to expand family size. Therefore, we take the negative effect
on the fertility of the woman who have given birth as the main result.
13Young (2005) suggests another channel linking mortality to fertility. When adult mortality risks
increase, labor supply falls short of demand, and wage level rises. The opportunity cost of childbearing is
accordingly increasing, so parents prefer to reduce number of children after shock. Note this channel also
does not generate heterogeneous effects.
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disaster. Both papers emphasize that the mortality shock reduces labor supply, and causes
a higher wage level. As a consequences, the shock increases the return to human capital
investment, which guarantees a sustainable economic growth. In this paper, we highlight
another channel through which mortality shock can affect economic growth. While disease
can raise wage level, it also increases uncertainty of investment in children. If children die
from the disease when they grow up, parents will lose all investment but earn nothing.
Therefore, the shock will impede human capital accumulation. This prediction is different
from Young (2005), since poor families will only reduce number of children rather than
switch kind, human capital per child will not be driven up. In the framework of “Unified
growth theory” (Weil and Galor (1999)), the shock may even drag a relatively rich country
back from “Post Malthusian regime” to “Malthusian regime”, which is featured as high
population and low human capital investment. In fact, the association between mortality
risk and economic growth will be clear only when we take both impacts into account.
3.3 Background, Data and Identification
3.3.1 A case of adult mortality shock: The HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa
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Figure 7: Top panel: Median UN projected male age-specific probability of dying 2000-2005 by HIV
prevalence group for 35 countries in Africa with HIV prevalence estimates of 1 percent or greater. Bottom
panel: Median UN projected female age-specific probability of dying 2000-2005 by HIV prevalence group
for 35 countries in Africa with HIV prevalence estimates of 1 percent or greater.
We now test a few important predictions of the model. The HIV/AIDS epidemic in
Africa is used to capture the adult mortality shock. HIV/AIDS not only significantly
increased adult mortality risks (Timaus and Jasseh (2004)), more importantly, it increased
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“morbidity and mortality at those ages where normal levels of morbidity and mortality are
very low” (Barnett and Whiteside (2002)). As shown in Figure 7, HIV/AIDS especially
increases the mortality rate of people from twenty to sixty. The HIV/AIDS crisis is so severe
in many Sub-Saharan African countries that we believe it can affect people’s fertility choice.
Worldwide, more than 30 million people are infected with HIV, and Sub Saharan Africa is
home to about two-thirds of these infected people. The prevalence rate among prime age
workers is high in many African countries. It is estimated that HIV/AIDS killed about 2
million Africans in 2005, and that HIV/AIDS-related mortality has driven a decline in life
expectancy to pre-1970 levels (US Census Bureau, 2005). Third, the HIV/AIDS epidemic
significantly threatens the expected return of human capital investment. As suggested in
Ardington et al (2010), “the deaths (of prime-aged people) have in turn affected both the
children and the parents of those who died... Parents of those infected with HIV are affected
in many ways, including providing care during illness, absorbing direct financial costs of
illness and death, losing financial support, and providing care for orphaned children”.
3.3.2 Data Source and Summary Statistics
Our empirical study is based on data sets of Africa at the country and individual level.
The country-level data cover 44 countries14 in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1975 to 2007. Table
1 summarizes these data. Data on HIV prevalence are from UNData15. Total fertility rate
14They are Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Kinshasa). Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
15http://data.un.org/Default.aspx
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables (Aggregate)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total fertility rate 1,452 5.87 1.17 1.66 8.29
Prevalence of HIV,
total (% of population ages 15-49) 792 5.08 6.25 0.10 27.30
GNI per capita, PPP (constant 2005,
1,000 international $) 843 2.56 3.14 0.29 18.36
School enrollment, primary 1,161 80.74 32.91 13.36 207.73
School enrollment, secondary 907 24.50 18.55 1.65 95.70
School enrollment, primary, female 1,106 73.92 35.18 10.13 168.01
School enrollment, primary, male 1,106 86.55 31.09 16.49 176.91
Mortality rate,
under 5 (per 1,000 live births) 1,342 153.42 63.45 15.60 339.20
Mortality rate,
infant (per 1,000 live births) 1,342 92.64 32.09 13.40 178.80
Urban population
(% of total) 1,353 30.83 15.61 4.00 84.43
Life expectancy at birth,
total (years) 1,353 51.24 7.07 26.82 73.01
Mortality rate, adult,
female (per 1,000 female adults) 456 356.97 116.84 77.54 688.84
Mortality rate, adult,
male (per 1,000 male adults) 456 402.52 99.75 162.71 681.97
and control variables (education16, income and other demographic variables) are from the
World Bank Database17. The mean of total fertility rate is around 6, and the gross income
per capita is less than $3000 on average.
The individual level data are from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). De-
scriptive statistics are reported in Table 2. The data set covers more than 120 thousand
people from 11 countries18. We only employ data collected in DHS V and DHS VI, for
16School enrollment rate can exceed 100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students
because of early or late school entrance and grade repetition.
17http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
18They are Congo (Kinshasa), Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tan-
zania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Key Variables (Individual)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total number of births in the past year 122,488 0.16 0.38 0.00 4.00
Total number of births in the last five years 122,488 0.72 0.86 0.00 8.00
Prevalence of HIV in the region,
total (% of population ages 15-49) 118,239 8.50 7.44 0.30 29.00
Wealth Index 122,483 1.21 10.93 -30.96 87.60
Age 122,488 28.06 9.53 15.00 49.00
Highest year of education 97,949 4.35 2.35 0.00 99.00
Type of place of residence (dummy for urban) 122,488 1.70 0.46 1.00 2.00
Knows someone who has or died of AIDS 61,119 0.50 0.58 0.00 9.00
Knowledge of any contraceptive method 106,170 2.78 0.78 0.00 3.00
Ever use any contraceptive method 106,170 1.50 1.51 0.00 4.00
Knowledge of any method to avoid AIDS 34,128 1.60 2.13 0.00 9.00
Total number of sons who have died 122,488 0.21 0.57 0.00 10.00
Total number of daughters who have died 122,488 0.18 0.52 0.00 8.00
which a wealth index is available. This index is a composite measure of a household’s cumu-
lative living standard, and is calculated using easy-to-collect data on household ownership
of selected assets (e.g., television and bicycles; materials used for housing construction; and
types of water access and sanitation facilities)19. Other variables include fertility choice
in the past year, past five years, HIV prevalence, some demographic variables, and other
HIV/AIDS-related variables, including knowledge about contraceptive methods and about
persons who have died of AIDS, etc.
3.3.3 Empirical Strategy
Our model’s main prediction is that the effect of HIV/AIDS on fertility is heteroge-
neous across income groups. The model also predicts a negative association between adult
mortality risk and human capital accumulation. We will test both predictions.
19Details of the index can be found in DHS Comparative Reports
(http://www.dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/CR6/CR6.pdf).
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Our model predicts the (intermediate) rich will expand the size of their family in re-
sponse to a mortality shock, whereas the poor reduce their number of children.
Hypothesis 1: The effect of HIV/AIDS epidemic is non-monotonic on fertility choice:
while low-income households reduce their fertility, high-income households prefer to have
more children.
We test this hypothesis using country-level data and individual level data. At the
aggregate level, fertility choice is captured by the TFR. The outbreak of HIV was around
1980, but since most HIV-infected people will develop AIDS after about ten years of
infection, we assume the onset of the mortality shock was in 1990 (see also Young (2005)).
As a benchmark, we first estimate the effect of HIV/AIDS on fertility and its association
with income in the following specification,
tftit = β0 + β1Incit × Postt + β2Postt + β3Incit + γ′Xit + βi + ηit + εit (21)
where tftit is the total fertility rate in country i and year t, Postt is the time dummy that
indicates year t is after 1990, Incit is the income level (GNI, per capita). According to our
model, fertility effects of HIV/AIDS are heterogeneous depending on wealth level rather
than income. Due to lack of data of wealth on aggregate level, we have to use income as
a proxy variable to wealth, since in reality, especially on aggregate level, income level is
closely correlated with wealth accumulation.
We assume that HIV affected fertility after 1990, but no earlier. However, because the
effect may only materialize after some delay (or vary over time), we also use a time dummy
for 1995 as a robustness check. Xit is a vector of control variables, such as education (school
68
enrollment, primary and secondary), mortality rate (infant and 5-year)20, residence (urban
or rural) and life expectancy. To control the effect of time trend and heterogeneity across
countries, we introduce countrywide fixed-effect term (βi) and country specific time trend
(ηit).
The specification can be easily transformed to
tftit = β0 + (β1Incit + β2)× Postt + β3Incit + γ′Xit + βi + ηit + εit (22)
where (β1Incit + β2) captures the effect of HIV/AIDS on fertility rate. From Hypothesis
1, we expect β2 < 0, since poor families want to reduce the number of children after the
shock, but as income levels rise, the fall in fertility rate is smaller, or even reversed (so
β1 > 0).
As suggested by Kalemli-Ozcan and Turan (2011) and Kalemli-Ozcan (2012), a mea-
surement error problem may emerge when we simply use a time dummy to capture the
impact of the mortality shock. Hence, as an extension, we employ a “generalized” difference-
in-difference approach, leveraging not only the before-after effect but also controlling
for regional differences in HIV prevalence21. Following Fortson (2009), the effect of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic on fertility and the mediating role of income are estimated as follows,
tftit = β0 + β1Incit ×HIVit × Postt + β2HIVit × Postt + β3HIVit
+β4Postt + β5Incit + γ
′Xit + βi + ηit + εit
(23)
where HIVit is the HIV prevalence in country i and year t, HIV prevalence is defined
as percentage of total population aged from 15 to 49. Prevalence of HIV, total (% of
20According to Zhang (1990), Doepke (2005) and others, infant-child mortality rate controls for the
replacement effect, which can lead to high fertility rates if infant mortality is high.
21Following Fortson (2009), we define the method as a “generalized” difference-in-difference. Although it
is not in a standard form, it keeps the spirit of difference-in-difference approach. Postt controls time trend
before and after 1990, HIVit controls regional differences, and the interaction term captures the treatment
effect.
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population ages 15-49) . The effect of HIV/AIDS on fertility is captured by the coefficient
to the interaction term HIVit × Postt. Similarly, the specification can be transformed to
tftit = β0 + (β1Incit + β2)×HIVit × Postt + β3HIVit + β4Postt
+β5Incit + γ
′Xit + βi + ηit + εit
(24)
so (β1Incit + β2) captures the effect of HIV/AIDS on fertility rate, β2 < 0, while β1 > 0.
We cluster standard errors at regional level22. Since the fertility rate is lower bounded
by zero, we use log form of the dependent variable, and estimate a Tobit model to avoid
potential bias due to censoring. In the specification, countrywide fixed effect and country
specific time trend are both controlled.
Since at aggregate level we cannot control for all relevant factors23, we also use individual-
level data to test Hypothesis 1. Since we do not have data on wealth before 2005, we
can only use cross-section data and estimate the following model,
fertilityirc = κ0 + κ1hivrc × wealthirc + κ2hivrc + κ3wealthirc + φ′xirc +Dc + µirc (25)
where fertilityirc is the number of births of woman i in region r and country c in the
last year (or in the last five years); hivrc is the HIV prevalence in region r and country
c; wealth is the wealth-index; and xirc is a vector of control variables, including some
22Because there may be serial correlation in fertility, a difference-in-differences model may have a ten-
dency to over-reject the null hypothesis of no effect. Clustering the standard errors on the region is one
solution proposed by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004).
23The measurement error and other problems of TFR are discussed in Bongaarts and Feeney (1998).
Furthermore, the composition of aggregate variables is so complex that it may cause ambiguous estimated
results. For instance, the estimation might be biased downward due to high inequality in most African
countries. So we also test the hypothesis by individual-level data.
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demographic variables such as age, highest year of education, type of residence; and other
HIV/AIDS related variables24. Dc represents regional dummies. We use the HIV prevalence
as a measure of adult mortality risks, and (κ1wealthirc + κ2) captures the effect of HIV
prevalence on fertility choice. Our model predicts κ2 < 0 and κ1 > 0.
As robustness check, we cluster standard errors at the regional level, and also estimate
the effect by income group,
fertilityirc = κ0 + κ1hivrc + φ
′xirc +Dc + µirc (26)
We use different approaches to classify households by wealth level. The effect of HIV
prevalence is predicted to be negative for low-income groups, but positive (or at least less
negative) for richer individuals.
3.3.4 Human Capital Investment
We now turn to mortality shocks and investments in human capital. Our model predicts
the poor will reduce their fertility without increasing human capital investment per child.
The relatively rich will reduce human capital investment (the quantity-quality tradeoff).
At the country level, consider the inequality in Africa, we expect a net decrease in human
capital accumulation across all countries, and perhaps particularly in richer countries.
Hypothesis 2: The effect of HIV/AIDS epidemic is negative on the human capital
investment of rich families due to kind-switching, but insignificant for poor families.
24Such as knowledge about any method to avoid AIDS, knowledge about any contraceptive method and
knowledge about someone who has or died of AIDS and ever use any contraceptive method.
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Data limitations imply we cannot test this hypothesis at the individual level. However,
Fortson (2011) provides some evidence at the regional level, and finds that “areas with
higher levels of HIV experienced relatively larger declines in schooling.” This is consistent
with our prediction.
We use school enrollment rate (primary and secondary) as a measure of human capital
investment at the country level. Our model predicts school enrollment will fall in all
countries (but in particular in rich countries). We use a difference-in-difference approach
to explore this issue. Since it takes time for parents to realize the long term effect of
HIV/AIDS epidemic on the returns to human capital, and adjust their fertility, we take
1995 as the time of shock. Following Fortson (2011), we estimate the effect on school
enrollment rate by the following specification.
Schoolit = β0 + β1HIVi,t−5 × Postt−5 + β2HIVi,t−5 + β3Postt−5 + γ′Xit + βi + ηit + εit
(27)
where Schoolit is the primary school enrollment rate in country i and year t. Since we
mainly use primary school enrollment rate, we expect the change in fertility choice will
take around 5 years to impact school enrollment. We use 5-year lagged term of HIVit and
Postit. β1 captures the effect the epidemic on school enrollment. Both fixed effect and
country specific time trends are controlled. As robustness check, we would like to test the
effect on school enrollment by income groups.
The association between the effect and income level can be accordingly estimated by
the following specification,
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Schoolit = β0 + β1Incit ×HIVi,t−5 × Postt−5 + β2HIVi,t−5 × Postt−5
+β3HIVit−5 + β4Postt−5 + β5Incit + γ
′Xit + βi + ηit + εit
(28)
where β1Incit + β2 captures the effect of the epidemic on school enrollment. According to




Table 3 reports the results of our benchmark specification (Equation (21)). Consistent
with our predictions, β1 enters significantly positive and β2 is also significant but negative.
As estimated in Column (1), β2 = −0.386, and β1 = 0.026, both are significant at least in
5 percent level. When evaluated against the standard deviation of the total fertility rate
variable, which is only 1.17, these are “large coefficients.” Taken together, these estimates
indicates a fall in TFR after the mortality shock for most poor countries, but this fall is
attenuated (and eventually reversed) as incomes rise. While the shock’s effect on TFR
is negative for most countries, it turns positive for rich countries such as South Africa,
Mauritius, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea or Botswana. Our estimate of the aggregate TFR
effect is likely an underestimate of the true effect for the relatively rich as within-country
inequality implies that the poor share of the population will reduce their fertility (driving
the aggregate fertility response down). Countrywide fixed-effect term is controlled in Col-
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umn (2). Fixed effects and country-specific time trends are both controlled in Column (3).
The estimation results are both robust. The estimation results are robust when clustering
standard errors (Column (4)). The Tobit model in Column (5) suggests a similar result.
In Table 4 we use a difference-in-difference approach (Equation (23)). The coefficient of
the interaction term Incit×HIVit×Postt is now estimated to be positive. The estimation is
robust to clustering and other correction approaches (Model with fixed effect and country-
specific time trends, and Tobit model). As pointed by Kalemli-Ozcan and Turan (2011),
data on HIV prevalence are missing before 1990, so we cannot estimate the coefficient to
the interaction term HIVit × Postt (β2) due to co-linearity.
Considering it takes time for people to realize the threat of AIDS to adults and human
capital investment, we next employ an alternative year dummy as a robustness check
(Postt). Specifically, we now use 1995 to capture the impact of the mortality shock. Table
5 contains the results of our difference-in-differences approach. Consistent with the results
in Table 4, the estimate of β1, the coefficient to the interaction term Incit×HIVit×Postt,
is around 0.005, still positive and significant at the 1 percent level (Column (1)). The
coefficient to HIVit × Postt, β2 is estimated to be -0.058 (significant and negative). Both
estimations support Hypothesis 1.
We did several additional robustness checks. For example, since both income and
education can be endogenous regressors, we also use lagged terms of both variables as
instrumental variables. The 2SLS estimates provide further robust evidence.
Next we turn to the results of the individual-level regressions based on DHS data.
Table 6 reports the estimation results of Equation (25), where the dependent variable is
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Table 3: Heterogeneous Effects of Mortality Risks on Fertility Choices (Aggregate)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GNI per capita ×
Year after 1990 (dummy) 0.026** 0.025*** 0.044*** 0.044* 0.044***
(0.013) (0.008) (0.012) (0.024) (0.011)
GNI per capita, PPP (constant 2005,
1,000 international $) -0.028** 0.111*** 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.011) (0.016) (0.032) (0.035) (0.030)
Year after 1990 (dummy) -0.386*** -0.289*** -0.304*** -0.304** -0.304***
(0.051) (0.034) (0.037) (0.116) (0.035)
Death rate, crude (per 1,000 people) 0.045*** 0.002 -0.035** -0.035 -0.035**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.035) (0.015)
School enrollment, secondary (% gross) -0.011*** -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.009* -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.008 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Urban population (% of total) 0.003* -0.020*** -0.036*** -0.036** -0.036***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.016) (0.006)
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 0.017* 0.011 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.023) (0.012)
Dependence Ratio 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.059***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003)
Country Fixed-effect NO YES YES YES YES
Country-Specific Time Trend NO NO YES YES YES
AIC 638.288 -173.194 -389.107 -441.107 -309.107
Adjusted R-square 0.899 0.893 0.929 0.934 -
Log likelihood - - - - 229.553
Observations 573 573 573 573 573
Note: 1. Dependent variables are Total fertility rate.
2. Since dependent variable is bounded by zero, a Tobit model is
employed in Column (5).
3. Standard errors are clustered in country level in Column (4).
4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Heterogeneous Effects of Mortality Risks on Fertility Choices (Diff-in-Diff)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GNI per capita × Prevalence of HIV
× Year after 1990 (dummy) 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.005* 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
GNI per capita, PPP (constant 2005,
1,000 international $) -0.010 0.048* -0.078** -0.078 -0.078**
(0.011) (0.025) (0.036) (0.061) (0.032)
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of
population ages 15-49) -0.068*** -0.022*** -0.013** -0.013 -0.013**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005)
Death rate, crude (per 1,000 people) 0.003 0.070*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.137***
(0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.042) (0.014)
School enrollment, secondary (% gross) -0.011*** -0.018*** -0.011*** -0.011 -0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002)
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) 0.003** 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.007 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001)
Urban population (% of total) -0.004*** 0.017** -0.033*** -0.033 -0.033***
(0.001) (0.008) (0.011) (0.031) (0.009)
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) -0.036*** 0.050*** 0.095*** 0.095** 0.095***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.014) (0.035) (0.013)
Dependence Ratio 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.059***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003)
Country Fixed-effect NO YES YES YES YES
Country-Specific Time Trend NO NO YES YES YES
AIC 187.115 -280.579 -671.658 -723.658 -591.658
Adjusted R-square 0.938 0.842 0.948 0.954 -
Log likelihood - - - - 370.829
Observations 370 370 370 370 370
Note: 1. Dependent variables are Total fertility rate.
2. Since dependent variable is bounded by zero, a Tobit model is
employed in Column (5).
3. Standard errors are clustered in country level in Column (4).
4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Heterogeneous Effects of Mortality Risks on Fertility Choices
(Diff-in-Diff, Robustness)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GNI per capita × Prevalence of HIV
× Year after 1995 (dummy) 0.005*** 0.001** 0.003*** 0.003 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
GNI per capita, PPP (constant 2005,
1,000 international $) -0.010 0.042* -0.056* -0.056 -0.056*
(0.010) (0.023) (0.033) (0.056) (0.029)
Year after 1995 (dummy) 0.123*** -0.215*** -0.114*** -0.114* -0.114***
(0.047) (0.040) (0.030) (0.065) (0.027)
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of
population ages 15-49) -0.022*** -0.017** 0.007 0.007 0.007
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005)
Prevalence of HIV ×
Year after 1995 (dummy) -0.058*** 0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
(0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005)
Death rate, crude (per 1,000 people) -0.015 0.054*** 0.085*** 0.085 0.085***
(0.014) (0.020) (0.019) (0.060) (0.017)
School enrollment, secondary (% gross) -0.010*** -0.015*** -0.011*** -0.011 -0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002)
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) 0.003** 0.010*** 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002)
Urban population (% of total) -0.004*** 0.020** -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
(0.001) (0.008) (0.010) (0.029) (0.009)
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) -0.052*** 0.040** 0.052*** 0.052 0.052***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.016) (0.043) (0.014)
Dependence Ratio 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.060***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003)
Country Fixed-effect NO YES YES YES YES
Country-Specific Time Trend NO NO YES YES YES
AIC 151.845 -316.724 -690.763 -742.763 -610.763
Adjusted R-square 0.944 0.858 0.951 0.956 -
Log likelihood - - - - 382.381
Observations 370 370 370 370 370
Note: 1. Dependent variables are Total fertility rate.
2. Since dependent variable is bounded by zero, a Tobit model is
employed in Column (5).
3. Standard errors are clustered in country level in Column (4).
4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
77
the number of births in the last five years. In Column (1), we use OLS to estimate the effect
of HIV prevalence on fertility and its association with wealth. In line with our predictions,
κ1 is positive and κ2 is negative, and both are significant at 1 percent level. Most families
reduce fertility in the presence of the mortality risk imposed by HIV/AIDS, but some rich
families do the opposite. In Column (2) we estimate a Tobit model to avoid censoring
bias, and find the results are consistent. Following Kalemli-Ozcan and Turan (2011), in
Column (3), we estimate a Count Data Model (Poisson distribution), and again the results
confirm our hypotheses. To avoid omitted variable problems and control for inter-region
heterogeneity, we include country dummies in Columns (4-6).
Table 7 shows estimation results by income group. We divide the whole sample into four
groups of equal size. The dependent variable is the number of births in the last year. The
estimated coefficient κ1 = −0.010 for middle-low income group (p < 0.05). For the middle-
high income group, κ1 = −0.009 (p < 0.01). By contrast, κ1 = 0.005 for the top income
group (p < 0.10). The positive coefficient helps to rule out the concern that the effect of
HIV/AIDS is biological, rather than economic. According to Gray et al (1998), “pregnancy
prevalence is greatly reduced in HIV-1-infected women”, so the biological channel cannot
explain the increase in fertility rate when the prevalence of HIV in the community is
higher. The estimated coefficient for the bottom income group is of the right sign but not
significant.
As a robustness check, we replace the dependent variable with the number of births in
the last five years (Table 8). The estimation results are rather consistent with predictions.
Although the effect for the top-income group is not positive, the estimated coefficient is
significantly smaller than coefficients for the other groups. Threatened by the HIV/AIDS
epidemic, therefore, the rich do not increase fertility but appear to adjust the investment
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in human capital per child (see below). Most estimates of individual level are robust to
clustering standard errors at the regional level. But a caveat is important. Data limita-
tions hinder us from addressing potential endogeneity problems when estimating with the
household level data, so the interpretation of the estimated coefficients requires care.
3.4.2 Effect on Human capital accumulation
In Table 9, we regress Equation (28) to test Hypothesis 2. Without controls, in
Column (1), β1 = −0.301 (p < 0.01) and β2 = 0.921 (positive but not significant). Both
estimated coefficients are consistent with our hypotheses. School enrollment in high-income
countries goes down, and the impact in low-income countries is less significant. This em-
pirical pattern does not follow from competing theoretical models. A possible alternative
interpretation for the fall in school enrollment may be the fact that HIV/AIDS induced mor-
tality has made orphans out of many children. The epidemic has altered family structures
in some regions in Africa — turning grandparents in care-givers for their grandchildren
after their adult children have died. In Column (2), we control for the rate of dependency
and other factors, and we found the same pattern with Column (1). Another potential
concern threatening our interpretation of the empirical findings is policy changes around
1990s in the domains of fiscal policy or education. To address this concern, we include
public expenditures on education, countrywide fixed effects as well as country specific time
trend in the model in Column (3) to (5). In Column (4), standard errors are clustered in
country level, and a Tobit model is estimated in Column (5). All these can not change the
signs and significance of β1 or β2, so the estimation results are quite robust and support




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Heterogeneous Effects of Mortality Risks on Fertility Choices
(Individual, by income group)
VARIABLES Bottom Middle low Middle high Top
Prevalence of HIV in the region,
total (% of population ages 15-49) -0.001 -0.010** -0.009*** 0.005*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Age -0.006*** -0.000 -0.002** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Highest year of education 0.008 0.006*** 0.004** 0.000
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Type of place of residence (dummy for urban) 0.020 0.002 0.037*** 0.031*
(0.028) (0.016) (0.012) (0.018)
Knows someone who has or died of AIDS 0.015 -0.006 0.013 0.007
(0.017) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009)
Knowledge of any contraceptive method 0.006 0.030*** 0.037*** 0.016
(0.013) (0.008) (0.011) (0.014)
Ever use any contraceptive method 0.017** 0.024*** 0.029*** 0.029***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Knowledge of any method to avoid AIDS 0.010*** -0.001 0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Total number of sons who have died 0.039** 0.039*** 0.010 0.008
(0.016) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014)
Total number of daughters who have died 0.035** 0.028** 0.033*** 0.055***
(0.017) (0.011) (0.012) (0.017)
AIC 2412.443 5303.903 4628.258 2256.521
Adjusted R-square 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.018
Observations 2,241 5,664 5,058 4,309
Note: 1. Dependent variable is Total number of births in last year.
2. The sample is divided into four groups based on wealth index.
3. Standard errors in parentheses.
4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Heterogeneous Effects of Mortality Risks on Fertility Choices
(Individual, Robustness Check)
VARIABLES Bottom Middle low Middle high Top
Prevalence of HIV in the region,
total (% of population ages 15-49) -0.024** -0.035*** -0.041*** -0.012**
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Age -0.005** 0.010*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Highest year of education 0.012 0.024*** 0.018*** 0.003
(0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Type of place of residence (dummy for urban) 0.060 0.060* 0.118*** 0.101**
(0.061) (0.034) (0.026) (0.040)
Knows someone who has or died of AIDS 0.051 0.001 0.080*** 0.053***
(0.038) (0.017) (0.025) (0.020)
Knowledge of any contraceptive method 0.063** 0.115*** 0.106*** 0.052
(0.029) (0.018) (0.023) (0.032)
Ever use any contraceptive method 0.091*** 0.147*** 0.148*** 0.132***
(0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
Knowledge of any method to avoid AIDS 0.019** 0.009 -0.004 0.008
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011)
Total number of sons who have died 0.211*** 0.198*** 0.189*** 0.120***
(0.035) (0.021) (0.026) (0.032)
Total number of daughters who have died 0.173*** 0.133*** 0.214*** 0.263***
(0.038) (0.024) (0.027) (0.039)
AIC 5981.801 14,206.930 12,751.130 9,389.890
Adjusted R-square 0.047 0.132 0.112 0.100
Observations 2,241 5,664 5,058 4,309
Note: 1. Dependent variable is Total number of births in the last five years.
2. The sample is divided into four groups based on wealth index.
3. Standard errors in parentheses.
4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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In Table 10 we split the sample by income group, attempting to explore the mediating
impact of income. The results indicate that the reduction in school enrollment is observed
for both high-income and low-income groups. No income-group has increased its school
enrollment rate after the shock.
3.5 Conclusion
The inter-twined issues of mortality, fertility and human capital accumulation have been
a prime research area in (development) economics for a long time. In this paper, we seek
to advance this literature by emphasizing the complex effects of a shock in adult mortality
risk on fertility choice and investment in human capital. We approach fertility and human
capital as an optimal investment issue, and focus on the portfolio of assets held by different
types of households. Since adult mortality risks affect the expected return on investments
in human capital, a mortality shock will invite a re-arrangement of the optimal portfolio.
A key result is that the nature of this adjustment process is different for poor and rich
households. Specifically, while enhanced adult mortality will always reduce investment
in human capital for all types of households, we find that the fertility impact depends
on wealth-varying risk attitude. The poor will reduce fertility, and the rich will increase
fertility (substituting high-quality offspring for low-quality but more numerous offspring).
As a consequence, people will lower their spending on childbearing and education due to
increased uncertainty of human capital investment. Possibly adult mortality shock may
slow down economic growth, and even trap an economy in a “Malthusian regime”.
We use cross-country and household data to empirically test these two predictions.
Following previous studies, we use the case of HIV/AIDS in Africa as the relevant mortality
shock. We consistently find (strong) support for our theory: human capital accumulation
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Table 9: The Effect of Mortality Risks on Human Capital Accumulation (Role of Income)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GNI per capita × Prevalence of HIV
× Year after 1995 (dummy, 5-year lagged) -0.301*** -0.241*** -0.148* -0.148* -0.148**
(0.053) (0.070) (0.079) (0.080) (0.065)
Prevalence of HIV ×
Year after 1995 (dummy, 5-year lagged) 0.921 -0.103 0.306 0.306 0.306
(0.586) (0.700) (0.257) (0.332) (0.212)
GNI per capita, PPP (constant 2005,
1,000 international $) 4.533*** 2.161** -1.244 -1.244 -1.244
(0.518) (0.884) (1.955) (5.158) (1.607)
Year after 1995 (dummy, 5-year lagged) 12.002*** 9.264** 0.612 0.612 0.612
(3.399) (4.155) (1.587) (2.047) (1.304)
Prevalence of HIV (5-year lagged) 1.203*** 1.889** 2.433*** 2.433*** 2.433***
(0.453) (0.726) (0.757) (0.776) (0.622)
Public spending on education,
total (% of GDP) -2.616*** -0.724 -0.724 -0.724
(0.747) (0.610) (0.526) (0.502)
Urban population (% of total) -0.331*** -0.297 -0.297 -0.297
(0.114) (1.055) (2.394) (0.866)
Death rate, crude (per 1,000 people) 6.453*** -8.263** -8.263 -8.263**
(1.619) (4.009) (10.307) (3.294)
Total fertility rate -17.486*** 28.759*** 28.759 28.759***
(4.474) (10.027) (17.864) (8.239)
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 3.701*** -2.735 -2.735 -2.735
(0.965) (2.385) (5.197) (1.960)
Mortality rate, infant (per
1,000 live births) -0.296* -0.809*** -0.809*** -0.809***
(0.176) (0.177) (0.186) (0.145)
Dependence Ratio 0.963*** -1.499** -1.499 -1.499***
(0.349) (0.693) (0.932) (0.570)
Country-Specific Time Trend NO NO YES YES YES
Country Fixed-effect NO NO YES YES YES
AIC 3286.254 1717.751 1122.684 1078.684 1184.684
Adjusted R-square 0.279 0.438 0.789 0.828 -
Log likelihood - - - - -527.341
Observations 361 197 197 197 197
Note: 1. Dependent variable is Primary school enrollment.
2. Since dependent variable is bounded by zero, a Tobit model is
employed in Column (5).
3. Standard errors are clustered in country level in Column (4).
4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: The Effect of Mortality Risks on Human Capital Accumulation
(by income group)
VARIABLES Bottom Middle Low Middle Middle high Top
Prevalence of HIV ×
Year after 1995 (dummy, 5-year lagged) -4.778** -0.114 0.200 -2.225** -1.294*
(2.314) (1.482) (0.629) (0.823) (0.618)
Year after 1995 (dummy, 5-year lagged) 9.153 3.702 11.647*** 9.402* 11.871*
(7.970) (7.669) (4.020) (4.712) (6.065)
Prevalence of HIV (5-year lagged) 7.144*** -3.563 1.755 1.272 2.100***
(1.952) (3.488) (2.323) (0.884) (0.630)
GNI per capita, PPP (constant 2005,
1,000 international $) 94.459*** -87.179** -76.067*** -3.279 -0.534
(27.586) (31.751) (19.278) (5.453) (2.707)
Public spending on education,
total (% of GDP) 2.188 1.091 2.489 -2.842*** 5.332***
(3.347) (3.419) (1.975) (0.603) (0.994)
Urban population (% of total) 0.280 0.415 0.740 -1.045*** 0.898*
(0.560) (0.825) (0.464) (0.092) (0.461)
Total fertility rate -21.003*** -12.359 -11.363 6.171 3.272
(6.167) (9.479) (12.592) (6.319) (4.979)
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) -4.061 -5.875 3.793 -5.726*** 3.706***
(2.551) (4.210) (3.226) (0.649) (0.599)
Mortality rate, infant
(per 1,000 live births) -0.610 -2.280** 0.638** -2.922*** 0.997***
(0.492) (1.016) (0.273) (0.330) (0.151)
AIC 277.289 311.215 314.458 334.297 154.848
Adjusted R-square 0.772 0.711 0.694 0.927 0.879
Observations 34 37 43 48 28
Note: 1. Dependent variable is Primary school enrollment.
2. The sample is divided into five groups based on GNI.
3. Standard errors in parentheses.
4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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falls in both rich and poor countries in response to the shock, and we find heterogeneous
effects of adult mortality risk on fertility choice across income groups.
We postulate that this heterogeneous treatment effect explains why existing empirical
work has produced mixed evidence regarding the impact of adult mortality risk on fertility.
Specifically, while some studies find that the HIV/AIDS epidemic has reduced fertility,
others find no significant effect, and yet other studies find that fertility has increased.
These outcomes are consistent with our theoretical predictions, as we would expect the
estimated outcomes of a mortality shock to critically depend on (average) income/wealth
of respondents in the sample that is studied. Samples dominated by rich respondents
produce opposite estimates than samples dominated by low income respondents. Samples
containing both rich and poor respondents are unlikely to produce significant net results
either way.
We believe these context-specific comparative statics speak against a uniform policy
response across the African continent. Taking the income position of specific social groups
into account is a first step towards developing policies that effectively help households to
cope with enhanced mortality risks. Consider the discouraging effect of HIV/AIDS on
human capital accumulation, we also highlight the necessity of more public spending on
education. Lowering the (private) cost of education is one approach to make investment
in high-quality children “less risky”.
3.6 Appendix: proofs
3.6.1 Proof of mH > mL
Assume here are two projects (i.e. kinds of children), and the payoffs follow each normal
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with mean µL = 0 and variance σL. Assume σH > σL. Define the outcome as “good” when
the payoff is positive. Before the shock, the probability of good outcome is 1
2
(halfway of
the distribution). After the shock, assume the reduction in probability of good outcomes
for the high risk project is equal to the reduction for the low risk one, and the shock only
reduces the means, rather than variances (the shape) of the distributions. We expect the
fall in the mean of the high risk project, mH to be bigger than mL. We prove this as
follows.
The reduction in probability of good outcome can be defined as
4Pr (i) = (1− ΦiB (0))− (1− ΦiA (0)) i ∈ {H, L} . (31)























































4Pr (H) = 4Pr (L) . (35)
then
(1− ΦHB (0))− (1− ΦHA (0)) = (1− ΦLB (0))− (1− ΦLA (0)) . (36)
therefore



























σH > σL. (39)
so that
mH > mL. (40)
3.6.2 Existence of Heterogeneous effects
From the top panel of Figure 6, the “transition region” (Q and R) generates the het-
erogeneous effects of the mortality shock. The region also holds the key to empirically test
our model. We now show the condition that the “transition region” and the intersection
point of TFR curves, W T exist.
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Define the "transition region" at the aggregate level as the region between the two
critical wealth levels, ŴB and ŴA, where countries switch from only investing in the low-
quality child to having both kinds of children. We can prove that, as long as the cost
of raising a high-quality child is sufficiently large (relative to low-quality child), w̄ = ŵB.
This implies that the threshold country, before the shock, is the country where the richest
family just prefers high-quality offspring. The proof is as follows.
We first derive the condition for local maxima at w̄ = ŵB before mortality. The number






w2(µL − a− bw)dw. (41)
As any country wealthier than ŴB has both kinds of children, the number of children
associated with ŴB + ∆w is,













w2(µH − a− bw)dw
. (42)
To ensure the local maxima is obtained at w̄ = ŵB, the difference between NB,thre and
NB(ŴB + ∆w) must be negative,













w2(µH − a− bw)dw > 0
. (43)
From the equation above, we have,


















In a similar fashion, one can derive the condition for local maxima at w̄ = ŵA after the
mortality shock:

















Obviously both l1 and l2 are exogenously given. Hence, we impose CH = lCL, where
l > max(l1, l2).
Therefore, as long as
CH > lCL. (48)






, w̄ = ŵB and w̄ = ŵA.
The one-to-one correspondence between the upper bound w̄ and aggregate wealth of












xdx = ŵA − 1
2
. (50)
Since ŵA > ŵB, then ŴA > ŴB, which ensures the “transition region” between ŴB
and ŴA in Figure 6 always exists.
While ŴA > ŴB ensures the existence of a “transition region”, we only find heteroge-
neous fertility effects if NB intersects NA in the “transition region”25. To guarantee the
intersection point W T exists, as shown in Figure 6, a condition should be satisfied. For the
threshold country after the shock, its TFR before the mortality shock (denoted by NB,A)
must be smaller than that after the mortality shock (denoted by NA,thre).















((ŵA)3 − (ŵA − 1)3)− b
4
((ŵA)4 − (ŵA − 1)4)
] . (51)
The value of NB,A depends on the relation between ŵB and ŵA − 1. We can prove that
only if mthrel < mL < mthreu , then NB,A < NA,thre, therefore the intersection of NB and NA
in the “transition region” between ŴB and ŴA can exist. In what follows, we prove the
condition in two cases: ŵB > ŵA − 1 and ŵB ≤ ŵA − 1.
Case 1. ŵB > ŵA−1. There exist mthrel and mthreu such that mthrel < mL < mthreu , which
implies that, to ensure the existence of transition, mortality shocks cannot be
25(As shown in the top panel of Figure 6, TFR before the mortality shock decreases over the interval
[WB , WA], while after the mortality shock fertility increases)
91
too small nor too large. We prove this as follows. In this case, the country with







2(µL − a− bw)dw + 1dCHσ2H
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From Equation 17, we have:
mL = eŵ







a(σH − σL)− σHµL + σLµH
cσL − σH
. (55)
The equation above implies that mL can be expressed as an increasing linear

























(µH − a)− 3e
i1 = 3(e− f)
j1 = 3f − e
























The equation above is a quartic inequality with a negative coefficient of the
highest order term and has a discriminant given by,
∆ = 256g31k
3
1 − 192g21h1j1k21 − 128g21i21k1 + 144g21i1j21k1 − 27g21j41 + 144g1h21i1k21
−6g1h21j21k1 − 80g1h1i21j1k1 + 18g1h1i1j31 + 16g1i41k1 − 4g1i31j21 − 27h41k21
+18h31i1j1k1 − 4h31j31 − 4h21i31k1 + h21i21j21
. (58)
We assume ∆ < 0, which implies that the associated equation has two real roots
and two complex conjugate roots. Thus, we have:
wthrel < ŵ
A < wthreu . (59)
where wthrel and wthreu are the two real roots. The linear relationship between
ŵA and mL ensures that there exist mthrel and mthreu such that,
mthrel < mL < m
thre
u . (60)
Case 2. ŵB ≤ ŵA − 1. There existsmthre such that mL < mthre. Since ŵB ≤ ŵA − 1
ensures that shocks cannot be very small, we only have to rule out that mortality
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shocks are too large. If mortality shocks are "too big", even kind-switching
agents are not willing to increase their offspring due to the low expected return.
We prove as follows. In this case, the country with wealth WA only has high-















((ŵA)3 − (ŵA − 1)3)− b
4
((ŵA)4 − (ŵA − 1)4)
] . (61)
Once again, using the linear relation between mL and ŵA and the condition


















































































The equation is a cubic inequality with a negative coefficient of the highest order
term and has a discriminant given by,
∆ = 18g2h2i2j2 − 4h32j2 + h22i22 − 4g2i32 − 27g22j22 . (64)
We assume ∆ < 0, which implies that the associated equation has one real roots
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and two complex conjugate roots. Thus, we obtain:
ŵA < wthre. (65)
where wthre is only one real root. The linear relation between ŵA andmL ensures
that there exists mthre such that
mL < m
thre. (66)
3.6.3 The dynamic in change of TFR before and after shock
For poor countries (Wt < ŴB), aggregate fertility increases monotonically with aggre-
gate wealth irrespective of whether there are mortality shocks, or not. Moreover, as shown
in the bottom panel, the difference between the number of children after and before the
mortality shock decreases because of the direct mortality effect. The proof is as follows.














2(µL − a− bw −mL)dw
. (67)
Thus, the difference between NB and NA is,
NB −NA = mL
3dCLσ2L
(3w̄2 − 3w̄ + 1). (68)
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It can be easily verified that (NB − NA) is an increasing function of w̄ for w̄ ∈ (0, ŵB].
The difference between NB and NA is not only non-monotonic with wealth, but can be
also (roughly) captured by a quadratic function of wealth.
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4 Who Should I Share Risk with? Gifts Can Tell: The-
ory and Evidence from Rural China1
Abstract: This paper studies how gift exchange may help to overcome limited commit-
ment problem in risk sharing. When efficient contract enforcement is lacking, people rely
on friends (or relatives) to share risk since emotional or moral cost of defaulting between
friends can help to prevent moral hazard. The problem is how to distinguish between
friends and non-friends? Gift expense serves as a signal of friendship since giving a gift
is less costly for a friend than a non-friend due to altruism. The model re-evaluates the
role of gift exchange in developing economies, and helps to rationalize the large amount of
gift exchange in China (10% of living expenditure). As a signal, gift exchange improves
the efficiency in risk sharing and facilitates favor exchange, but I also demonstrate that
the welfare gains due to this improvement may be offset by increased inequality. By us-
ing a unique data set containing detailed records about gift exchange in rural China, the
empirical study suggests gift expenses, as a signal, significantly increase the probability of
risk sharing. I also show further empirical evidence to the theory by testing more model
predictions.
JEL classification: O16, O17, L14, D03
Key words: Gift Exchange, Risk Sharing, Emotional Collateral, Signaling
1I deeply appreciate the supervision and support of Erwin Bulte, Xiaobo Zhang and Peter Kooreman.
Part of this research was done while the author was visiting International Food Policy Research Institute,
which I thank for the hospitality. I thank Anna Dreber Almenberg, Cédric Argenton, Patricio Dalton,
Martin Dufwenberg, Magnus Johannesson, Tobias Klein, Xu Lang, Florian Schuett, Gyula Seres, Eric van
Damme, Gonzague Vannoorenberghe, Jörgen Weibull, Danyang Xie, Yifan Yu and Yu Zhu, for some very
useful comments and discussions, as well as seminar audiences at Tilburg University and Stockholm School
of Economics. Remaining errors are my own. I am indebted and extremely grateful to the International
Food Policy Research Institute and Xiaobo Zhang for granting me access to the data set I am using in
this analysis.
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She throws a peach to me,
I give her a white jade,
Not in return, you see,
But to show friendship made.
—— Gifts, Shi Jing (Classic of Poetry)
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4.1 Introduction
Across the developing world, people face various and severe risks in daily life. These risks
range from diseases and accidents to poor weather conditions and natural disasters. As
a result, risk sharing is an important determinant of household welfare. However, Udry
(1994) and Fafchamps (1999) point out that typically in these regions, due to lack of
written records, collateral or legal procedures to enforce repayments, limited commitment
problem (default) is a main barrier to effective risk sharing. A usual solution is to solve the
problem in the framework of repeated game, specifically, by sanction in future or from other
members of the community. However, consider the economic vulnerability in developing
areas, it might be too risky or costly if people simply count on punishment in future or from
the other people. A natural question will be whether there is any alternative approach to
prevent defaulting.
A possible solution is relying on friends (or relatives). Due to the emotional connection,
friends may endure more emotional or moral cost if they default. So one may suffer less
from limited commitment problem if she shares risk only with friends, who are actually
more trustworthy than others. But a crucial question is how to distinguish a (real) friend,
who has emotional attachment, from those who only pretend to be, particularly when the
benefits involved are large. Regarding the question, some behavioral modes of risk sharing
in China, where “guanxi” (friendship) is much emphasized in social life, may suggest a
mechanism to distinguish friends from non-friends, so that solve the limited commitment
problem in a framework of non-repeated game.
By using recent census survey in 26 natural villages, we can take a close scrutiny on the
the behavior patterns regarding risk sharing in rural China2. Similar to other less developed
regions3, people highly rely on friends and relatives, and most loans are only made between
friends following a reciprocal principle, namely they require no collateral or interest but are
rewarded by expected future help4. However, to highlight the friendship or social distance
2This survey was jointly conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Chi-
nese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS) and Guizhou University.
3where is typically featured as absent of formal opportunities for risk pooling. From the survey, other
than self-financing, the first choice for most people to deal with shortage of cash is to borrow from friends
or relatives. In 2011, only 2% of households borrowed from formal financial institutions.
4In 2011, only 2% of debts required physical collateral.
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between each other, people spend a surprisingly large amount of money on gifts at specific
social events, e.g. wedding, funerals, come-of-age and birth-of-old ceremonies, and many
festivals. On average, more than 10 percent of household expenditures is spent on gifts,
and in some villages this share is around 20 percent. This is consistent with “Peking
University-CITI Group” rural financial investigation data, in which the gift-income ratio
is 8.69%5. Among the gift giving, a large share is directed to close friends (or relatives)
who they count on if in need6.
As we observe, gift expenses play a key role in linking friendship and risk sharing. So
in this paper, I attempt to formulate the underlying mechanism and demonstrate why gift
expenses can help to form a reliable risk sharing group only between friends. Specifically,
the paper aims to addresses three questions. First, why emotional connection between
friends can help to prevent default problem? Second, how can gifts help people to dis-
tinguish between friends and non-friends? Third, what is the welfare implication of the
mechanism?
Regarding the first question, I demonstrate that friends are more reliable and less
likely to default in risk sharing due to the emotional or moral cost of defaulting. The
emotional cost is not only out of altruism, but also because of some relationship-based moral
emotions, such as guilt-aversion. In this paper, guilt-aversion is assumed to be particularly
strong between friends, and can result in a large emotional cost if one defaults to her
friend. Hence, akin to the role of physical collateral, guilt-aversion serves as “emotional
collateral” between friends, which makes them more trustworthy than a random stranger.
As Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) suggests, guilt-aversion may help to regulate limited
commitment problem.
Second, since altruism (or friendship) is not always observable, people need to use a
mechanism to distinguish friends from non-friends. I employ a signaling-game framework
where people interpret gifts as a signal of altruism (friendship). Gift giving is purely a cost
5From summary statistics of “Peking University-CITI Group” rural financial investigation data in Yi,
Zhang, Yang, and Yang (2012).
6 In 2011, the highest single-time gift expense exceeded 1.5 times the average gift for more than 80%
of households. For 20% of the cases, the highest gift exceeded the average gift by a factor of 3.5.
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to non-friends, whereas it is less costly to friends thanks to altruism. I show that gifts can
signal altruism and help individuals identify friends. Accordingly, the level of risk sharing
depends heavily on costly signals, in particular, gift expenses.
The third main result concerns the welfare implications of gift expenses. When society
is equal, gift giving improves welfare through reducing informational asymmetries in risk
sharing. But the situation is more complex in unequal societies, where welfare improve-
ments to the poor may be offset. Compared to a rich non-friend, it is more beneficial for
a poor non-friend to pretend to be a friend, so the poor friend has to spend more on gifts
to compete and distinguish herself. I demonstrate that the competition in gifts may hurt
the poor in an unequal society.
To summarize, I propose that gift expense serves as a signal of altruism and helps to
distinguish friends from non-friends. In equilibrium, friends can form risk-sharing groups
by using “emotional collateral” to reduce default, but the welfare improvement associated
with risk sharing may be offset for the poor by increased inequality. The contribution of
this paper is two-folded. First, the paper is the first to study the interrelation between
gift giving on risk sharing through the perspective of a signaling game. The model helps
to rationalize high gift expenses in some developing countries, and evaluate the efficiency
gain and loss of gift giving. It is worth noticing that in China, the purpose of signaling
friendship (in general, social distance) by gift expenses is to facilitate all kinds of reciprocal
exchange, rather than only risk sharing. I just narrow the focus on risk sharing in this
paper, considering its importance to underdeveloped areas. Second, by using a unique data
set containing detailed gift records in 26 villages in rural China, I provide empirical evidence
by testing three key model predictions. The empirical findings also help to formulate policy
implications.
This paper fits into the recent literature on non-market institutions as a response to
problems of imperfect monitoring and limited enforcement (e.g. Greif (1993)), and is
related to several strands of literature. First, this paper discusses a novel approach to form
risk-sharing groups in the absence of effective contract enforcement. Limited commitment,
in previous literature, is mainly overcome by sanctions such as disrepute or social pressure.
The former solves the problem by repeated interaction (e.g. Coate and Ravallion (1993)
and Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002)). The latter refers to the “social punishments”
101
imposed by members of close-knit communities as “social collateral” (e.g. Udry (1994) and
Ferrara (2003)). However, these mechanisms may be too costly or risky, considering the
vulnerability of the poor in the rural economy.
The role of gift expense in risk sharing is also discussed in Fafchamps (1999) where the
gift is taken as quasi-credit or reciprocal exchange, rather than a signal. In Fafchamps and
Gubert (2007) and Fafchamps and Lund (2003), the correlation between gift giving and
income shocks is based on a data set from the Philippines, and is interpreted as evidence
for the quasi-credit hypothesis (c.f. Fafchamps (1999)). However, as most gifts are not
given to cope with specific income shocks, but rather at festivals or ceremonies, this paper
suggests that gift giving can also serve as a signal in risk sharing7.
Following Foster and Rosenzweig (2001), this paper extends the analysis of altruism
in risk sharing. In particular, it considers the realistic case when altruism is difficult to
observe. This paper is also related to the literature on “impure altruism” (e.g. Andreoni
(1989), Andreoni (1990), Ellingsen and Johannesson (2011) and Hopkins (2014)). One
common feature is the notion of “signaling altruism”. In this paper, I emphasize the role
of “signaling altruism” in overcoming limited commitment and facilitating risk sharing.
As a contribution to theory, “signaling altruism” in this paper is not simply to signal an
intention to reciprocate kind acts, but rather an emotional cost or collateral. Thus, one
can be trusted in risk sharing even if the interest involved is considerable, as long as her
emotional cost of default is sufficiently large. This paper also discusses the downside of
“signaling altruism”. If capabilities or statuses are unequal, “signaling altruism” may cause
efficiency losses to the poor, and worsen inequality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the notion of
gift exchange and its economic and social functions as they emerge from the anthropological
literature and related studies in economics. I pay special attention to gift giving in China.
Section 3 develops the theoretical framework and derives several testable implications from
the model. Section 4 describes the data. In Section 5, I outline the empirical strategy to
address the hypotheses. I present estimation results in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
7Gifts are defined as quasi-credit, when they are directly given as credit to solve difficulties and share
risks.
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4.2 Gift Exchange, Guanxi and Risk Sharing
When discussing risk-sharing network in China, it is inevitable to refer to the term
“guanxi”, the social network built only between close friends. People rely on guanxi, and
spend much time, energy and money on developing and sustaining these networks. A
growing body of literature studies the role that guanxi plays in Chinese social and economic
life: not only in rural areas, as described in Yan (1996), where “residents rely heavily on
their guanxi network for agricultural production, personal financing and...” but also in
urban area, where guanxi affects entrepreneurship, see Yueh (2009), and the labor market
in a transition economy, see Knight and Yueh (2008), Zhang and Li (2003) and Gold,
Guthrie, and Wank (2002). The impact of guanxi cannot be ignored in any field in China.
Guanxi can be taken as a kind of social capital, but “there are important aspects that
set it apart from a generalized notion of social capital” (Gold, Guthrie, and Wank (2002)).
First is that it is “based implicitly on mutual interest and benefit. Once guanxi is recognized
between two people, each can ask a favor of the other with the expectation that the debt
incurred will be repaid sometime in the future (Yang (1994)). In other words, guanxi is
based on friendship, but in nature, it is a kind of reciprocal relationship, which facilitates
risk sharing and favor exchange.
The second distinctive aspect is the importance of affection or sentiment in guanxi. As
Kipnis (1997), “in guanxi, feelings and instrumentality are a totality”, instrumentalism and
sentiment come together, as cultivating guanxi successfully over time creates a basis of
trust in a relationship (Smart (1993)). This trust is based not only on personal sentiment,
but also on moral sentiment.
Thirdly, gift exchange plays a key role in maintaining a guanxi. As Gold, Guthrie, and
Wank (2002) summarize, guanxi is the basis for a particular type of gift economy in China.
In Euro-American ideology, a gift is construed as a pure, disinterested, unconstrained
“present”, which is nothing more than a voluntary, spontaneous expression of the inner
feeling. But when studying the case in China, as pointed out in Yan (1996), such ideology
actually obscures the fact that gift exchange is regulated by many rules and serves to deal
with “relationships that are important but insecure”. In China, gift exchange serves as
an important expressive function, which means the existing status relationship (guanxi)
between giver and receiver determines the types and values of the gift expenses, and the
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gift giving supports this status relationship.
Finally, guanxi depends on people’s statuses, so gift exchanges are not always balanced
or equal between friends, as documented in Yan (1996). People may give more gifts than
they receive, especially the poor, but “where do these excess gifts end up?” In rural areas,
the answer is village cadres and the rich. When the rich or cadres host family ceremonies,
guests have to show respect by presenting gifts, but when the poor or common villagers host
ceremonies, only a few can expect a return gift. There is no doubt that all the patterns in
anthropology are quite inspiring. In the following section, I generalize the concept “guanxi”
to “friendship” based on altruism, and apply the insights into economics.
4.3 The Model
4.3.1 Setup
The model studies the effect of gift expenses on risk sharing in the circumstances where
efficient contract enforcement is lacking. In previous studies, limited commitment in risk
sharing is overcome by punishment such as disrepute or peer pressure in a repeated game.
This model suggests that in a non-repeated game setup, limited commitment problem can
be overcome by “emotional collateral”, which is defined as an emotional cost of betrayal or
cheating to friends. The cost disincentivizes people from default8, so in the First Best case,
people can share between friends risk without any concern, and keep autarky when there
is no “emotional collateral” in between. However, friendship is not perfectly observable in
reality, even in small villages, relationship can change over time. The main contribution
of this model is to prove that, in this case, gifts can facilitate risk sharing by serving as
a signal of friendship. I start the model with the basic setup, and discuss the equilibrium
and efficiency in various occasions in the rest of the section.
Consider a two-player, two-type, multiple-stage game. There are two types of player:
friend and non-friend. Player i is a friend if she is altruistic9 to another player −i, so the
8The nature of collateral is to cause cost to a defaulter. In this sense, guilt to a friend plays a similar
role to physical collateral.
9Altruism is exogenously given in this paper, rather than endogenous to gifts. This is not only for
simplicity, but also because altruism is a result of many factors, such as common experience, common
ideas, similar preferences and so on, rather than simply by gifts.
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utility function of Player 1, for example, is
U1 (c1, c2) = u1 (c1) + µu2 (c2) , µ =
δ, if friend0, if non− friend (1)
where µ is the coefficient of altruism, which equals δ ∈ (0, 1) if Player 1 is a friend,
otherwise zero. u (c1) is the self-interest part of Player 1’s utility function, the rest is the
altruism part10. The utility function of Player 2 is symmetric. Friendship is assumed to be
not necessarily mutual or symmetric11, this assumption allows the possibility that Player
1 is altruistic to Player 2, but Player 2 is purely self-interested. Under the assumption,
type of player is not always a common knowledge, so a non-friend can claim to be a friend
if it is beneficial.
Assume both players are risk-averse, so risk sharing can improve ex-ante efficiency. In
this model, I employ a loss-aversion utility function to capture the risk-aversion preference.
The kinked form of function not only ensures concavity of the utility function, but also
applies better to the reality of developing countries. Specifically, the self-interest part of
Player 1 is
u1 (c1) =
c1, if c1 ≥ hc1 + α (c1 − h) , if c1 < h (2)
where h is the threshold level of subsistence, and α > 0 is the loss-aversion coefficient.
The self-interest part of Player 2 follows the same form. It is easy to prove that the linear
combination of a concave function is still concave, so U1 (c1, c2) and U2 (c1, c2) are both
concave.
10It does not mean the utility of a friend is in nature higher than a non-friend, since in the setup of this
model, utility function is specific to a pair of players. But in reality, Player 1 can be a non-friend to Player
2, but can be a friend to Player 3 or Player 4. Given the same share of friend, q, the utility function of
each player is actually identical.
11For lack of better word, I have to use “friend” here to denote the player who has altruism to the other
player, although in daily life, this term is mainly used to describe a bilateral relationship.
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The structure of the game is as follows.
t












• Stage 1: Nature decides the type of player. The probabilities of friend and non-friend
are q and (1− q). Each player has endowment κ.
• Stage 2: Both players decide whether or not to join a risk sharing group (by a risk-
sharing contract of loans) simultaneously.
• Stage 3: Nature chooses shocks to both players. For simplicity, all kinds of shocks
are considered as income shock. So the incomes of both players are realized in Stage
3. This consists of two elements, a certain part, w; and an uncertain part, which is m
with probability p, and −m with probability (1− p). The income shock is denoted
by εi, i ∈ {1, 2},
εi =
m, with p−m, with 1− p (3)
Once income is realized, a loan is made between players if the contract is signed by
both players. They must maintain autarky as long as any player refuses to sign.
• Stage 4: Players have a certain income, (1 + r)w in this stage. Assume rw = m,
which ensures that borrowers have capacity to repay. Meanwhile, players decide to
default or repay if the loan was made in Stage 3.
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The rule of risk-sharing in the paper follows the income-sharing contract in Genicot
and Ray (2003), Ligon (1998) and Bloch, Genicot, and Ray (2008). Following such a rule,
after realization of income, each player offers a share of income, π to form a risk pooling,
and obtains a certain share from the pooling income. For simplicity, the share is assumed
to 1/2. In the context of this paper, the pooling income is π(w+ε1)+π(w+ε2)
2
, so the income of
Player 1 after sharing is
(1− π) (w + ε1) + π ·
(w + ε1) + (w + ε2)
2
(4)
The income of Player 2 is symmetric. The rule of risk sharing indicates that, when both
players face positive or negative shocks, neither of them will make any loan. Only if Nature
chooses different shocks for each player, the one with positive shock will transfer a certain
amount to the other player in negative shock.
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, I assume π = m
m−κ , so that in nature
it is a problem-solving contract. When players receive different shocks, the one with
positive shock will lend to the other player until the actual income of any player reaches the
threshold level of subsistence. It is worthy of note that the rule of risk sharing is realistic,
since in most cases, we only help friends back to the normal condition, rather than a much
higher level in expense of our utility. Consider no third party enforcing the contract, it
must be self-enforcing.
Assuming κ < m, and the endowment is not sufficiently large to be taken as physical
collateral. So the payoff of Player 1 in each stage is shown as follows,
z11 = w + ε1 + κ+ t21z12 = (1 + r)w, if default happensz12 = (1 + r)w − t21, if no default happens
(5)
where t21 is the net transfer from Player 2 to Player 1. z11 is the income of Player 1 before
Stage 3, and z12 is the income of Player 1 in Stage 4. The income of Player 2 after transfer
follows the same rule. Each player maximizes her expected utility given the other player’s
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strategy. Since the utility function is piecewise linear and µ ∈ [0, 1), the optimal condition
is reached when one player uses up all the income.
To prevent limited commitment problem, we introduce an emotional cost of default
into the model. Such emotional cost can help to regulate default behavior, since it can
result in an emotional loss to the one who defaults. In reality, such emotional cost exists
between people having some specific relationships, such as friends or relatives.
Altruism between friends or relatives can be a source of emotional cost. One would
feel painful if she hurts friends by defaulting. However, the emotional cost will be not
sufficiently large if it is only because of altruism. That is because the parameter of altruism,
δ is smaller than one. It indicates that the emotional cost is always smaller than the benefits
of default.
Other sources can also generate emotional costs, particularly between friends, such as
guilt aversion. As Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007), Battigalli, Charness, and Dufwenberg
(2013) suggest, people feel guilty when they let others down or get hurt, so this moral emo-
tion can help to regulate the moral hazard problem. Similar to altruism, guilt-aversion is
also relationship dependent. Sugato Chakravarty (2011), Morell (2014) and Blum (2009) all
suggest that guilt-aversion is much stronger between friends than with a random stranger.
In reality, this relationship-based preference is not simply out of human nature, but also
fostered by culture and social norms. For example in China, moral code is differential over
social distance. As Fei, Hamilton, and Wang (1992) demonstrated, society in China is
characterized by “chaxugeju”12, which means that most benefits are shared only with a few
close relatives and friends, but the moral code will also differ depending on the closeness
of the friendship or guanxi. Traditional Chinese ethics (in particular, Confucian ethics)
emphasizes the moral code between friends rather than a random stranger, resulting in a
large emotional or moral cost only between friends.
Both sorts of emotional costs help to prevent limited commitment problem between
12The term is to define the differential mode of association (social sphere) in Chinese society.
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friends, as a result, people will prefer to share risk only with friends rather than non-
friends. We model the relationship-based emotional cost as follows. Suppose both players
sign the contract, once the loan is made in Stage 3, the lender (e.g. Player 1) expects to
receive repayment in Stage 4. If the borrower (Player 2) is a non-friend, she will definitely
default because there is no cost of defaulting. However, if the borrower happens to be a
friend of Player 1, she will feel guilty for defaulting, and there will be an emotional cost.
Define the emotional cost of Player 1 as
EC1 = δ (1 + θ) t12 (6)
where EC represents the emotional cost, which is larger than the economic cost t12 as long
as δ (1 + θ) > 1. The emotional cost of Player 2 is symmetric. As defined above, δ is the
parameter to altruism, when it is larger, people may feel more guilty, and the emotional
cost of defaulting is higher. θ decides the level of guilt-aversion, when it is larger, the
emotional cost is higher, so θ is defined as the parameter to guilt-aversion.
4.3.2 First Best
First Best is defined as the case with no informational asymmetry between players,
so type of player is common knowledge. Using backward induction, the decision in Stage
4 determines if the contract is self-enforcing, which is a key to the decision of signing
contract in Stage 2, and players may make different decision about default given their
different types. Assume h = w, we have13
Lemma 1. When θ > θ?, a friend will not default.
Proof: see Appendix. θ? = (1−δ)(m−κ)+αδm
(1+α)δ(m−κ) . From the condition, when θ is sufficiently
13Since I use a loss-aversion utility function, this assumption ensures that the agents have incentive to
share risk. Facing a shock, it is beneficial to share risk since the consumption will be lower than threshold
h.
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large, default is not preferred by a friend. Intuitively, when the emotional cost of defaulting
is sufficiently large, the borrower, as a friend, will feel so guilty that it is better to choose
not to default. Therefore, the contract is self-enforcing, and players do not have to worry
about the default problem if they sign a risk-sharing contract with a friend. The threshold
is determined by δ, the parameter to capture altruism. With δ increasing, the threshold is
smaller and default is less likely between friends.
By contrast, as a non-friend, if the other player decides to sign contract and share risk
with her, she will definitely default. Since a non-friend will never feel guilty, the “emotional
collateral” cannot prevent her from defaulting.









. Given Lemma 1, when θ is larger
than (1−δ)(m−κ)+αδm
(1+α)δ(m−κ) , it is beneficial for a friend to sign contract without the concern of
being defaulted. When θ is larger than [α−1+(1+α)δ](m−κ)+αm
(1+α)(m−κ) , the loss of being defaulted
is larger than benefits of risk sharing, so a friend prefers not to sign the contract with a
non-friend.
As a simple implication of Proposition 1,
Corollary 1. When θ > θ?, (sign, sign) is a Pareto-dominant Nash Equilibrium (NE) if
both players are friends.
Without concerns of being defaulted, a friend prefers to share risk with another friend,
so (sign, sign) can form a Nash Equilibrium. There are some other equilibria if one
player rejects to sign the contract. In this case, risk cannot be shared, so (sign, sign) is
the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. In most cases in previous literature, people are hard
110
to share risk in a non-repeated game setup due to limited commitment, but thanks to
“emotional collateral”, at least friends can share risk between each other.
Proposition 2. If θ > θ̃, A non-friend will sign the contract with a friend, but will not
sign with a non-friend.
Proof: see Appendix. θ̃ = α(2m−κ)
(1+α)(m−κ) . Without “emotional collateral”, a non-friend can
obtain extra benefits by default, but the contract will be rejected by a friend. When θ is
sufficiently large, the loss of being defaulted is larger than the benefit of consumption risk
sharing, so a non-friend will also reject to sign contract with a non-friend.
Therefore, in the First Best case, friends can overcome the limited commitment problem
and share risk with each other. In the non-repeated game setup, only non-friends are hard
to share risk.
4.3.3 Second Best without Gift Exchange
In the First Best case, thanks to complete information, a friend can share risk with
a friend, and can avoid being defaulted by a non-friend. In reality, however, information
is not always complete, and the type of each player is not common knowledge. Suppose
Player 1 only knows her own type, and the probability that Player 2 is a friend, q, her best
strategy will accordingly change.
From Lemma 1, if θ > θ?, a friend will not default, but a non-friend definitely will. If
the share of friends is sufficiently small, it is too risky for a player, no matter a friend or
a non-friend, to sign the risk-sharing contract, since it is very likely to be defaulted by a
non-friend. So in the Second Best case,
Proposition 3. When q < q̃, the only NE is (not sign, not sign) under asymmetric in-
formation.
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q, the share of friends, is sufficiently small, it is very possible to sign the contract with a
non-friend, so both will reject the contract. Compared with the First Best case, apparently
friends appear worse off since they cannot share risk. For non-friends, it is indifferent since
they cannot share risk in either cases.
4.3.4 Second Best with Gift Exchange
As illustrated above, type of friend in reality, who is altruistic, is not perfectly observ-
able. So when q is small, people may have concerns with sharing risks. But without any
risk sharing, people have to suffer from welfare loss of income shocks. In what follows, I
will demonstrate that the problem can be solved by introducing gift expenses to the game.
In this case, game structure is changed as follows.
t















• Stage 1: Nature decides the type of player. The probabilities of friend and non-friend
are q and (1− q). Each player has endowment κ.
• Stage 2: With only the information on her own type, Player 1 and Player 2 decide
whether or not to give a gift simultaneously.
• Stage 3: Based on the result of the gift exchange and the inferred information, both
players decide whether or not to sign a risk-sharing contract of loans simultaneously.
• Stage 4: Nature chooses shocks to both players. For simplicity, all kinds of shocks
are abstracted to income shock. So the incomes of both players are realized in Stage
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4. This consists of two elements, a certain part, w; and an uncertain part, which is m
with probability p, and −m with probability (1− p). The income shock is denoted
by εi, i ∈ {1, 2},
εi =
m, with p−m, with 1− p (7)
Once income is being realized, a loan is made between players if the contract is signed
by both players. They must maintain autarky as long as any player refuses to sign.
• Stage 5: Players have a certain income, (1 + r)w in this stage, assume rw = m which
ensures that borrowers have capacity to repay. Meanwhile, players decide to default
or repay if the loan was made in Stage 4.
The payoff of Player 1 in each stage is as follows,
z11 = w + ε1 + κ+ t21 − g1 + g2z12 = (1 + r)w, if default happensz12 = (1 + r)w − t21, if no default happens
(8)
g1 and g2 are the gifts given by Player 1 and Player 2, respectively. z11 is the income of
Player 1 before Stage 4, and z12 is the income of Player 1 in Stage 5. The payoff of Player
2 is symmetric.
When introducing gift exchange, the game consists of five stages. Using backward
induction, players decide to repay or default in Stage 5. Given the results, they decide
whether or not to sign the contract in Stage 3. Then in Stage 2, players decide whether
or not to offer a gift under informational asymmetry. If friends can be distinguished from
non-friends by the gift, players can only sign contract with friends, and keep autarky if
meeting a non-friend.
Due to asymmetric information, as shown in Proposition 3, players cannot share risk
even though they have “emotional collateral” to each other. In this case, gift expenses can
facilitate risk sharing by telling friends from non-friends, because gift can play as a signal
of friendship (altruism). Since a friend is altruistic, when gifts increase the other player’s
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utility, her own utility also increases. So gifts are always less costly to a friend than a
non-friend.
Suppose both players have belief that
Pr (gift | friend) = 1
Pr (gift | non− friend) = 0
(9)
both friends and non-friends will seek to share risk with a player who wish to give a gift.
However, when friends wish to give a gift and show their type, non-friends also wish to give
gift and pretend to be friends, If the benefits of pretending friends, i.e. the opportunities
of risk sharing and defaulting, are sufficiently high.
Fortunately, gifts are always less costly to a friend than to a non-friend. When a gift
is sufficiently expensive, only friends will give a gift, and non-friends will offer nothing
since the gift is so expensive that the cost of pretending friends cannot be compensated.
On equilibrium, the two types of player will have different strategies, and thus separating
equilibrium can exist. The equilibrium is consistent with the belief that a friend will
give gifts, and a non-friend will not, so the equilibrium is separating Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE), which ensures the revelation of types of both players. As in the First
Best case, friends can form a risk-sharing group with friends, and non-friends have to keep
autarky.
Formally, to have the separating equilibrium, the friend sets g, the gift value, so as to
maximize the expected utility subject to the non-friend’s incentive compatibility constraint.
The value of gift has to fulfill the following conditions:
1. IR condition : Eq (UF (c1, c2, g?)) > Eq (UF (c1, c2, 0))
2. IC condition: Eq (UNF (c2, 0)) > Eq (UNF (c2, g?))
where friend is denoted as f , and non-friend is denoted as nf . The individual rationality
(IR) condition guarantees that it is beneficial for a friend to give a gift and share risk; the
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incentive compatibility (IC) condition ensures a non-friend will prefer to offer nothing and
keep autarky. I then obtain
Proposition 4. Given θ > θ?, q ≤ q? and belief
Pr (gift | friend) = 1






, (0 | non− friend)
)
exists. A friend
would like to offer a gift, g? = qp(1−p)(1+α)(m−κ)
1+(1−p)α , while non-friends offer nothing.
Proof: see Appendix. q? = (1+(1−p)α)
p(1−p)(1+α)(m−κ) . Using Bayes’ rule, if g
? ≥ qp(1−p)(1+α)(m−κ)
1+(1−p)α ,
the belief about the other player’s type can be updated and help in forming a risk-sharing
group. The intuition is shown in Figure 1. When the value of gift is equal to or greater
than g?, only friends can benefit from giving gift. It is noteworthy that the equilibrium
in Proposition 4 is not the only equilibrium, but the least-cost one, which is refined by
intuitive criterion.
Figure 1: Separating equilibrium in a game of gift
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The threshold g? is determined by the share of friends. When q is larger, the value of
g? is higher, since the gift is more likely to be rewarded. However, q has to be smaller than
q?. From IR condition, if q is too large, non-friends have a strong motivation to offer gifts
and pretend to be friends. So the gift value, which can distinguish friends from non-friends
is too high to afford (bigger than κ). In other words, it may be even better for friends to
simply bear the risk of defaulting, which is relatively small.
α also affects the threshold: a non-friend has a greater incentive to spend on gifts when
α is larger, since they have to place considerable weight on risk sharing. Gift competition
will drive the threshold up.
The effect of κ is ambiguous, on the one hand, as κ increases, non-friends moves away
from the subsistence level of consumption, so have lower incentive to pretend to be friends.
On the other hands, they become more capable to pretend to be friends, the total effect on
g? depends on which effect dominates. Due to the form of utility function (kinked form),
the extra κ is always preferred to be consumed directly, rather than spent as a gift in a
risk-sharing group, so g? is decreasing with κ.
As a straightforward implication, in this symmetric case (w = w1 = w2), if the two
players are friends to each other, after gift exchange, there is no actual cost in gifting
ex-post. Because the payment of gifts will be compensated by the received gifts, in this
model, the cost of gift giving only comes from the uncertainty of giving to a non-friend,
who will not give a gift back.
Back to the context of rural China, the model explains why people spend so much money
on gifts, in particular, the gifts to a few certain friends. On each ceremony, especially
wedding ceremonies and funerals, it is quite easy to compare the gift values and evaluate
the closeness of friendship. So ceremonies can be taken as an arena of gift contest where
people talk about the values of gifts, and the information is quite open to every one. In fact,
the equilibrium of gift expense is easy to reach, as sometimes gift givers will communicate
before the ceremony and decide how much to pay.
It is worthy of note that, a gift can be used as a signal only when most people accept
and believe it as a signal. In China, gifts play an important role in facilitating risk sharing
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thanks to the culture of gift exchange. Confucian Culture emphasizes the role of gift ex-
change in connecting members in society, thus compared to other cultures, it is easier for
Chinese to find the possibility of taking gifts as a signal of friendship. When most people
realize the benefits of giving gifts, the mechanism becomes more efficient in distinguish-
ing friends from non-friends. Once gift exchange between friends become a social norm,
everyone has to join the signaling game, otherwise they have to face all kinds of risks alone.
4.3.5 Discussion on Efficiency
To evaluate the welfare effect of the mechanism, based on the analysis above, I compare
the ex-ante efficiencies of the two cases under asymmetric information in this sub-section.
In the case without gift exchange, players have no means to identify friends and non-friends,
but in the case with gift, players can signal their types by giving gifts. If the conditions of
Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 hold, I obtain
Corollary 2. Compared to the Second Best case without gift exchange, ex-ante efficiencies
of both friends and non-friends in the case with gift exchange are improved.
Proof: see Appendix.
Since gift exchange helps to rule out the possibility of being defaulted, friends will no
longer reject sharing risks. Unlike what they choose in the Second Best case without gift
exchange, a friend can share risk with another friend in whom she can trust. Therefore, the
welfare of the friend definitely gets better off in the Second Best case with gift exchange.
It is surprising that, compared with the Second Best case without gift exchange, non-
friends also get better off. Although they still have to maintain autarky in both cases, it
is at least possible for them to receive gifts if the other player is a friend, so the efficiency
is higher.
Corollary 3. Compared to the First Best case, the ex-ante efficiency of friends is worse
off in the case with gift exchange, but ex-ante efficiency of non-friends is better off.
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Proof: see Appendix.
When comparing the Second Best case with gift exchange with the First Best case, the
welfare of the friend is worse off since it is possible for them to give gifts to a non-friend
and have no reward. But for non-friends, it is still possible to get better off. Although
they cannot share risk with them, it is possible for them to get gifts from friends, and the
values of gifts are always considerable.
I conduct further analysis on the ex-post efficiency of the case. If both players are
friends, there is no actual cost of gift giving. When a player gives a gift to another, she will
get a gift back by the same value. If one player is a friend and the other is a non-friend,
there is an actual cost to the friend to signal herself. Therefore, if most friendships are
mutual in reality, the actual cost of giving gifts is actually very low.
Even though friendship is not always a mutual relationship, the actual cost can be also
very low. In reality, the type of each player can be partially revealed by other approaches,
so in many cases, the gift giver knows who is more likely to be her friend. That is why the
approach is considered quite cost-effective.
4.3.6 Costly Signal: Asymmetric Case
Gift expenses, as a signal of friendship, can facilitate risk sharing. In the symmetric
case, when incomes of each player are identical, w1 = w2 = w, the actual cost of the
approach can be quite low, the main cost is the probability to offer gifts to non-friends.
However, in an asymmetric case, for example, w1 > w2, the gift values will not be the
same any more. Even if between friends, gift expenses are more costly to one player than
another.
Suppose Player 1 is richer than Player 2 (w1 > w2), according to the sharing rule, the
income of Player 1 takes a larger share than Player 2 in the income pooling. It indicates
that, Player 1 has to lend more to Player 2 than she can borrow. Formally, when Player 1
is in need, she can only borrow
π
2
· (w2 − w1 + 2m) (10)
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However, when Player 2 is in need, she only has to offer
π
2
· (w1 − w2 + 2m) (11)
Apparently, Player 1 has to lend more but borrow less, so she accordingly has less
incentive to signal her type by giving gift. From another perspective, it is not so beneficial
to pretend to be a friend of Player 2, so the competition pressure on Player 1 is not heavy.
Therefore, Player 1 will not give many gifts.
By contrast, Player 2 can benefit more from the risk sharing. Meanwhile, since everyone
wants to be friend with the rich, Player 2 has heavier competition pressure from non-friends,
so she has more incentive to give gifts. To summarize,






poor friend has to offer a more valuable gift to the rich friend than she gets back, so g1 < g2.
Proof: see Appendix.
Intuitively, for the non-friend with w1, the benefits of risk sharing and defaulting are
lower, but the cost of being defaulted is higher since they have to lend more. Especially
when the share of friends, q is small enough, it is more possible to have no gift back. So
she has less incentive to pretend to be a friend by giving gift. The pressure on the rich
friend is thus less, and she will spend less on gifts.
However, the non-friend with w2 has a greater incentive to spend in the gift competition,
so the poor friend has to spend more to distinguish herself. A straightforward implication is
that inequality may force the poor to spend more on gifts than the rich, so the mechanism
of gift exchange will mitigate the beneficial effect of risk sharing and worsen inequality in
the economy. α is negatively correlated with the threshold, the rich friends may give a
more valuable gift than receive, since they place too much weight on risk sharing.
This extension contributes to understanding why in Yan (1996), the author observed
that the gift exchange is not always balanced or equal between friends in reality. Poor
people give more gifts to the rich or the village cadres than they get back, since the poor
have more competitors, who would like to spend more on gifts to pretend to be friends.
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When the poor host ceremonies, the rich or the cadres may not show up, let alone give
gifts. But the poor will not complain, since they have got or will get more help than they
can offer.
4.3.7 Risk Sharing and Favor Exchange
Risk sharing is one case of reciprocal exchange, so following the same mechanism, the
model can be applied to analyze other types of reciprocal exchange, such as, favor exchange.
In developing areas, the use of cash is limited, and in many other cases, people highly rely on
exchanging favors with friends. For example, in busy seasons (planting or harvest seasons),
people rely heavily on the help from friends. Mutual help also includes taking care of the
sick, irrigating others’ fields in drought seasons, overcoming natural disasters and so on.
As Coate and Ravallion (1993) illustrated, the limited commitment problem does not only
exist in risk sharing, but also in all other kinds of reciprocal exchange. Therefore, by gift
exchange, people facilitate not only risk sharing, but also all other reciprocal exchange in
general.
A natural question is, if friendship is reflected in providing loans or favors to those in
need, why is it necessary to use gifts as a signal? It is because compared with gifts, it
might be too costly to signal type of friend by a favor or loans. For example, any delay
in seeding or harvesting can cause a substantial loss to peasants, particularly when busy
seasons are more or less the same to every household, so it is a big favor to help a friend in
busy seasons in expense of their own job. Certainly it is a costly signal to identify a friend
from a non-friend, but the cost might be too high to afford. Therefore, compared to some
other signals, gift giving is cost effective.
4.4 Data Source
4.4.1 Four-Wave Census Survey
The empirical evidence for the model is drawn from the data set of a census conducted
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in three administrative villages in Guizhou Province, China14. It contains four waves of
census-type household data collected in 3 administrative villages, 26 natural villages in
2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011. The natural villages are both geographically isolated and
ethnically diversified. Local residents know each other well. Most residents’ kinship and
friendship networks are confined to these natural villages. An administrative village con-
sists of several natural villages. More than 20 ethnic groups are living in the area, including
Han, Miao, Buyi, Gelao, and Yi. In total, ethnic minorities comprise about 20 percent of
the population.
The four waves of survey cover more than 800 households. All four waves include de-
tailed information on household demographics, income, consumption, and transfers. Trans-
fers include gifts received and extended. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the three
administrative villages in 2006, 2009 and 2011 15, respectively. The rise in income and
living expenditure reflects the basic trend of economic growth in rural China. The first
administrative village consists of 11 natural villages, but is relatively low in income and
expense. The second is smallest, only has 5 natural villages. The third has ten natural
villages. Since it is a short walk to the county seat, its economic performance is the best
of the three administrative villages.
Records on gift expense in the survey have to be highlighted. Compared to most similar
databases, the records on gift spending in this survey are quite detailed and cover every
household of the three villages. The variables about gifting behavior are not only total gift
expense, times of gift giving, but also average gift expenses of each time. Table 2 provides
summaries about some key variables in the empirical study.
4.4.2 Gift-Exchange Records Collection
In addition to this information, the database also offers a sub-sample with records on
every single item of gifting behavior in the period 2000 to 2009. From those records, it
is easy to identify, in the ten years prior to 2010, how many gifts a household made to
another household, and what the gifts were for. Thanks to the emphases on gift exchange
14The four-round surveys were conducted by International Food Policy Research Institute, the Chinese
Academy of Agricultural Science, and Guizhou University in 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in rural China, the households usually keep records of gifts received on major occasions
over a long period for several reasons (Yan (1996)). In the survey area in Guizhou, almost
all the households kept a gift book, which records the gift exchange on major occasions (i.e.
male members’ wedding, female members’ wedding, funeral, coming-of-age ceremony, child
birth ceremony, and house-moving ceremony), the sub-sample consists of 56 households of
three natural villages.
4.5 Empirical Strategy
This section outlines the strategy to the empirical study regarding the theory. The
key mechanism of the model is that gift expenses can improve risk sharing by serving as a
signal of friendship. So in the following study, I will pay special attention to the empirical
patterns of the mechanism. By using the data on both gift giving and gift receiving, I will
empirically show the impact of gift expenses on risk sharing, and its signaling function.
Moreover, since the association between gift exchange and risk sharing can be also explained
by competing hypotheses, by using the same data set, I would like to further test some
model predictions which are hardly interpreted by alternative theories.
4.5.1 Hypothesis I: Gift Giving and Risk Sharing
According to the model, people spend on gifts for better risk sharing. So in this dynamic
game model, people who spend more on gifts in the first period, are more likely to get help
in the second period, when they face income or consumption shocks. In other words, under
income or consumption shock, people certainly have incentive to borrow from friends, in
order to share the shock and smooth their consumptions. However, they cannot necessarily
obtain any loan, unless they are sufficiently trustworthy. In the model, trustworthiness is
signaled by (previous) gift expenses, so if the theory holds, people who give more gifts
deserve a higher chance of risk sharing. The hypothesis is summarized as follows.
• Hypothesis I : Average gift expenses in last period can increase the probability of
risk sharing in current period, if one has any consumption shock.
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To empirically test the hypothesis, a few issues have to be addressed. First, who has
consumption shock and needs loans? The data set, fortunately, allows me to identify
the people who have consumption shocks. In rural China, the following events can cause
shortage of cash: holding ceremonies, especially wedding ceremony and funeral; natural
disaster; death of livestock; being stolen; tuition and fees for college education and fire
hazard. So I calculate the number of consumption shock for each household, and in what
follows, I will focus on the borrowing behavior of those who suffer from these shocks.
Second, what is an appropriate measure of gift giving if I attempt to capture the impact
of gift expenses? In this study, I measure gift giving of each household by averaging gift
expenses of each time, rather than the total gift expenditure. Since only high-value gift
expenses can play the role of signal, without controlling the times of gift giving, larger total
gift expenses do not necessarily indicate more friends or higher chance of risk sharing.
In fact, I am not the first to argue the association between gift expenses and risk sharing.
Fafchamps (1999) and Fafchamps and Lund (2003) have shed light on this association, but
consider gift expenses as quasi-credit, which can share risk directly. Unlike their argument,
gifts play as a signal in this paper, which can improve risk sharing in future rather than in
current stage. Therefore, I use the lagged term of average gift expenses rather than current
term as an explanatory variable, so as to highlight the dynamic association between gift
expenses and risk sharing.
Third, how to measure the opportunity or capacity of risk sharing? In this study, it is
measured as a dummy variable indicating if a household borrows any new loan in the survey
year. As defined in Fafchamps and Lund (2003), one has shared her risk if some new loans
are made, even if they are not completely16. Hence in a binary choice model, the dummy
variable helps to estimate the probability of getting risk shared with friends. According to
the model I propose, one’s (previous) gift expenses can increase the probability of obtaining
loans if she has any consumption shock.
I will test the hypothesis by regressing the specification as follows.
Debti,t = α0 + α1AGi,t−1 + δ
′Xi,t + εi,t if Casheventi,t > 0 (12)
16Particularly most loan requires no interest or physical collateral, if the loan can be made, it is very
likely based on reciprocal principle, in other words, for the purpose of risk sharing.
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Debti,t is a dummy variable that indicates if there is any new loan that household i borrowed
from friends and relatives in period t. AGi,t−1 is average gift expenses of household i
for each time, Casheventi,t is the number of events that can cause shortage of cash for
household i in period t. Xi,t is a vector of control variables, including income rank in natural
village, household size, per capita household income, share of family member having jobs
outside the county, share of family member having odd jobs in the county seat and some
demographic characteristics of household head. If the theory holds, gift expenses can signal
friendship and improves risk sharing, so that people who gave more gifts in period t − 1,
are more likely to borrow new debt if they are in need in period t. So when I estimate
the specification above only for the sub-sample who have consumption shocks in period t
(Casheventi,t > 0 ), α1 is predicted to be positive and significant.
As a natural concern, there might be endogeneity problem. If people can predict to have
consumption shock, they may give more gifts in previous period, then the regression will
suffer from mutual causality problem. I will solve the problem by narrowing the definition
of consumption shock. As a robustness check, I only focus on those who have funeral;
natural disaster; death of livestock; being stolen; and fire hazard and regress the model
above again. Apparently all the events are hard to predict and assigned randomly.
4.5.2 Hypothesis II: Gift Receiving and Risk Sharing
The first hypothesis provides us a chance to test the basic linkage between gift expenses
and risk sharing. However, this association can also be interpreted by some competing
theories, for example, Hypothesis of Altruism. Suppose friends are always mutual, it will
be not surprising that people who give more gifts can gain more help. So in what follows,
I attempt to provide empirical evidence regarding the signaling function of gift expenses.
In theory, on a separating equilibrium, only friends will signal their type by gifting
(“signaling” gift), and non-friends will not. However in rural China, for simply showing
politeness or keeping basic harmony in community, people have to exchange some low-
value gifts even if the relationship is not so close (Yan (1996)). These “politeness” gifts
pushes up the value of “signaling” gift in reality to a even higher level. If an individual
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wants to distinguish herself from the non-friends, she has to spend much more than the
level of “politeness” gift. So in reality, only high-value gifts can improve risk sharing by
serving as a signal, while low-value gifts cannot do so and may even squeeze the spending
on high-value gifts. If the model holds, given the number of gift giving, those who spend
more on high-value gifts can obtain more help if in need. By contrast, the spending on
low-value gifts cannot improve risk sharing. This heterogeneous impacts of gift expenses
helps us to identify the signaling function.
In the data set, however, we only have detailed records of gifts received rather than gift
giving. So in this empirical study, I will test the heterogeneous effects from the perspective
of gift receiving. The empirical strategy can simply apply to the case of gift receiver. Given
the number of received gift, a larger share of the high-value gifts means more friends, then
an individual may wish to provide more help since she knows the help will be rewarded
sooner or later. However, a larger share of the low-value gifts may have little or even
negative effect on risk sharing, since it may indicate that the household has been isolated
from the risk sharing group in community.
As we have shown above, the data set only has the detailed records (every item of
received gift from each household in each ceremony) of 55 households for 10 years, so I
design the empirical strategy according to the data limitation. First, a household cannot
hold ceremony every year, so there might be only a few or even no gift received in some
years. Hence, I expand the window of observation to 10 years, in order to completely
capture the gifts one can receive from all her friends and accurately calculate the share
of high-value gifts. Second, loans are rarely made in rural China. In fact, there is little
loan made among the 55 households, so new loan cannot be an appropriate measure of risk
sharing. Alternatively, I measure risk sharing with the number of days to help friends in
busy seasons. In busy seasons, such as harvesting seasons or seeding seasons, people have
to finish their jobs in a very limited time, otherwise it may cause a big loss. So help in busy
seasons is an important mean of sharing (potential) risks. However, since the busy season
is almost the same to each household, it is hard for people to help a random stranger in
expense of their own benefits, and people cannot afford any “limited commitment” problem.
Therefore, people will only help friends who are trustworthy, and according to the theory,
the number of days will depend on the share of high-value gifts. Fortunately, the variable
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is available in the data set, among the 55 households, most spend some days to help friends
(5.3 days on average) each year.
Following the empirical strategy, I will test the hypothesis as follows to explore the
heterogeneous effect of gift receiving on sharing friends’ risk.
• Hypothesis II : Given number of received gifts, the share of the high-value gifts has
positive effect on help one would like to offer, whereas the share of the low-value gifts
has negative effect.
The prediction can be tested by using following specifications,
Daysi,t = α0 +
N∑
n=1
αnSGn,i + θT imei + δ
′Xi,t + βi + ηt + εi,t (13)
whereDaysi,t is the number of days that household i offers to help friends in busy seasons in
period t. Since there is no natural criterion to distinguish “signaling” gifts from “politeness”
gifts, I equally divide all the gifts received in a natural village to N groups by value (Group
1 is lowest, and N is highest), SGn,i are the share of gifts which belongs to group n over
all the gifts received by household i from 2000 to 2009. For example, gifts received in a
natural village are equally divided to 5 groups. At least top 20% gifts are quite likely to
be high-value gifts which can serve as signal, whereas bottom 20% gifts are more likely to
be low-value which has no impact on risk sharing. This empirical exercise will focus on
the (heterogeneous) effects of gift received over value groups.
Timei is the number of received gifts from 2000 to 2009. Xi,t is a vector of control
variables, including household size, normalized income rank, log per capita income, days
of busy season, share of family member having jobs outside the county, share of family
member having odd jobs in the county. If Hypothesis II holds, at least the coefficient
to SGN,i is positive and significant, and the coefficient to SG1,i is either insignificant or
negative. To control heterogeneity across households and over time, I include household
and year fixed effects into the specification. As robustness check, I will re-estimate by
using different grouping methods.
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4.5.3 Hypothesis III: Gift Expenses and Income Status
By testing Hypothesis I and II , I attempt to provide empirical evidence to the
signaling function of gift expenses and its impact on risk sharing. To rule out other
competing interpretation, I would like to provide a further evidence by testing Hypothesis
III .
Most models regarding gift behavior predict that rich people will give more gifts to the
poor than they receive (Andreoni (1989), Brown, Bulte, and Zhang (2011) and Ellingsen
and Johannesson (2011)), but the model in this paper predicts that in a pair of friends, the
poor one has to offer more gifts to the rich to signal herself as a friend, since her competitors,
the poor non-friends have more incentive to pretend to be friends. Conversely, it is less
beneficial to pretend to be friends with the poor, so the rich one faces less competition
and does not have to spend so much on gifting. The empirical pattern will be hardly
interpreted by alternative theories, so that provide evidence to the model. The prediction
can be summarized as follows.
• Hypothesis III: In an unequal risk-sharing group, a low-income member will offer
more gifts to a high-income member than the high-income member gives back.
Since the data set is accessible to detailed records of gift giving and receiving among 55
households from 2000 to 2009, I make a matrix of gift giving and receiving among each
other (55× 55) for each year, so that I can find the determinants of gift exchange between
each pair of households, and explore the role of income gap. In this study, I use the
difference of income rank rather than absolute income to measure the income gap, because
in reality, the absolute income may not be perfectly observable, while income rank or status
of income is easier to observe, particularly when the gap is large.
Following Chen, Kanbur, and Zhang (2011) and Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), I employ
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the following specification of a dyadic regression.
Gi,j,t = γ0 + γ1 (zi,t − zj,t) + γ2 (zi,t + zj,t) + δ′Xi,t + θ′Xj,t + βj + εi,j,t (14)
where Gij is the accumulated gift flow from i to j. zi and zj respectively denote the income
status (rank) of the gift giver i and gift receiver j, which is measured by normalized income
ranking. γ1 captures the impact of the gap of income status between giver i and gift receiver
j, then γ2 captures the impact of the level effect of income status. Xi and Xj are other
control variables of household i and j, including difference effects of per capita income,
share of family member having jobs outside the county, share of family member having
odd jobs in the county, household size, education, marriage status and age of household
head between household i and j and the corresponding level effects.
If the prediction holds, γ1 should be negative and significant, which indicates that the
gifts from the rich to the poor on average will be smaller than that from the poor to the
rich.
Since most control variables are only available on 2004, 2006 and 2009, I take data
of these three years to test Hypothesis III . Since a higher gift received may be simply
because the family hold more on social events, I control for the number of social events held
by the gift receiver in 2004, 2006 and 2009. In addition, more gifts may also be due to the
heterogeneity of social events, for example, a family holds more wedding ceremonies than
others, therefore receives more gifts. Thus I control for the number of wedding ceremony
held by a family in the three years.
To control heterogeneity among gift receivers, a fixed effect term is included in specifi-
cation. Since the auto-correlation must exist in dyadic regression (εi,j,t and εj,i,t), standard
errors are clustered in each pair of gift giver and receiver. As a robustness check, I employ
the method in Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) to re-estimate the dyadic regression.
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4.6 Estimation Results
4.6.1 Hypothesis I: Gift Giving and Risk Sharing
Before reporting the estimation results, I first provide a basic pattern regarding the
linkage between gift expense and risk sharing by Figure 2. On natural village level, higher
average gift expenses of each time are positively correlated with average loans for each
consumption shock. The pattern shows a rough relationship between gift expenses and
loans, which provides basic support the Hypothesis I .
Figure 2: Correlation between gift expenses and loan per consumption shock
Table 3 reports the estimation results to the test on the first hypothesis. In column 1,
I run a Probit model with the sample who have consumption shocks without any control
variables. The definition of consumption shock includes all kinds of events that lead to
shortage of cash. The coefficient to AGi is 0.204 and significant at 1 percent level. The
result indicates that people who give more gifts in period t − 1 are more likely to gain
some new loans to smooth their consumption, apparently it provides empirical support to
Hypothesis I .
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More control variables are added in Column 2. The coefficient to AGi,t−1 is 0.147 and
significant at 1 percent level, which provides further empirical support to Hypothesis I .
Given the estimated coefficient, when average gift expenses for each time increases by 100
RMB, the chance of obtaining loans will increase by 1 percent.
To solve the endogeneity problem, in column 3, I run a Probit model again with a
smaller sample. The definition of Casheventi,t covers only funeral; natural disaster; death
of livestock; being stolen; and fire hazard, which are exogenous. The estimated coefficient
to AGi,t−1 is 0.168 and significant (p < 0.05), which indicates that the people under (ex-
ogenous) consumption shock have more incentive to borrow new loan. In line with the
model prediction, the coefficient to AGi,t−1 is also positive and significant (p < 0.05) in
Column (4) when more control variables are added.
4.6.2 Hypothesis II: Gift Receiving and Risk Sharing
Table 4 provides estimation results to the test on Hypothesis II . An individual fixed
effect model (Equation (13)) is estimated in Column 1. The coefficient to the share of
top 20% gifts is 34.532 and significant at 10 percent level, indicating that high-value gifts
received can significantly increase the number of days that one would like to offer to help
friends. By contrast, the received gifts in other value groups have little impact on risk
sharing, the coefficient to any other SGn,i is significant. Given the estimated coefficient,
as the share of top 20% gifts increases by 0.01, the household would like to provide 0.345
days to help friends, given others equal. Consider on average people provide around 5 days
to help friends, the impact is quite significant.
The estimation results are robust when a year fixed effect is added in Column (3).
Only high-value gifts can increase the number of days one is willing to help friends in busy
seasons. Since the dependent variable is lower bounded by zero, a Tobit model is estimated
in Column (2) and (4). After correcting the downwards-bias, the coefficient to the share
of top 20% gifts increases to 282.356 and is significant at 1 percent level in Column (2).
Although the coefficients to the other SGn,i become significant, they are much smaller in
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Table 3: The Effect of Gift Giving on Chance of Risk Sharing
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag term average gift expenses
of each household each time 0.198*** 0.147*** 0.168** 0.101**
(0.057) (0.013) (0.069) (0.043)
Number of events leading to shortage of cash 0.345*** 0.309**
(0.114) (0.143)
Household size -0.029 -0.015
(0.057) (0.057)
Per capita income of each household -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Controls NO YES NO YES
Village fixed effect YES YES YES YES
AIC 627.168 522.026 610.719 513.885
Log likelihood -312.584 -259.013 -304.359 -254.942
Observations 598 519 582 505
Note: 1. Dependent variables are There is any new debt in 2011.
2. A Probit model is employed.
3. Control variables are Normalized per capita income rank,
Head is a party member, Share of family member having
job outside county, Share of family member
having odd job in county, Male head of household (dummy),
Head is village cadre, Marriage status of household head,
Share of family member having chronic disease.
4. The consumption shocks in (1) and (2) consist of ceremonies, natural disasters,
accidents and spending for children’s high education.
5. The consumption shocks in (3) and (4) consist of funerals, natural disasters
and accidents.
6. Standard errors are clustered in administrative village.
7. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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size and even negative. The estimation results suggest that the high-value gifts (top 20%)
provide more incentive of sharing risk than any other kind of gifts, and the estimation
results are robust to the year fixed effect.
As robustness check, I re-estimate the hypothesis by using different grouping methods.
In Table 5, I report the estimation results when gifts received are equally divided to four
groups. The estimation provides further empirical support to Hypothesis II . Both lin-
ear and Tobit model suggest that high-value gifts can significantly improve risk sharing,
whereas low-value gifts has either much smaller effects or negative effects.
4.6.3 Hypothesis III: Gift Expenses and Income Status
To provide further evidence to the model, Table 6 shows the dyadic regression (Equation
(13)) results for Hypothesis III . Column 1 presents a basic regression without control
variables, and the estimation results are in line with the model prediction. The estimated
γ1 is -1.211 and significant at 1 percent level, which indicates that a rich gift giver will
spend less on gifts to a relatively poor gift receiver. In other words, a poor gift giver has
to offer more to the rich receiver. When more control variables are added, the results in
Column 2 are not substantially changed (1.831 and p < 0.01). Since the higher gift income
of the rich is perhaps because they held more wedding ceremonies, I control for times of
wedding ceremonies in Column 3, where the estimation results are still consistent with the
prediction. In Columns 4, the number of other ceremonies and social events are controlled.
The estimated coefficients become smaller to -0.896, but still significant at 10 percent level.
All the results show support to Hypothesis III .
As a robustness check, I employ the method in Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) to re-
estimate. The estimation results are robust, and provide further support for the findings
in Table 617.
17 The unequal flow of gifts between the rich and the poor has been documented in Weerdt and Fafchamps
134
Table 4: The Effect of Gift Receiving on Help Offered (I)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of highest 20% gifts
received in total gifts received 34.532* 282.356*** 33.693* 274.668***
(13.034) (0.202) (15.239) (0.412)
Share of middle high 20% gifts
received in total gifts received 3.837 55.591*** 4.024 54.365***
(10.863) (0.089) (11.687) (0.152)
Share of middle 20% gifts
received in total gifts received -17.760 -155.497*** -21.663* -165.674***
(9.836) (0.151) (9.735) (0.268)
Share of middle low 20% gifts
received in total gifts received 7.156 79.382*** 3.574 67.554***
(16.051) (0.131) (22.457) (0.221)
Number of received gift 0.037 0.290*** 0.031 0.263***
(0.076) (0.001) (0.092) (0.001)
Normalized per capita income
rank (natural village) 0.516 2.526*** -0.134 0.907***
(0.871) (0.034) (1.887) (0.010)
Constant -1.804 -57.572*** -.818 -52.348***
(13.165) (0.041) (16.341) (0.081)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Household fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effect NO NO YES YES
AIC 607.123 428.618 606.093 425.969
Log likelihood - -210.309 - -208.984
Adjusted R-square 0.237 - 0.227 -
Observations 103 103 103 103
Note: 1. Dependent variable is Number of days to help friends and
relatives in busy season.
2. The gifts received in the natural village are divided to five groups
equally. The household may have more friend if they receive
a larger share of high-value gifts.
3. OLS estimations are reported in Column (1) and (3), and Tobit model
estimations are reported in Column (2) and (4), since the dependent
variable is lower bounded by zero.
4. Control variables are Per capita income,
Days of busy season, Share of family member having
job outside county, Share of family member
having odd job in county.
5. Standard errors are clustered in natural village.
6. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: The Effect of Gift Receiving on Help Offered (II)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of highest 25% gifts
received in total gifts received 175.137** 1,057.791*** 147.881** 962.175***
(52.003) (0.085) (47.586) (0.166)
Share of middle high 25% gifts
received in total gifts received 239.765** 1,404.408*** 199.404** 1,265.285***
(79.702) (0.171) (64.868) (0.285)
Share of middle low 25% gifts
received in total gifts received 92.495** 573.010*** 74.376 511.918***
(32.505) (0.097) (39.751) (0.169)
Number of received gift 1.173** 6.895*** 0.988** 6.248***
(0.358) (0.001) (0.313) (0.001)
Normalized per capita income
rank (natural village) 0.516 2.526*** -0.134 0.907***
(0.871) (0.033) (1.887) (0.011)
Constant -210.382** -1275.504*** -175.974** -1155.298***
(65.113) (0.044) (60.218) (0.087)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Village fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effect NO NO YES YES
AIC 607.123 428.618 606.093 425.969
Log likelihood - -210.309 - -208.984
Adjusted R-square 0.237 - 0.227 -
Observations 103 103 103 103
Note: 1. Dependent variable is Number of days to help friends and
relatives in busy season.
2. The gifts received in the natural village are divided to four groups
equally. The household may have more friend if they receive
a larger share of high-value gifts.
3. OLS estimations are reported in Column (1) and (3), and Tobit model
estimations are reported in Column (2) and (4), since the dependent
variable is lower bounded by zero.
4. Control variables are Per capita income,
Days of busy season, Share of family member having
job outside county, Share of family member
having odd job in county.
5. Standard errors are clustered in natural village.
6. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Gift Exchange and Status of Income (Panel Data)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Difference of income rank in natural village -1.211*** -1.831*** -1.514*** -0.896*
(0.299) (0.568) (0.539) (0.542)
Sum of income rank in natural village 1.096** 1.897*** 1.410** 0.775
(0.445) (0.598) (0.604) (0.550)
Difference in times of wedding ceremonies 7.334*** 6.872***
(1.582) (1.534)
Sum of times of wedding ceremonies 8.774*** 8.983***
(1.750) (1.706)
Difference in times of social events 5.422***
(1.034)
Sum of times of social events 5.597***
(0.870)
Controls NO YES YES YES
Fixed effect YES YES YES YES
AIC 66,186.160 46,783.620 46,729.090 46,647.370
Adjusted R-square 0.004 0.018 0.029 0.045
Observations 7,098 5,012 5,012 5,012
Note: 1. Dependent variable is Accumulative gifts from giver to receiver in each year.
2. Control variables are Difference of household size between gift giver and receiver,
Difference of marriage status of household head,
Difference of education of household head,
Difference of share of family member having job outside county,
Difference of share of family member having odd job in county,
Sum of household size between gift giver and receiver
Difference of marriage status of household head,
Sum of education of household head,
Sum of share of family member having job outside county,
Sum of share of family member having odd job in county,
3. Standard errors are clustered within a pair of people who exchange gifts.
4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.6.4 Discussion
I also consider several competing interpretations to the association between gift ex-
penses and risk sharing. First, gift giving may just build a patron-client relationship. Poor
people give gifts to the rich as “insurance fee” and obtain help when they are in need,
meanwhile the gifts from the rich can be simply out of altruism. A similar interpretation
takes gifts as a fee to gain access to favor or credit of the rich. The interpretation implies
that gift expenses will help people to get access to risk sharing, but the empirical findings
in the paper suggest only high-value gifts can affect risk sharing, rather than other kinds.
The pattern is hardly explained by this interpretation, but in line with the model I propose.
Another alternative interpretation is that both gift exchange and risk sharing are just out
of altruism or reciprocity. As a natural implication of the hypothesis, if gift expenses are
just because of altruism, rich people are supposed to give more to the poor than they re-
ceive. However, the empirical pattern I find in data is just opposite. The third competing
interpretation argues that the gift expenses and the amount of loan are correlated because
people borrow money just for giving gifts (under pressure of social norm). However, the
average amount of debt is much larger than gift expenses, for example in 2011, the amount
of debt on average is more than 11000 RMB, but the average gift expenses are only more
than 3000 RMB. Apparently gift spending is not a main use of the loan. There might
be some more alternative interpretations, and I never deny the possibility that gift ex-
penses facilitate risk sharing through other channels, but the empirical evidence suggests
the signaling function plays an important role.
(2011), where gifts are taken as quasi-credit in their paper. The interpretation in this paper can explain
not only the unequal flow, but also other empirical patterns in gift expense and risk sharing.
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Table 7: Gift Exchange and Status of Income (Dyadic Regression)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Difference of income rank in natural village -4.514** -5.981** -5.560* -6.694**
(1.808) (2.684) (2.891) (3.323)
Sum of income rank in natural village 1.178 -2.436* -2.058* -3.415***
(1.471) (1.274) (1.218) (1.188)
Difference in times of wedding ceremonies 3.547 2.803
(2.627) (3.246)
Sum of times of wedding ceremonies -3.056 -2.166
(5.960) (5.309)
Difference in times of social events 3.591 2.155
(3.181) (3.967)
Sum of times of social events -3.399 -1.682
(5.274) (4.409)
Difference in social expenses 0.001*
(0.001)
Sum of social expenses 0.001*
(0.001)
Observations 1,260 1,260 1,260 1,260
Note: 1. Dyadic Regression is run by the method of Fafchamps and Gubert (2007).
2. Dependent variable is Accumulative gifts from giver to receiver
in 2004, 2006 and 2009.
3. Control variables are Difference of household size between
gift giver and receiver, Difference of education of
household head, Difference of income per capita,
Difference of share of family member having job outside county,
Difference of share of family member having odd job in county,
Sum of household size between gift giver and receiver
Sum of education of household head, Sum of income per capita,
Sum of share of family member having job outside county,
Sum of share of family member having odd job in county,
Median of per capita income of sender′s natural village,
Median of per capita income of receiver′s natural village.
4. Dyadic robust Standard errors are in parenthesis.
5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.7 Conclusion
To conclude, this paper makes two contributions. First, it shows how “signaling al-
truism” can overcome limited commitment problem and facilitate risk sharing between
friends. Thanks to the emotional cost of defaulting, people can form self-enforcing risk-
sharing groups only between friends, even though effective contract enforcement is lacking.
However, this reliable risk sharing is not easily formed in reality, since friendship is not
perfectly observable. In this case, gifts can help to distinguish friends from non-friends,
since it is less costly to the friends than the non-friends. When gift is sufficiently expen-
sive, non-friends would have little incentive to pretend to be friends. The model offers
an interpretation to the high gift expense in China. In the absence of efficient contract
enforcement in rural China, gift expenses play an important role in facilitating risk sharing
and mutual help. But the efficiency improvement may be offset by increased inequality.
Second, beyond the theoretical analysis, the paper provides empirical evidence for the
association between gift expenses and risk sharing. Three hypotheses are tested by using
a unique data set from rural China. The estimation results are in line with the predictions
of the model, but different from the patterns predicted by alternative interpretations.
These results have potentially relevant implications from a policy perspective. On the
one hand, we may re-evaluate the role of gifts in China. As a simple, cost-effective and
practical approach, gift exchange helps to facilitate risk sharing and favor exchange in the
absence of efficient contract enforcement. The mechanism may also help to share risk and
improve welfare in other developing countries with similar cultural backgrounds, such as
East or Southeast Asian countries. However, on the other hand, inequality always arises
during economic growth. When the poor bear too much burden of gift giving due to




4.8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 is about the condition under which a friend will not default. The return of
a friend to default is
UF,D (c1, c2) = 2w +m+ δ (2w + 2κ+ (1 + α) (m− θ (m− κ))) (15)
and when she does not default, the return will be
UF,ND (c1, c2) = 2w + κ+ δ (2w + 2m+ κ) (16)
When θ > (1−δ)(m−κ)+αδm
(1+α)δ(m−κ) , U1, D (c1, c2) > U1, ND (c1, c2), so a friend will definitely not
default18.
I would like to prove the condition under which a non-friend will default. The return
of a non-friend to default is UNF, D (c1, c2) = 2w +m, whereas if she does not default, the
return is UNF, ND (c1, c2) = 2w+ κ. Since m > κ, apparently in any case, a non-friend will
default.
4.8.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 is about the best strategy of a friend given the type of the other player.
If information is complete, she will share risk with a friend rather than a non-friend. Given
Lemma 1, when θ > (1−δ)(m−κ)+αδm
(1+α)δ(m−κ) , if the type of the other player is a friend, there will
be no concern of being defaulted, so she would like to sign contract with a friend and share
risk. However, a non-friend will default, so it is quite risky to share risk with a non-friend,
even though risk sharing is still beneficial. The expected return of a friend to sign contract
18The loss-aversion utility function effectively simplifies the problem. An altruistic player has no moti-
vation to lend money, unless the other player’s consumption is lower than subsistence level. An implicit
assumption is made here that, α is sufficiently small that a friend’s optimal share of income in pooling is
smaller than π.
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with a non-friend is
ES (UF (c1, c2)) = p
2 (2w + 2m+ κ) (1 + δ)
+ (1− p)2 (2w + κ− α (m− κ)) (1 + δ)
+p (1− p) [2w + 2κ+ (1 + α) (m− θ (m− κ)) + δ (2w +m)]
+p (1− p) (2w + κ+ δ (2w + 2m+ κ))
(17)
The expected return to not sign is
ENS (UF (c1, c2)) = p
2 (2w + 2m+ κ) (1 + δ)
+ (1− p)2 (2w + κ− α (m− κ)) (1 + δ)
+p (1− p) [2w +m+ κ+ δ (2w + κ− α (m− κ))]
+p (1− p) (2w + κ− α (m− κ) + δ (2w + 2m+ κ))
(18)
When θ > [α−1+(1+α)δ](m−κ)+αm
(1+α)(m−κ) , ENS (UF (c1, c2)) > ES (UF (c1, c2)), that is, the loss of
being defaulted is larger than the benefits of risk sharing, so a friend will not sign the con-








the best strategy of a friend is to share risk with a friend, and reject a non-friend, under
complete information.
4.8.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 is about the best strategy of a non-friend under complete information.
Simply taking Player 1 as an example and given the type of the other player, from Lemma
1, she would like to share risk to a friend, since there is only benefits of risk sharing and
defaulting, and no concern of being defaulted. Note that, to make sure that non-friends will
reject risk sharing due to the risk of being defaulted, I impose an extra cost. Specifically,
when player 1 is being defaulted, her loss is not only economic, i.e. t12, but also emotional.
For simplicity, we assume the emotional cost is equal to θt12. Therefore, if the other player
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is a non-friend, the expected return of a non-friend to sign contract is
ES (UNF (c1)) = p
2 (2w + 2m+ κ)
+ (1− p)2 (2w + κ− α (m− κ))
+p (1− p) (2w +m)
+p (1− p) (2w + 2κ+ (1 + α) (m− θ (m− κ)))
(19)
The expected return to not sign is
ENS (UNF (c1)) = p
2 (2w + 2m+ κ)
+ (1− p)2 (2w + κ− α (m− κ))
+p (1− p) (2w + κ− α (m− κ))
+p (1− p) (2w + 2m+ κ)
(20)
When θ > α(2m−κ)
(1+α)(m−κ) , ENS (UNF (c1)) > ES (UNF (c1)), that is, the loss of being defaulted
is larger than the benefits of risk sharing, so a non-friend will not sign the contract with a
non-friend. So the best strategy of a non-friend is to sign contract with a friend, but reject
a non-friend.
4.8.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3 is about the best strategy of a friend and a non-friend under incomplete
information (Second Best). As a friend, given the share of friends, q, the expected return
to sign the contract is
ES (UF (c1, c2)) = p
2 (2w + 2m+ κ) (1 + δ)
+ (1− p)2 (2w + κ− α (m− κ)) (1 + δ)
+p (1− p) q (2w + 2m+ κ+ δ (2w + κ))
+p (1− p) (1− q) (2w + 2κ+ (1 + α) (m− θ (m− κ)) + δ (2w +m))
+p (1− p) (2w + κ+ δ (2w + 2m+ κ))
(21)
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The expected return to not sign the contract is
ENS (UF (c1, c2)) = p
2 (2w + 2m+ κ) (1 + δ)
+ (1− p)2 (2w + κ− α (m− κ)) (1 + δ)
+p (1− p) [2w +m+ κ+ δ (2w + κ− α (m− κ))]
+p (1− p) (2w + κ− α (m− κ) + δ (2w + 2m+ κ))
(22)
When q < [(1+α)(θ−δ)−(α−1)](m−κ)−αm
[(1−δ)+(1+α)θ](m−κ)−αm , ENS (UF (c1, c2)) > ES (UF (c1, c2)), so that a friend
will reject to share risk under incomplete information.
Similarly, the expected return of a non-friend, simply taking Player 1 as an example,
to sign the contract is
ES (UNF (c1)) = p
2 (2w + 2m+ κ)
+ (1− p)2 (2w + κ− α (m− κ))
+p (1− p) (2w +m)
+p (1− p) (2w + 2m+ κ+ qm)
+p (1− p) (1− q) (κ+ αm− (1 + α) θ (m− κ))
(23)
The expected return to not sign contract is
ENS (UNF (c1)) = p
2 (2w + 2m+ κ)
+ (1− p)2 (2w + κ− α (m− κ))
+p (1− p) (2w + κ− α (m− κ))
+p (1− p) (2w + 2m+ κ)
(24)
When q < [(1+α)(θ−1)−1](m−κ)−αm
[(1+α)θ−1](m−κ)−αm , ENS (UNF (c1)) > ES (UNF (c1)), so that a friend will
reject to share risk under incomplete information. Therefore, when
q < min
{
[(1 + α) (θ − δ)− (α− 1)] (m− κ)− αm
[(1− δ) + (1 + α) θ] (m− κ)− αm
,
[(1 + α) (θ − 1)− 1] (m− κ)− αm
[(1 + α) θ − 1] (m− κ)− αm
}
(25)
, both friend and non-friend will reject to sign the contract and share risk, since it is so
easy to be defaulted.
144
4.8.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 4 is about the Incentive Compatibility (IC) condition and IR (Individual
Rationality) condition when taking gifts as a signal. The IC condition is based on the
decision of a non-friend. The expected return of a non-friend, simply taking Player 1 as
an example, to give gift is
EG (UNF (c1)) = p
2 (2w + 2m+ κ− (1− q) g)
+ (1− p)2 (2w +m− (1 + α) (m− κ)− (1− q) (1 + α) g)
+p (1− p) (2w + 2m+ κ− (1− q) g)
+p (1− p) (2w +m− (1− q) (1 + α) (m− κ+ g))
(26)
The expected return to give no gift is
ENG (UNF (c1)) = p
2 (2w + 2m+ κ+ qg)
+ (1− p)2 (2w +m− (1 + α) (m− κ) + q (1 + α) g)
+p (1− p) (2w + 2m+ κ+ qg)
+p (1− p) (2w +m− (1 + α) (m− κ) + q (1 + α) g)
(27)
When g ≥ qp(1−p)(1+α)(m−κ)
1+(1−p)α , ENG (UNF (c1)) > EG (UNF (c1)), that is, if the gift is expensive
enough, a non-friend would like to give no gift. The least-cost equilibrium
g? =
qp (1− p) (1 + α) (m− κ)
1 + (1− p)α
(28)
Concerning with the IR condition, which ensures it is beneficial for a friend to give a
gift rather than not. The expected return of a friend to give a gift is,
EG (UF (c1, c2)) = p
2 ((1 + δ) (2w + 2m+ κ)− (1− q) (1− δ) g)
+ (1− p)2 (2w + κ− α (m− κ)− (1− q) (1 + α) g)
+ (1− p)2 δ (2w + κ− α (m− κ) + (1− q) (1 + α) g)
+p (1− p) (2w + 2m+ κ+ δ (2w + κ)− (1− q) (1− δ) g − (1− q) δα (m− κ− g))
+p (1− p) (2w + κ+ δ (2w + 2m+ κ)− (1− q) (1− δ) g − (1− q)α (m− κ+ g))
(29)
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The expected return to not give gift is
ENG (UF (c1, c2)) = p
2 ((1 + δ) (2w + 2m+ κ) + q (1− δ) g)
+ (1− p)2 ((1 + δ) (2w + κ− α (m− κ)) + q (1 + α) (1− δ) g)
+p (1− p) (2w + 2m+ κ+ δ (2w + κ− α (m− κ)) + qg − qδ (1 + α) g)
+p (1− p) (2w + κ− α (m− κ) + δ (2w + 2m+ κ) + q (1 + α) g − qδg)
(30)
When g < p(1−p)q(1+δ)α(m−κ)
(1−δ)(1+(1−p)α) = g
??, ENG (UF (c1, c2)) > EG (UF (c1, c2)), that is, a friend
would like to give gift than not give. If δ > 1
2α+1
, g?? > g?, so the separating equilibrium,
g? can exist. The intuition is, when δ, the parameter to altruism is not too small, gift is
not so costly to a friend, then it can be taken as a signal of friendship.
4.8.6 Proof of Corollary 2
For a friend, compare the expected return in the Second Best case with gift (Equation
(29)) with the Second Best case without gift (Equation (22)), the ex-ante welfare of a
friend is better off in the case with gift exchange, since it is possible for them to share risk.
Similarly, for a non-friend, compare the expected return in the case with gift (Equation
(27)) to the case without gift (Equation (24)), apparently the expected return in the case
with gift is higher than without gift. Although in any case, a non-friend cannot share risk,
at least in the case with gift expense, it is possible for them to get a gift from a friend.
Therefore, the ex-ante efficiency is higher for both friends and non-friends in the case with
gift expense than without.
4.8.7 Proof of Corollary 3
Similar to Corollary 2, by comparing the expected returns of a friend in the Second
Best case with gift expense and the First Best case, it is easy to prove that the efficiency in
Second Best case with gift expense is lower than the First Best case. The expected return
in Second Best case with gift expense is shown in Equation (29), and the expected return
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in the First Best, given the share of friends, is shown by
EFB (UF (c1, c2)) = p
2 (2w + 2m+ κ) (1 + δ)
+ (1− p)2 (2w + κ− α (m− κ)) (1 + δ)
+p (1− p) [2w + 2m+ κ+ δ (2w + κ)− (1− q)αδ (m− κ)]
+p (1− p) (2w + κ+ δ (2w + 2m+ κ)− (1− q) δ (m− κ))
(31)
For non-friends, in both the Second Best case with gift and the First Best case, they cannot
share risk and have to maintain autarky, but in the case with gift, it is possible to get gift
if the other player is a friend. Therefore, the ex-ante efficiency of the Second Best case
with gift is higher than the First Best.
4.8.8 Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5 is about the IC condition when w1 > w2. For simplicity and without lack
of generality, assume w1 = w2 + ρ = h + ρ (ρ > 0), and keep the assumption π = m−κm .
Denote on equilibrium, the gift expenses of Player 1 and Player 2 are g1 and g2, respectively.
The expected return of a non-friend with w1 to give gift is
EG (UNF (c1)) = p
2 (2w1 + 2m+ κ− g1 + qg2)
+ (1− p)2
(
2w1 + κ− α (m− κ) + αρ− g1 + qg2 − α (1− q) g1 − (1+α)qρπ2
)
+p (1− p) (2w1 + 2m+ κ− g1 + qg2)
+p (1− p)
(
2w1 + κ+ (1− q)αρ− g1 + qg2 + (2m−ρ)qπ2 − (1− q)α (m− κ+ g1)
) (32)
If the non-friend does not give a gift, the expected return19 will be
ENG (UNF (c1)) = p
2 (2w1 + 2m+ κ+ qg2)
+ (1− p)2 (2w1 +m− (1 + α) (m− κ) + αρ+ q (1 + α) g2)
+p (1− p) (2w1 + 2m+ κ+ qg2)
+p (1− p) (2w1 +m− (1 + α) (m− κ) + αρ+ q (1 + α) g2)
(33)
On equilibrium, the gift expense of Player 1, as a friend, is given by EG (UNF (c1)) =
19It is assumed here that the transfer won’t drag the consumption level of a player who have positive
income shock lower than the subsistence level.
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ENG (UNF (c1)), so
g1 =
p (1− p) (1 + α) q (m− κ)− (1−p)qρπ((1+α)(1−p)+p)
2
− (1− p) qα (pρ+ g2)
1 + (1− p) (1− q)α
(34)
Similarly, the expected return of a non-friend with w2 to give gift is
EG (UNF (c2)) = p
2
(




2w2 + κ− α (m− κ)− g2 + qg1 − α (1− q) g2 + (1+α)qρπ2
)
+p (1− p) (2w2 + 2m+ κ− g2 + qg1)
+p (1− p)
(
2w2 + κ− g2 + qg1 + (2m+ρ)qπ2 − (1− q)α (m− κ+ g2)
) (35)
Whereas the expected return of a non-friend with w2 to not give gift is
ENG (UNF (c2)) = p
2 (2w2 + 2m+ κ+ qg1)
+ (1− p)2 (2w2 +m− (1 + α) (m− κ) + q (1 + α) g1)
+p (1− p) (2w2 + 2m+ κ+ qg1)
+p (1− p) (2w2 +m− (1 + α) (m− κ) + q (1 + α) g1)
(36)
So the equilibrium gift expense of Player 2, as a friend, equals
g2 =





− (1− p) qαg1
1 + (1− p) (1− q)α
(37)
Therefore,















, g1 − g2 is negative. So the poor has to give more give to the
rich than they get back from the rich. When inequality gets more serious, ρ increases, the
gap of gift expenses between the rich and the poor becomes larger.
As a simply extension, if income rise is asymmetric to each player, for example, only
the income of Player 1 increases by ρ. The equilibrium gift expense g1 and g2 can be solved
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by taking g2 in Equation (37) back to g1 in Equation (34). By using Implicit Function








So the income rise of Player 1 will lower the gift expense of Player 1, but raise the gift
expense of Player 2, which can be taken as a kind of gift competition.
4.8.9 Estimation of Dyadic Regression
When I check robustness of the estimation to Hypothesis III , I employ the method
developed in Fafchamps and Gubert (2007). Apparently dyadic observations (observations
in pair) are not independent, so an auto-correlation problem within a pair of observations
has to be solved. Therefore, E [uij, uik] 6= 0 for all k and E [uij, ukj] 6= 0 for all k.
Meanwhile E [uij, ujk] 6= 0 for all k and E [uij, uki] 6= 0 for all k. Given that regressors are
exogenous, simple OLS will provide an inconsistent standard error estimation, leading to
incorrect inference. Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) extends the method in Conley (1999),



























where β denotes the vector of coefficients, N is the number of dyadic observations, K is
the number of regressors, X is the matrix of all regressors, Xij is a vector of regressors
for dyadic observation ij, and mijkl = 1 if i = k, j = l, i = l or j = k, and 0 otherwise.
Reasonably assume E [uij, ukm] = 0, the variance computed by Equation (41) corrects for
possible auto-correlation and heteroskedasticity.
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5 Conclusion
The three chapters in this thesis all aim to uncover the mechanisms that matter for social
welfare in a world full of uncertainty, but are ignored in literature. As these hidden
mechanisms are being revealed, we show that fiscal decentralization can actually reduce
social welfare rather than increase in Chapter 1; we also find the empirical studies regarding
the association between HIV/AIDS and fertility are actually not conflicting if we take
people’s risk attitude into account in Chapter 2; furthermore in Chapter 3, we demonstrate
that the high gift expenses in rural China is not simply a burden: people can form risk
sharing by exchanging gifts, if contract enforcement is lacking in these areas. The analysis
helps us to understand how people behave when they face risk and uncertainty. The
implications of these chapters also help to improve policy design and implementation.
All three papers have contribution to development economics. The second chapter uses
the case of HIV/AIDS prevalence in Africa to study the effect of adult mortality risks.
Both theoretical and empirical analysis in Chapter 3 are about the behavioral pattern of
gift expenses in rural China. Although the empirical study in Chapter 1 is based on data
from the United States, the analysis has important implication for developing countries.
As Mani and Mukand (2007) states, the visibility issue is more serious in developing coun-
tries, since “voter illiteracy, corruption and a lack of transparency are rife there”. Hence,
policy makers should be aware of the negative side of fiscal decentralization. In fact, fiscal
decentralization has been taken as an effective policy tool to improve government efficiency
by many developing countries, but few of them have noticed the structural bias that fis-
cal decentralization may cause. As shown in Caldeira (2012), fiscal decentralization in
China has triggered an intergovernmental competition, and the imbalanced structure of
public expenditure in China has attracted more and more attention in recent research (e.g.
Henglong and Xian (2007)).
Following the three papers, I will continue my study on public economics and devel-
opment economics in the future. By using data from China, I will apply the model in
Chapter 1 to developing countries, and explore the effect of fiscal decentralization when
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the “dress-up contest” is not “from the bottom”, but “from the top”. We will also apply
the theory in Chapter 2 to the case of One Child Policy in China, studying its effect on
human capital accumulation and financial investment. By using the same data set cited
with the third chapter, we explore in a work-in-progress paper, the welfare consequences
of gift exchange, particularly to poor people both theoretically and empirically.
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